Historically, biological agents have been used to target various populations. One of the earliest examples could be the catastrophic effect of smallpox in Australia in the eighteenth century (as alleged by some historians). Modern biological techniques can be used to both create or provide protection against various agents of biological warfare. Any microorganism (viruses, bacteria, and fungi) or its toxins can be used as biological agents. Minnesota Department of Health has listed Smallpox (variola major) as a category A bioterrorism agent, even though it has been eradicated in 1980 through an extensive vaccination campaign. Category A agents are considered the highest risk to public health. Laboratory-associated outbreaks of poxviruses could cause unprecedented occupational hazards. Only two WHO-approved BSL-4 facilities in the United States and Russia are allowed to perform research on the variola virus. So, poxviruses present themselves as a classical case of a dual-use dilemma, since research with them can be used for both beneficial and harmful purposes. Although the importance of ethics in scientific research requires no further elaboration, ethical norms assume greater significance during experimentation with poxviruses. In this chapter, we will update the readers on the sensitive nature of conducting research with poxviruses, and how these viruses can be a source of potential biological weapons. Finally, specified ethical guidelines are explored to ensure safe research practices in virology.

This study investigates a real-time handheld bioaerosol monitoring system for the detection of biological particles using UV-LED and light-induced fluorescence technology. Biological particles produce both scattering and fluorescence signals simultaneously, which can help distinguish them from general particles. The detected scattering, fluorescence, and simultaneous signals are then converted into photon signals and categorized based on predetermined criteria. A reliable biological particle generator was required to validate the performance of the system. This study explores the use of an M13 bacteriophage as a virus simulant of biological agents and employs a customized inkjet aerosol generator to produce M13 bacteriophage aerosols of a specific size by controlling the concentration of M13. We confirmed that micro-sized, narrowly dispersed M13 aerosols were efficiently generated. Additionally, we confirmed the performance of this real-time handheld bioaerosol monitoring system by detecting viruses.

To investigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the strategic decisionmaking of leaders with respect to biological weapons, this study employed a prospective simulation technique called Asynchronous Strategic Dynamics Red Teaming. Using an immersive, multimedia simulation conducted remotely and asynchronously, the effort engaged 240 carefully selected and curated expert participants in either biological weapons or the countries of interest (as well as 60 naïve participants). Across our sample of 30 countries, simulated interest in pursuing some type of biological weapons program (defensive or offensive) remained low to moderate. While such interest increased after the simulated onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, it was limited overall, with only a handful of states showing salient increases in offensive biological weapon interest. When directly referencing why their countries might have changed their post-COVID-19 interest in biological weapons, the most commonly cited reasons were: (1) COVID-19 demonstrated the power of biological weapons to disrupt societies and cause large-scale economic harm, and (2) the pandemic revealed either the state\'s own or its rivals\' vulnerability to diseases like COVID-19, as well as an inability to efficiently respond and contain such diseases. In sum, despite a global pandemic with massive consequences, the simulation revealed that most states are not likely to dramatically change their strategic posture regarding pursuit of offensive biological weapons.

Bacterial cells often suffer a fitness cost after conjugative plasmids\' entry because these cells replicate slower than plasmid-free cells. Compensatory mutations may appear after tens of or a few hundred generations, reducing or eliminating this cost. A previous work based on a mathematical model and computer simulations has shown that plasmid-bearing cells already adapted to the plasmid may gain a fitness advantage when plasmids transfer into neighboring plasmid-free cells because these cells are still unadapted to the plasmid. These slow-growing transconjugants use fewer resources, which can benefit donor cells. However, opportunities for compensatory mutations in transconjugants increase if these cells become numerous (through replication or conjugation). Moreover, transconjugants also gain an advantage when transferring the plasmid, but the original donors may be too distant from conjugation events to gain an advantage. To understand which consequence prevails, we performed further computer simulations allowing versus banning transfer from transconjugants. The advantage to donors is higher if transconjugants do not transfer plasmids, mainly when donors are rare and when the plasmid transfer rate (from donors) is high. These results show that conjugative plasmids are efficient biological weapons even if the transconjugant cells are poor plasmid donors. After some time, conjugative plasmids gain other host-benefit genes, such as virulence and drug-resistance.

BACKGROUND: Recent news points to the eventuality of an armed conflict on the national territory.
BACKGROUND: In this situation, pulmonologists will in all likelihood have a major role to assume in caring for the injured, especially insofar as chest damage is a major cause of patient death.
CONCLUSIONS: The main injuries that pulmonologists may be called upon to treat stem not only from explosions, but also from chemical, biological and nuclear hazards. In this article, relevant organizational and pedagogical aspects are addressed. Since exhaustiveness on this subject is unattainable, we are proposing training on specific subjects for interested practitioners.
CONCLUSIONS: The resilience of the French health system in a situation of armed conflict depends on the active participation of all concerned parties. With this in mind, it is of prime importance that the pneumological community be sensitized to the potential predictable severity of war-related injuries.

