In this article, we investigate how the concept of Care Biography and related concepts are understood and operationalised and describe how it can be applied to advancing our understanding and practice of holistic and person-centred care. Walker and Avant\'s eight-step concept analysis method was conducted involving multiple database searches, with potential or actual applications of Care Biography identified based on multiple discussions among all authors. Our findings demonstrate Care Biography to be a novel overarching concept derived from the conjunction of multiple other concepts and applicable across multiple care settings. Concepts related to Care Biography exist but were more narrowly defined and mainly applied in intensive care, aged care, and palliative care settings. They are associated with the themes of Meaningfulness and Existential Coping, Empathy and Understanding, Promoting Positive Relationships, Social and Cultural Contexts, and Self-Care, which we used to inform and refine our concept analysis of Care Biography. In Conclusion, the concept of Care Biography, can provide a deeper understanding of a person and their care needs, facilitate integrated and personalised care, empower people to be in control of their care throughout their life, and help promote ethical standards of care.

Combinatorial thought, or the ability to combine a finite set of concepts into a myriad of complex ideas and knowledge structures, is the key to the productivity of the human mind and underlies communication, science, technology, and art. Despite the importance of combinatorial thought for human cognition and culture, its developmental origins remain unknown. To address this, we tested whether 12-mo-old infants (N = 60), who cannot yet speak and only understand a handful of words, can combine quantity and kind concepts activated by verbal input. We proceeded in two steps: first, we taught infants two novel labels denoting quantity (e.g., \"mize\" for 1 item; \"padu\" for 2 items, Experiment 1). Then, we assessed whether they could combine quantity and kind concepts upon hearing complex expressions comprising their labels (e.g., \"padu duck\", Experiments 2-3). At test, infants viewed four different sets of objects (e.g., 1 duck, 2 ducks, 1 ball, 2 balls) while being presented with the target phrase (e.g., \"padu duck\") naming one of them (e.g., 2 ducks). They successfully retrieved and combined on-line the labeled concepts, as evidenced by increased looking to the named sets but not to distractor sets. Our results suggest that combinatorial processes for building complex representations are available by the end of the first year of life. The infant mind seems geared to integrate concepts in novel productive ways. This ability may be a precondition for deciphering the ambient language(s) and building abstract models of experience that enable fast and flexible learning.

Although nursing seems to understand itself and its practice as complex, the literature is less clear about what this actually means. While complexity is discussed as an attribute of nursing, it is also suggested that complexity in nursing remains misunderstood and poorly articulated, is devalued, is not considered as a measure of health outcomes and remains invisible. Despite the overarching lack of a definition, some nurse scholars have conceptualized complexity as a complex intervention. For these authors, complexity becomes a complex intervention defined as that which is composed of component parts interacting in a variety of ways that influence the delivery of and outcomes of health-related interventions for populations. Conceptualizing complexity as a complex intervention forces nursing to embrace and adopt a received interpretation of complexity as expressed through complexity theory and complexity science. While complexity theory may afford us some tools for thinking about complexity, when we deconstruct nursing complexity to explicitly determinate and quantifiable tasks, this artificially narrowed orientation to complexity reveals an oversimplified explanation of the complexities associated with nursing and serves to blind us to its real qualities. Through a consideration of complexity from a Western philosophical tradition, I demonstrate that when nursing adopts the received interpretation of complexity as a complex intervention, this perspective on complexity contains nursing epistemologically and ontologically. I offer an extended conceptualization of complexity framed upon the consideration that nurses assume complexity and do not reduce it; that nurses have the capacity to not be paralysed by complexity and have developed logics to mobilize it in productive ways. Mobilizing complexity through navigating paradox and contradiction shapes an orientation to complexity that embraces an extended epistemology. This extended epistemology is characterized by a \'yes/and\' mindset that expresses the dynamic and generative relationship between forms of knowledge which reflects complexity that characterizes nursing.

Spelke posits that the concept of \"social agent,\" who performs object-directed actions to fulfill social goals, is the first noncore concept that infants acquire as they begin to learn their native language. We question this proposal on empirical grounds and theoretical grounds, and propose instead that the representation of object-mediated interactions may be supported by a dedicated prelinguistic mechanism.

Spelke\'s What Babies Know masterfully describes infants\' impressive repertoire of core cognitive concepts, from which the suite of human knowledge is eventually built. The current commentary argues for the existence of a core concept that Spelke claims preverbal infants lack: social goal. Core social goal concepts, operative extremely early in human development, underlie infants\' basic abilities to interpret and evaluate entities within the moral world; such abilities support claims for a core moral domain.

Decades of research have pushed us closer to understanding what babies know. However, a powerful approach - representational similarity analysis (RSA) - is underused in developmental research. I discuss the strengths of this approach and what it can tell us about infant conceptual knowledge. As a case study, I focus on numerosity as a domain where RSA can make unique progress.

Spelke\'s sweeping proposal requires greater precision in specifying the place of language in early cognition. We now know by 3 months of age, infants have already begun to forge a link between language and core cognition. This precocious link, which unfolds dynamically over development, may indeed offer an entry point for acquiring higher-order, abstract conceptual and representational capacities.

Central to What Babies Know (Spelke, ) is the thesis that infants\' understanding is divided into independent modules of core knowledge. As a test case, we consider adding a new domain: core knowledge of substances. Experiments show that infants\' understanding of substances meets some criteria of core knowledge, and they raise questions about the relations that hold between core domains.

What Babies Know (WBK) argues that core knowledge has a unique place in cognitive architecture, between fully perceptual and fully conceptual systems of representation. Here I argue that WBK\'s core knowledge is on the perception side of the perception/cognition divide. I discuss some implications of this conclusion for the roles language learning might play in transcending core knowledge.

While Spelke provides powerful support for concept nativism, her focus on understanding concept nativism through six innate core knowledge systems is too confining. There is also no reason to suppose that the curse of a compositional mind constitutes a principled reason for positing less innate structure in explaining the origins of concepts. Any solution to such problems must take into account poverty of the stimulus considerations, which argue for postulating more innate structure, not less.