PDF(Pubmed)
Abstract：
Developments in science and technology improve health and wellbeing of humankind, for example with better methods to detect and treat diseases. However, some advances have led to the development of weapons of mass destruction: chemical and biological weapons. Although banned by international treaties, chemical weapons have been used in recent years in assassinations and the Syrian civil war. Additionally, biological weapons became the subject of recent suspicions and allegations. While not limited to these fields, the so-called dual-use potential-the possibility to apply aspects both with benevolent or malevolent intentions-is especially pronounced in the life sciences. Here, we showcase some areas explored at the conference series Spiez CONVERGENCE that facilitates an exchange between science, arms control and international security. Together, these communities discuss the potential impact of life scientific advances on the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions. Enabled by digital technologies, DNA sequencing and synthesis provide the toolbox to (re)construct viruses and cells, which demonstrated invaluable during the COVID-19 pandemic but bear the misuse risk to allow intentionally triggering an outbreak. Open databases and algorithms could be used to generate new chemical weapons. We argue that preventing unintended consequences of life science research while promoting its benefits with responsible science, requires awareness and reflection about unexpected risks of everyone involved in the research process. The strength of the ban of chemical and biological weapons also depends on scientists interacting with policy makers in evaluating risks and implementing measures to reduce them.
摘要：
科学技术的发展改善了人类的健康和福祉，例如用更好的方法来检测和治疗疾病。然而,一些进展导致了大规模毁灭性武器的发展:化学和生物武器。虽然被国际条约禁止，近年来，化学武器被用于暗杀和叙利亚内战。此外,生物武器成为最近怀疑和指控的主题。虽然不限于这些领域，所谓的双重用途潜力-具有仁慈或恶意意图的应用方面的可能性-在生命科学中尤其明显。这里,我们展示了在会议系列中探索的一些领域SpiezCONVERGENCE，以促进科学之间的交流，军备控制和国际安全。一起,这些社区讨论了生命科学进步对《化学和生物武器公约》的潜在影响。通过数字技术实现，DNA测序和合成为（重新）构建病毒和细胞提供了工具箱，这在COVID-19大流行期间表现出无价，但有滥用风险，允许故意引发疫情。开放的数据库和算法可用于生成新的化学武器。我们认为，防止生命科学研究的意外后果，同时促进其与负责任的科学的好处，需要了解和反思参与研究过程的每个人的意外风险。禁止化学武器和生物武器的力度还取决于科学家与政策制定者互动，评估风险并实施减少风险的措施。
