In multi-agent partially observable sequential decision problems with general-sum rewards, it is necessary to account for the egoism (individual rewards), utilitarianism (social welfare), and egalitarianism (fairness) criteria simultaneously. However, achieving a balance between these criteria poses a challenge for current multi-agent reinforcement learning methods. Specifically, fully decentralized methods without global information of all agents\' rewards, observations and actions fail to learn a balanced policy, while agents in centralized training (with decentralized execution) methods are reluctant to share private information due to concerns of exploitation by others. To address these issues, this paper proposes a Decentralized and Federated (D&F) paradigm, where decentralized agents train egoistic policies utilizing solely local information to attain self-interest, and the federation controller primarily considers utilitarianism and egalitarianism. Meanwhile, the parameters of decentralized and federated policies are optimized with discrepancy constraints mutually, akin to a server and client pattern, which ensures the balance between egoism, utilitarianism, and egalitarianism. Furthermore, theoretical evidence demonstrates that the federated model, as well as the discrepancy between decentralized egoistic policies and federated utilitarian policies, obtains an O(1/T) convergence rate. Extensive experiments show that our D&F approach outperforms multiple baselines, in terms of both utilitarianism and egalitarianism.

This study aims to examine how the activation of the role of nursee and professional identification as a nurse can influence moral judgments in terms of deontological and utilitarian inclinations. In Study 1, a priming technique was used to assess the impact of activating the nursing concept on moral reasoning. Participants were randomly assigned to either a nursing prime or neutral prime condition. By using a scrambled-sentence task, participants were prompted to think about nursing-related or neutral thoughts. Following the priming task, participants were asked to respond to 20 moral dilemmas. The process dissociation approach was employed to measure the degree of deontological and utilitarian tendencies in their moral reasoning. In Study 2, participants completed the nursing profession identification scale and the moral orientation scale before engaging in moral judgments similar to those in Study 1. The findings revealed that priming the concept of being a nursee resulted in an increase in deontological clinical inclinations while having no significant effect on utilitarian inclinations. Additionally, a positive correlation was observed between identification with the nursing profession and deontological clinical inclinations, whereas a negative correlation was found with utilitarian inclinations. Deliberation orientation acted as a complete mediator in the relationship between nursing professional identification and deontological tendencies and as a partial mediator for utilitarian tendencies.

With the rapid development of society and the deteriorating natural environment, there has been an increase in public emergencies. This study aimed to explore how sadness and fear in the context of public emergencies influence moral judgments. This research first induced feelings of sadness and fear by using videos about public emergencies and music, and then used moral scenarios from the CNI model (C parameter: sensitivity to consequences; N parameter: sensitivity to norms; I parameter: general preference for inaction) to assess participants\' moral thinking. In Study 1, participants were divided into a sadness group and a neutral group, while in Study 2, participants were divided into a fear group and a neutral group. During the experiment, participants were exposed to different videos related to public emergencies to induce the corresponding emotions, and emotional music was continuously played throughout the entire experiment. Participants were then asked to answer questions requiring moral judgments. The results showed that based on the CNI model, sadness induced in the context of public emergencies significantly increased the C parameter, without affecting the N or I parameters. Fear increased the I parameter, without affecting the C or I parameters. That is, sadness and fear induced in the context of a public emergency can influence moral judgments. Specifically, sadness increases individuals\' sensitivity to consequences and fear increases the general preference for inaction in moral judgments.

UNASSIGNED: This study delves into the ethical dimensions surrounding autonomous vehicles (AVs), with a specific focus on decision-making algorithms. Termed the \"Trolley problem,\" an ethical quandary arises, necessitating the formulation of moral algorithms grounded in ethical principles. To address this issue, an online survey was conducted with 460 participants in China, comprising 237 females and 223 males, spanning ages 18 to 70.
UNASSIGNED: Adapted from Joshua Greene\'s trolley dilemma survey, our study employed Yes/No options to probe participants\' choices and Likert scales to gauge moral acceptance. The primary objective was to assess participants\' inclinations toward four distinct algorithmic strategies-Utilitarianism, Rawlsianism, Egoism, and a Hybrid approach-in scenarios involving AVs.
UNASSIGNED: Our findings revealed a significant disparity between participants\' preferences in scenarios related to AV design and those focused on purchase decisions. Notably, over half of the respondents expressed reluctance to purchase AVs equipped with an \"egoism\" algorithm, which prioritizes the car owner\'s safety. Intriguingly, the rejection rate for \"egoism\" was similar to that of \"utilitarianism,\" which may necessitate self-sacrifice.
UNASSIGNED: The hybrid approach, integrating \"Utilitarianism\" and \"Egoism,\" garnered the highest endorsement. This highlights the importance of balancing self-sacrifice and harm minimization in AV moral algorithms. The study\'s insights are crucial for ethically and practically advancing AV technology in the continually evolving realm of autonomous vehicles.

International carbon allocation confronts the conflict between efficiency and equality. Previous research based on the intergroup bias perspective has attributed carbon allocation preference to the defence of ingroup interests (i.e., national interests) while overlooking the critical role of trade-offs between competing moral values. Integrating the contingency theory of justice and moral philosophical theories of utilitarianism and egalitarianism, we proposed that the moral-values trade-off between utilitarianism and egalitarianism determines carbon allocation preference through justice reasoning. Analysis of large-scale survey datasets (Study 1) revealed that aggregated national endorsement of utilitarianism over egalitarianism predicted greater efficiency preference in total and per capita carbon emission levels. Study 2 demonstrated that experimentally manipulating endorsement of utilitarianism versus egalitarianism boosted efficiency (vs. equality) preference in carbon allocation, and justice reasoning characterized by enhanced efficiency-focused justice and diminished equality-focused justice accounted for these effects. Using a \'manipulation-of-mediator\' design, Study 3 further confirmed the causal link in the mediation model. By highlighting the significance of moral trade-offs in shaping carbon allocation preference, this research not only provides a novel moral perspective in understanding debates on international carbon allocation but also has important implications for fostering international carbon abatement cooperation.