Developments in science and technology improve health and wellbeing of humankind, for example with better methods to detect and treat diseases. However, some advances have led to the development of weapons of mass destruction: chemical and biological weapons. Although banned by international treaties, chemical weapons have been used in recent years in assassinations and the Syrian civil war. Additionally, biological weapons became the subject of recent suspicions and allegations. While not limited to these fields, the so-called dual-use potential-the possibility to apply aspects both with benevolent or malevolent intentions-is especially pronounced in the life sciences. Here, we showcase some areas explored at the conference series Spiez CONVERGENCE that facilitates an exchange between science, arms control and international security. Together, these communities discuss the potential impact of life scientific advances on the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions. Enabled by digital technologies, DNA sequencing and synthesis provide the toolbox to (re)construct viruses and cells, which demonstrated invaluable during the COVID-19 pandemic but bear the misuse risk to allow intentionally triggering an outbreak. Open databases and algorithms could be used to generate new chemical weapons. We argue that preventing unintended consequences of life science research while promoting its benefits with responsible science, requires awareness and reflection about unexpected risks of everyone involved in the research process. The strength of the ban of chemical and biological weapons also depends on scientists interacting with policy makers in evaluating risks and implementing measures to reduce them.

Biological weapons have been used for thousands of years, but recent advances in synthesis technologies have made peptide and protein toxin production more accessible and pose a threat to biosecurity worldwide. Natural toxins such as conotoxins, certain hemolytic compounds, and enterotoxins are peptide agents that can be synthesized in an environment with weak biosecurity measures and rudimentarily weaponized for limited use against smaller targets for lethal or nonlethal effects. Technological advances are changing the threat landscape around biological weapons and potentially facilitating a shift from state sponsored to more micro-level threats stemming from terror cells, insider threats, and lone wolf attacks. Here, we present the reader with an overview of the threat of peptide and protein toxins, provide examples of potent peptide toxins, and introduce capabilities of a proposed biosecurity program utilizing artificial intelligence that unifies commercial nucleotide and peptide synthesis vendors.

The twenty-first century has witnessed an increasing confluence of rapidly advancing science and its embodiment in practical technologies, an extensive global diffusion of the knowledge and capabilities associated with those developments, and a seemingly unending shift in the international security environment. The scope and intensity of these interactions in the life sciences have generated concern about security risks stemming from possible misuse. This lecture focuses on one of the key emerging life science technologies of concern, gene synthesis, and considers how the new risks and challenges it poses for governance can best be managed.

This article discusses the contingencies and complexities of CRISPR. It outlines key problems regarding off-target effects and replication of experimental work that are important to consider in light of CRISPR\'s touted ease of use and diffusion. In light of literature on the sociotechnical dimensions of the life sciences and biotechnology and literature on former bioweapons programs, this article argues that we need more detailed empirical case studies of the social and technical factors shaping CRISPR and related gene-editing techniques in order to better understand how they may be different from other advances in biotechnology-or whether similar features remain. This information will be critical to better inform intelligence practitioners and policymakers about the security implications of new gene-editing techniques.

We report for the first time the efficient use of accelerated solvent extraction (ASE) for extraction of ricin to analytical purposes, followed by the combined use of sodium dodecyl sulfate-polyacrylamide gel electrophoresis (SDS-PAGE), Matrix-assisted laser desorption/ionization time-of-flight mass spectrometry (MALDI-TOF MS), and MALDI-TOF MS/MS method. That has provided a fast and unambiguous method of ricin identification for in real cases of forensic investigation of suspected samples. Additionally, MALDI-TOF MS was applied to characterize the presence and the toxic activity of ricin in irradiated samples. Samples containing ricin were subjected to ASE, irradiated with different dosages of gamma radiation, and analyzed by MALDI-TOF MS/MS for verification of the intact protein signal. For identification purposes, samples were previously subjected to SDS-PAGE, for purification and separation of the chains, followed by digestion with trypsin, and analysis by MALDI-TOF MS/MS. The results were confirmed by verification of the amino acid sequences of some selected peptides by MALDI-TOF MS/MS. The samples residual toxic activity was evaluated through incubation with a DNA substrate, to simulate the attack by ricin, followed by MALDI-TOF MS/MS analyses.