This study aims to examine how the activation of the role of nursee and professional identification as a nurse can influence moral judgments in terms of deontological and utilitarian inclinations. In Study 1, a priming technique was used to assess the impact of activating the nursing concept on moral reasoning. Participants were randomly assigned to either a nursing prime or neutral prime condition. By using a scrambled-sentence task, participants were prompted to think about nursing-related or neutral thoughts. Following the priming task, participants were asked to respond to 20 moral dilemmas. The process dissociation approach was employed to measure the degree of deontological and utilitarian tendencies in their moral reasoning. In Study 2, participants completed the nursing profession identification scale and the moral orientation scale before engaging in moral judgments similar to those in Study 1. The findings revealed that priming the concept of being a nursee resulted in an increase in deontological clinical inclinations while having no significant effect on utilitarian inclinations. Additionally, a positive correlation was observed between identification with the nursing profession and deontological clinical inclinations, whereas a negative correlation was found with utilitarian inclinations. Deliberation orientation acted as a complete mediator in the relationship between nursing professional identification and deontological tendencies and as a partial mediator for utilitarian tendencies.

With the rapid development of society and the deteriorating natural environment, there has been an increase in public emergencies. This study aimed to explore how sadness and fear in the context of public emergencies influence moral judgments. This research first induced feelings of sadness and fear by using videos about public emergencies and music, and then used moral scenarios from the CNI model (C parameter: sensitivity to consequences; N parameter: sensitivity to norms; I parameter: general preference for inaction) to assess participants\' moral thinking. In Study 1, participants were divided into a sadness group and a neutral group, while in Study 2, participants were divided into a fear group and a neutral group. During the experiment, participants were exposed to different videos related to public emergencies to induce the corresponding emotions, and emotional music was continuously played throughout the entire experiment. Participants were then asked to answer questions requiring moral judgments. The results showed that based on the CNI model, sadness induced in the context of public emergencies significantly increased the C parameter, without affecting the N or I parameters. Fear increased the I parameter, without affecting the C or I parameters. That is, sadness and fear induced in the context of a public emergency can influence moral judgments. Specifically, sadness increases individuals\' sensitivity to consequences and fear increases the general preference for inaction in moral judgments.

From deciding which meal to prepare for our guests to trading off the proenvironmental effects of climate protection measures against their economic costs, we often must consider the consequences of our actions for the well-being of others (welfare). Vexingly, the tastes and views of others can vary widely. To maximize welfare according to the utilitarian philosophical tradition, decision-makers facing conflicting preferences of others should choose the option that maximizes the sum of the subjective value (utility) of the entire group. This notion requires comparing the intensities of preferences across individuals. However, it remains unclear whether such comparisons are possible at all and (if they are possible) how they might be implemented in the brain. Here, we show that female and male participants can both learn the preferences of others by observing their choices and represent these preferences on a common scale to make utilitarian welfare decisions. On the neural level, multivariate support vector regressions revealed that a distributed activity pattern in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), a brain region previously associated with reward processing, represented the preference strength of others. Strikingly, also the utilitarian welfare of others was represented in the VMPFC and relied on the same neural code as the estimated preferences of others. Together, our findings reveal that humans can behave as if they maximized utilitarian welfare using a specific utility representation and that the brain enables such choices by repurposing neural machinery processing the reward others receive.

National vaccination programs against SARS-CoV2 in South America played an important role in the timely response to the COVID-19 pandemic, however, was an ethical approach capable of guaranteeing greater benefit to the population through vaccination being applied? To answer this question, my aim was to analyze the national vaccination programs of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru to identify the extent to which they aligned with the utilitarianism and prioritarianism oriented ethical approaches when assigning the vaccine against COVID-19. I start from the hypothesis that all the selected countries propose vaccination policies with possible prioritarian and/or utilitarian ethical approaches, however, those that align with prioritarianism manage to better adhere to the moral duties of social justice. To demonstrate my hypothesis, I have integrated the socio-economic information, analyzed the coverage strategies of each country and tried to frame them with the proposed ethical approaches, to finally present arguments for and against these approaches. I conclude that, unlike utilitarianism, the application of prioritarianism to the vaccine allocation schemes of the four countries analyzed allowed prioritizing the vaccine in those who are worse off in terms of social justice, and that, unequivocally, includes the severely ill.

In 2017, Michael Nair-Collins formulated his Transitivity Argument which claimed that brain-dead patients are alive according to a concept that defines death in terms of the loss of moral status. This article challenges Nair-Collins\' view in three steps. First, I elaborate on the concept of moral status, claiming that to understand this notion appropriately, one must grasp the distinction between direct and indirect duties. Second, I argue that his understanding of moral status implicit in the Transitivity Argument is faulty since it is not based on a distinction between direct and indirect duties. Third, I show how this flaw in Nair-Collins\' argument is grounded in the more general problems between preference utilitarianism and desire fulfillment theory. Finally, I present the constructivist theory of moral status and the associated moral concept of death and explain how this concept challenges the Transitivity Argument. According to my view, brain death constitutes a valid criterion of death since brain death is incompatible with the preserved capacity to have affective attitudes and to value anything.

Utilitarianism is the most prominent social welfare function in economics. We present three new axiomatic characterizations of utilitarian (that is, additively-separable) social welfare functions in a setting where there is risk over both population size and individuals\' welfares. We first show that, given uncontroversial basic axioms, Blackorby et al.\'s (1998) Expected Critical-Level Generalized Utilitarianism is equivalent to a new axiom holding that it is better to allocate higher utility-conditional-on-existence to possible people who have a higher probability of existence. The other two characterizations extend and clarify classic axiomatizations of utilitarianism from settings with either social risk or variable-population, considered alone.

