A resurgence of panpsychism and dualism is a matter of ongoing debate in modern neuroscience. Although metaphysically hostile, panpsychism and dualism both persist in the science of consciousness because the former is proposed as a straightforward answer to the problem of integrating consciousness into the fabric of physical reality, whereas the latter proposes a simple solution to the problem of free will by endowing consciousness with causal power as a prerequisite for moral responsibility. I take the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) as a paradigmatic exemplar of a theory of consciousness (ToC) that makes its commitments to panpsychism and dualism within a unified framework. These features are not, however, unique for IIT. Many ToCs are implicitly prone to some degree of panpsychism whenever they strive to propose a universal definition of consciousness, associated with one or another known phenomenon. Yet, those ToCs that can be characterized as strongly emergent are at risk of being dualist. A remedy against both covert dualism and uncomfortable corollaries of panpsychism can be found in the evolutionary theory of life, called here \"bioprotopsychism\" and generalized in terms of autopoiesis and the free energy principle. Bioprotopsychism provides a biologically inspired basis for a minimalist approach to consciousness via the triad \"chemotaxis-efference copy mechanism-counterfactual active inference\" by associating the stream of weakly emergent conscious states with an amount of information (best guesses) of the brain, engaged in unconscious predictive processing.

Hypnosis has sometimes been described as an \"altered state of consciousness,\" but what is \"unaltered\" consciousness? We approach the issue by first exploring the sense of free will, because it can be lost during hypnosis. However, the argument is developed that free will is an illusion, so should not be present in the waking state. Thus, in a sense, hypnosis is a more accurate state of consciousness. The sense of free will is shown to result from an experience of agency, which is often missing in hypnosis. We consider how hypnotic, illusory perceptions are developed, and plausible processes are discussed, but none throws clear light upon what the philosopher David Chalmers called the \"hard problem\" of consciousness. The paper concludes with a brief evaluation of the possibility that phenomenal consciousness is associated with feedback loops, which transform the simple registering of stimuli into experiences of which we are aware.

The concept of free will has challenged physicists, biologists, philosophers, and other professionals for decades. The constrained disorder principle (CDP) is a fundamental law that defines systems according to their inherent variability. It provides mechanisms for adapting to dynamic environments. This work examines the CDP\'s perspective of free will concerning various free will theories. Per the CDP, systems lack intentions, and the \"freedom\" to select and act is built into their design. The \"freedom\" is embedded within the response range determined by the boundaries of the systems\' variability. This built-in and self-generating mechanism enables systems to cope with perturbations. According to the CDP, neither dualism nor an unknown metaphysical apparatus dictates choices. Brain variability facilitates cognitive adaptation to complex, unpredictable situations across various environments. Human behaviors and decisions reflect an underlying physical variability in the brain and other organs for dealing with unpredictable noises. Choices are not predetermined but reflect the ongoing adaptation processes to dynamic prssu½res. Malfunctions and disease states are characterized by inappropriate variability, reflecting an inability to respond adequately to perturbations. Incorporating CDP-based interventions can overcome malfunctions and disease states and improve decision processes. CDP-based second-generation artificial intelligence platforms improve interventions and are being evaluated to augment personal development, wellness, and health.

It is generally assumed that verbal communication can articulate concepts like \'fact\' and \'truth\' accurately. However, language is fundamentally inaccurate and ambiguous and it is not possible to express exact propositions accurately in an ambiguous medium. Whether truth exists or not, language cannot express it in any exact way. A major problem for verbal communication is that words are fundamentally differently interpreted by the sender and the receiver. In addition, intrapersonal verbal communication - the voice in our head - is a useless extension to the thought process and results in misunderstanding our own thoughts. The evolvement of language has had a profound impact on human life. Most consequential has been that it allowed people to question the old human rules of behavior - the pre-language way of living. As language could not accurately express the old rules, they lost their authority and disappeared. A long period without any rules of how to live together must have followed, probably accompanied by complete chaos. Later, new rules were devised in language, but the new rules were also questioned and had to be enforced by punishment. Language changed the peaceful human way of living under the old rules into violent and aggressive forms of living under punitive control. Religion then tried to incorporate the old rules into the harsh verbal world. The rules were expressed in language through parables: imaginary beings - the gods - who possessed the power of the old rules, but who could be related to through their human appearance and behavior.

The relationship between consciousness and individual agency is examined from a bottom-up evolutionary perspective, an approach somewhat different from other ways of dealing with the issue, but one relevant to the question of animal consciousness. Two ways are identified that would decouple the two, allowing consciousness of a limited kind to exist without agency: (1) reflex pathways that incorporate conscious sensations as an intrinsic component (InCs), and (2) reflexes that are consciously conditioned and dependent on synaptic plasticity but not memory (CCRs). Whether InCs and CCRs exist as more than hypothetical constructs is not clear, and InCs are in any case limited to theories where consciousness depends directly on EM field-based effects. Consciousness with agency, as we experience it, then belongs in a third category that allows for deliberate choice of alternative actions (DCs), where the key difference between this and CCR-level pathways is that DCs require access to explicit memory systems whereas CCRs do not. CCRs are nevertheless useful from a heuristic standpoint as a conceptual model for how conscious inputs could act to refine routine behaviors while allowing evolution to optimize phenomenal experience (i.e., qualia) in the absence of individual agency, a somewhat counterintuitive result. However, so long as CCRs are not a required precondition for the evolution of memory-dependent DC-level processes, the later could have evolved first. If so, the adaptive benefit of consciousness when it first evolved may be linked as much to the role it plays in encoding memories as to any other function. The possibility that CCRs are more than a theoretical construct, and have played a role in the evolution of consciousness, argues against theories of consciousness focussed exclusively on higher-order functions as the appropriate way to deal with consciousness as it first evolved, as it develops in the early postnatal period of life, or with the conscious experiences of animals other than ourselves. An evolutionary perspective also resolves the problem of free will, that it is best treated as a property of a species rather than the individuals belonging to that species whereas, in contrast, agency is an attribute of individuals.

