In the \"Libet experiment\" the onset of movement-related brain activity preceded the reported time of the conscious intention to move, suggesting that conscious intention may not play a role in initiating voluntary movements (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Dominik et al. (2017) provided evidence that the intention reports employed in the Libet experiment, which Libet et al. (1983) found to precede movement reports, are invalid. In the study by Dominik et al., intention reports preceded movement reports only when participants had prior experience making movement reports. Individuals without such experience reported intention around the same time as movement. These findings suggest that Libet\'s intention reports do not reflect experiences of intention, but, rather, inferences based on prior experience with movement reports. Our study replicated the core findings of Dominik et al. We argue that Libet\'s intention reports are invalid and explore the phenomenology of intention in the Libet experiment.

Phenomenology aspires to philosophical analysis of humans\' subjective experience while it strives to avoid pitfalls of subjectivity. The first step towards naturalizing phenomenology - making phenomenology scientific - is to reconcile phenomenology with modern physics, on the one hand, and with modern cellular and molecular neuroscience, on the other hand. In this paper, free will is chosen for a case study to demonstrate the feasibility. Special attention is paid to maintain analysis with mathematical precision, if possible, and to evade the inherent deceptive power of natural language. Laplace\'s determinism is re-evaluated along with the concept of microscopic reversibility. A simple and transparent version of proof demonstrates that microscopic reversibility is irreconcilably incompatible with macroscopic irreversibility, contrary to Boltzmann\'s claim. But the verdict also exalts Boltzmann\'s statistical mechanics to the new height of a genuine paradigm shift, thus cutting the umbilical cord linking it to Newtonian mechanics. Laplace\'s absolute determinism must then be replaced with a weaker form of causality called quasi-determinism. Biological indeterminism is also affirmed with numerous lines of evidence. The strongest evidence is furnished by ion channel fluctuations, which obey an indeterministic stochastic phenomenological law. Furthermore, quantum indeterminacy is shown to be relevant in biology, contrary to the opinion of Erwin Schrödinger. In reconciling phenomenology of free will with modern sciences, three issues - alternativism, intelligibility and origination - of free will must be accounted for. Alternativism and intelligibility can readily be accounted for by quasi-determinism. In order to account for origination of free will, the concept of downward causation must be invoked. However, unlike what is commonly believed, there is no evidence that downward causation can influence, shield off, or overpower low-level physical forces already known to physicists. Quasi-determinism offers an escape route: The possibility that downward causation arising from hierarchical organization of biological structures can modify dispersions of physical laws remains open. Empirical evidence in support of downward causation is scanty but nevertheless exists. Still, origination of free will must be considered an unsolved problem at present. It is demonstrated that objectivity does not guarantee scientific rigor in the study of complex phenomena, such as human creativity. In its replacement, universality and overall consistency between a theory and empirical evidence must be maintained. Visual thinking is proposed as a reasoning tool to ensure universality and overall consistency through inference to the best explanation.

Nazi death camps, as any total institutions, were designed to deny any free will or choice from inmates. Furthermore, former inmates in such extreme conditions often account for their own actions and behavior in such settings as inevitable (\"I had no other choice\"). This study examines the questions of free will vs. determinism in death camps from a descriptive-phenomenological perspective. Data was collected through in-depth interviews with 20 former death camp inmates. The following themes emerged from the qualitative analysis of the data: the \'selection\' experience; \'borrowed time\' perception; and the experience of \'nothingness\'. A conceptual model grounded in these data was developed to illustrate the inmate\'s lived experience of choice in the reality of the camps. Analysis of the model indicates that under the extreme conditions of the death camp, free will and existence are interchangeable: \"I choose - therefore I am\".