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Abstract：
In 2017, Michael Nair-Collins formulated his Transitivity Argument which claimed that brain-dead patients are alive according to a concept that defines death in terms of the loss of moral status. This article challenges Nair-Collins\' view in three steps. First, I elaborate on the concept of moral status, claiming that to understand this notion appropriately, one must grasp the distinction between direct and indirect duties. Second, I argue that his understanding of moral status implicit in the Transitivity Argument is faulty since it is not based on a distinction between direct and indirect duties. Third, I show how this flaw in Nair-Collins\' argument is grounded in the more general problems between preference utilitarianism and desire fulfillment theory. Finally, I present the constructivist theory of moral status and the associated moral concept of death and explain how this concept challenges the Transitivity Argument. According to my view, brain death constitutes a valid criterion of death since brain death is incompatible with the preserved capacity to have affective attitudes and to value anything.
摘要：
2017年，MichaelNair-Collins提出了他的及物论据，声称脑死亡患者是活着的，根据道德地位的丧失来定义死亡的概念。本文分三个步骤挑战Nair-Collins的观点。首先,我详细阐述了道德地位的概念，声称要恰当地理解这个概念，必须把握直接职责和间接职责的区别。第二,我认为，他对及物论中隐含的道德地位的理解是错误的，因为它不是基于直接和间接职责之间的区别。第三，我展示了Nair-Collins论证中的这一缺陷是如何基于偏好功利主义和欲望实现理论之间的更普遍的问题。最后,我介绍了建构主义的道德地位理论和相关的死亡道德概念，并解释了该概念如何挑战及物性论点。根据我的观点,脑死亡构成了死亡的有效标准，因为脑死亡与保持情感态度和价值任何事物的能力是不相容的。