This article critically examines the experimental philosophy of free will, particularly the interplay between ordinary individuals\' compatibilist and incompatibilist intuitions. It explores key insights from research studies that propose \"natural compatibilism\" and \"natural incompatibilism\". These studies reveal a complex landscape of folk intuitions, where participants appear to exhibit both types of intuitions. Here, we examine error theories, which purport to explain the coexistence of apparently contradictory intuitions: the Affective Performance Error hypothesis, the \"Free Will No Matter What\" hypothesis, the Bypassing hypothesis, and the Intrusion hypothesis, and the article explores the cognitive errors that could shape individuals\' inconsistent perceptions of free will. We then explore three possibilities regarding folk intuitions: most individuals may hold either compatibilist or incompatibilist intuitions, both simultaneously, or neither. Our aim is to deepen the understanding of the complex dynamics of intuitions about free will, and we close with suggestions for future studies in experimental philosophy.

In this introduction to a thematic issue dealing with free will, some possibilities of free will in different physical, social, and technological worlds, as well as discussions of the possibilities are considered. What are the possibilities and limitations of free will in various other worlds differing from our world? What are the possibilities and limitations of free will in different species, both in our world and in other hypothetical worlds, including future species, naturally evolving, and artificially modified? What are the possibilities and limitations of free will related to the development of AI? How can the diversity of free will levels in an agent be related to possible levels (depth) of its self-knowledge? What can agents differing in levels of self-knowledge know and think about the issue of free will? How do different societies (social worlds) support and inhibit different manifestations of free will in different areas? What is the role of hard neurodeterminism and \"mindless neuroscience\" in general neuroscience? What are ethical aspects of the questions, including the initial one: \"If a neuroscientist denies free will, how can they write a text of voluntary informed consent and propose to sign it?\".

This article delves into the implications of neurotechnologies for the philosophical debates surrounding free will and moral responsibility. Tracing the concept from ancient religious and philosophical roots, we discuss how recent neurotechnological advancements (e.g. optogenetics, fMRI and machine learning, predictive diagnostics, et al.) challenge traditional notions of autonomy. Although neurotechnologies aim to enhance autonomy in the strict sense - as self-determination - they risk reducing or changing the broader notion of autonomy, which involves personal authenticity. We also submit that, in a world with an altered or limited concept of free will, humans should still be held accountable for actions executed through their bodies. By examining the dynamic between choice and responsibility, we emphasize the shift in technology ethics, moral philosophy, and the broader legal landscape in response to the advancement of neurotechnologies. By bringing the neurotechnological innovations into the world, neuroscientists not only change the technological landscape but also partake in long-standing moral narratives about freedom, justice, and responsibility.

Neuroscience has convinced people that much of their behavior is determined by causes unknown to them and beyond their control. However, are advances in neuroscience truly a prerequisite for such beliefs? Robert Kane\'s theory of ultimate responsibility is libertarian theory. Its innovative nature makes it possible to discuss the neurophysiological basis of its postulates. Using the functions of the midbrain dopaminergic system as an example, this article provides an overview of this neurophysiological basis. According to Kane, if we are to be ultimately responsible for our wills as well as for our actions, some actions in our lives must lack sufficient motives and causes. These are self-forming actions. Dopamine is hypothesized to mediate self-forming action execution. Dopamine not only mediates action but also ensures synaptic plasticity in the brain, that is, learning from action; hence, dopamine changes the acting individual and provides the formation of our own wills. The basal ganglia, which are the main target of dopamine in the brain, act through parallel pathways and are involved in decision-making processes. Dopamine is also involved in the regulation of the neurodynamical properties of prefrontal cortex networks with random spiking noise. It can be assumed that the activity of the dopaminergic system is closely related to the physiological basis of free will.

The article draws from critical psychology to discuss the rising debate on brain determinism and free will in the legal domain. As free will also corresponds to the context and culture, it can have both the public and private space of expressions. The rise of neuroscience and its influence in the legal domain offers a holistic and sociocultural meaning of responsibility. Even one becomes entitled to take free will as a \'necessary illusion\' in order to be in the zone of \'moral as well as legal-social life forming activities\'. In the criminal justice system free will is not taken as any kind of \'necessary illusion\' but the conscious will and action of the person. This further throw light on how the wilful control of any criminal act is a social act and our brain is not separate from our collective will.