UNASSIGNED: This study delves into the ethical dimensions surrounding autonomous vehicles (AVs), with a specific focus on decision-making algorithms. Termed the \"Trolley problem,\" an ethical quandary arises, necessitating the formulation of moral algorithms grounded in ethical principles. To address this issue, an online survey was conducted with 460 participants in China, comprising 237 females and 223 males, spanning ages 18 to 70.
UNASSIGNED: Adapted from Joshua Greene\'s trolley dilemma survey, our study employed Yes/No options to probe participants\' choices and Likert scales to gauge moral acceptance. The primary objective was to assess participants\' inclinations toward four distinct algorithmic strategies-Utilitarianism, Rawlsianism, Egoism, and a Hybrid approach-in scenarios involving AVs.
UNASSIGNED: Our findings revealed a significant disparity between participants\' preferences in scenarios related to AV design and those focused on purchase decisions. Notably, over half of the respondents expressed reluctance to purchase AVs equipped with an \"egoism\" algorithm, which prioritizes the car owner\'s safety. Intriguingly, the rejection rate for \"egoism\" was similar to that of \"utilitarianism,\" which may necessitate self-sacrifice.
UNASSIGNED: The hybrid approach, integrating \"Utilitarianism\" and \"Egoism,\" garnered the highest endorsement. This highlights the importance of balancing self-sacrifice and harm minimization in AV moral algorithms. The study\'s insights are crucial for ethically and practically advancing AV technology in the continually evolving realm of autonomous vehicles.

One influential framework for examining human moral cognition has been a dual process model, in which utilitarian judgment (e.g., infliction of harm for the greater good) is associated with cognitive control processes, while non-utilitarian judgment (e.g., avoiding such harms) is associated with emotional, automatic processes. Another framework of moral cognition, the two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology, posits that utilitarian choices may reflect either instrumental harm, i.e., inflicting harm on an individual for the greater good; or impartial beneficence, i.e., impartially and altruistically acting for the benefit of the overall welfare. We evaluated preregistered hypotheses (https://osf.io/m425d) derived from these models of moral cognition in a sample of 275 neurologically healthy older adults. Our results suggest that both the dual process and two-dimensional models provided insights regarding utilitarian reasoning, including three cardinal domains of conflict between utilitarianism and common-sense morality: agent-centered permissions, special obligations, and personal rights. One prediction of the dual process-based model was supported by our findings, with higher emotionality associated with decreased endorsement of utilitarian judgments (b = - 0.12, p < .001). We also found partial support for the two-dimensional model, as utilitarian judgments about dilemmas involving agent-centered permissions and personal rights were dissociated; however, both sets of judgments were associated with utilitarian judgments involving special obligations (p < .001 and p = .008, respectively). We propose that our findings, with support for some elements of the dual process and two-dimensional models, can be integrated into a revised two-dimensional model of utilitarian judgment as including impartial beneficence and acceptance of attributable harms.

The notion of utility gained a strong foothold in health economics over the last decades. However, the concept of health utility has not yet been decisively or irrefutably defined and the definitions that exist often do not take into account the current state of psychological literature. This perspective paper shows that the current definition of health utility emphasizes decision-making processes, deploys personal preferences, assumes psychological egoism, and attempts to objectively and cardinally measure utility. However, these foundational axioms that underly the current definition of health utility are not necessarily in concurrence with the current state of psychological literature. Due to these perceived shortcomings of the current health utility definition, it may be beneficial to redefine the concept of health utility in accordance with the current state of psychological literature. In order to develop such a revised definition of health utility the commonly deployed formula (Eidos = Genos + Diaphora) originating from Aristotle\'s metaphysics is applied. The revised definition of health utility proposed in this perspective paper alludes to health utility as \'the subjective value, expressed in terms of perceived pain or pleasure, that is attributed to the cognitive, affective and conative experience of one\'s own physical, mental and social health state, which is determined through self-reflection and interaction with significant others\'. Although this revised definition does neither replace nor supersede other conceptualizations of health utility, it may serve as a refreshing avenue for further discussion and could, eventually, support policymakers and health economists in operationalizing and measuring health utility in an even more accurate and veracious manner.

UNASSIGNED: Although several studies have investigated the association between alexithymia and moral decision-making in sacrificial dilemmas, the evidence remains mixed. The current work investigated this association and how alexithymia affects moral choice in such dilemmas.
UNASSIGNED: The current research used a multinomial model (ie, CNI model) to disentangle (a) sensitivity to consequences, (b) sensitivity to moral norms, and (c) general preference for inaction versus action irrespective of consequences and norms in responses to moral dilemmas.
UNASSIGNED: Higher levels of alexithymia were associated with a greater preference for utilitarian judgments in sacrificial dilemmas (Study 1). Furthermore, individuals with high alexithymia showed significantly weaker sensitivity to moral norms than did those with low alexithymia, whereas there were no significant differences in sensitivity to consequences or a general preference for inaction versus action (Study 2).
UNASSIGNED: The findings suggest that alexithymia affects moral choice in sacrificial dilemmas by blunting emotional reactions to causing harm, rather than through increased deliberative cost-benefit reasoning or general preference for inaction.