OBJECTIVE: The current study aims to assess, for the first time, whether vaccination is predicted by different behavioral and cognitive aspects of moral decision-making.
BACKGROUND: Studies linking moral factors to vaccination have largely examined whether vaccination decisions can be explained by individual differences in the endorsement of various principles and norms central to deontology-based arguments in vaccination ethics. However, these studies have overlooked whether individuals prioritize norms over other considerations when making decisions, such as maximizing consequences (utilitarianism).
METHODS: In a sample of 1492 participants, the current study assessed whether vaccination is explained by individual differences in three aspects of moral decision-making (consequence sensitivity, norm sensitivity, and action tendency), while also considering ethics position (idealism, relativism) and moral identity.
RESULTS: Supportive vaccination (vaccine uptake accompanied by a positive attitude toward vaccines) was associated with utilitarianism (increased consequence sensitivity) and increased tolerance to risks and harm toward others. Meanwhile, although those in the non-vaccinated group was associated with higher harm sensitivities, they neither supported nor received the COVID vaccines (when vaccines prevent harm from infection).
CONCLUSIONS: Pro-vaccination messages may be made more effective by addressing perceptions of harms associated with vaccines and infections, respectively.

UNASSIGNED: Although several studies have investigated the association between alexithymia and moral decision-making in sacrificial dilemmas, the evidence remains mixed. The current work investigated this association and how alexithymia affects moral choice in such dilemmas.
UNASSIGNED: The current research used a multinomial model (ie, CNI model) to disentangle (a) sensitivity to consequences, (b) sensitivity to moral norms, and (c) general preference for inaction versus action irrespective of consequences and norms in responses to moral dilemmas.
UNASSIGNED: Higher levels of alexithymia were associated with a greater preference for utilitarian judgments in sacrificial dilemmas (Study 1). Furthermore, individuals with high alexithymia showed significantly weaker sensitivity to moral norms than did those with low alexithymia, whereas there were no significant differences in sensitivity to consequences or a general preference for inaction versus action (Study 2).
UNASSIGNED: The findings suggest that alexithymia affects moral choice in sacrificial dilemmas by blunting emotional reactions to causing harm, rather than through increased deliberative cost-benefit reasoning or general preference for inaction.

UNASSIGNED: Recently, sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) remain a sensitive issue within generally healthy environments. Different countries have developed various principle-based approaches to tackle the ethical issues surrounding STDs. Due to lacking any relevant laws or code of conducts to deal with the ethical issue, it has become a notable ethical problem in China.
UNASSIGNED: Ethical principles involve a sensitive clinical problem, this paper intends to reflect upon and discuss how nurses as moral agents deal with ethical dilemmas within Chinese culture and provided some orientations for further study.
UNASSIGNED: This paper briefly presented the nurses\' ethical dilemma related to the issue of confidentiality and disclosure of STD patients\' information via a case scenario. Based on Chinese cultural tradition, we focused on how to solve this situation as a clinical nurse with ethical principles and philosophical theories. The process of discussion provided eight steps by the Corey et al model to solve the ethical dilemma.
UNASSIGNED: The ability to deal with ethical dilemmas is a necessary quality for nurses. On the one hand, nurses should respect patients\' autonomy and contribute positively to the relationship between confidentiality and the nurse-patient therapeutic relationship. On the other hand, nurses should combine with the current situation and make a targeted decision where necessary. Of course, professional code supported by related policies is necessary.

Artificial intelligence has quickly integrated into human society and its moral decision-making has also begun to slowly seep into our lives. The significance of moral judgment research on artificial intelligence behavior is becoming increasingly prominent. The present research aims at examining how people make moral judgments about the behavior of artificial intelligence agents in a trolley dilemma where people are usually driven by controlled cognitive processes, and in a footbridge dilemma where people are usually driven by automatic emotional responses. Through three experiments (n = 626), we found that in the trolley dilemma (Experiment 1), the agent type rather than the actual action influenced people\'s moral judgments. Specifically, participants rated AI agents\' behavior as more immoral and deserving of more blame than humans\' behavior. Conversely, in the footbridge dilemma (Experiment 2), the actual action rather than the agent type influenced people\'s moral judgments. Specifically, participants rated action (a utilitarian act) as less moral and permissible and more morally wrong and blameworthy than inaction (a deontological act). A mixed-design experiment provided a pattern of results consistent with Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 (Experiment 3). This suggests that in different types of moral dilemmas, people adapt different modes of moral judgment to artificial intelligence, this may be explained by that when people make moral judgments in different types of moral dilemmas, they are engaging different processing systems.

Consequentialist life-maximizing approaches to triaging prescribe that everyone ought to have an equal chance of living a typical lifespan, through the saving more life-years (or saving most lives) principle, which emphasizes the youngest-first principle and in some cases a lottery approach, often at the expense of the old and the sick. Although this approach has already been criticized by several bioethicists, this article provides a different kind of criticism to the life-cycle viewpoint, one that has not yet been explored at length; namely, we contend that the life-maximizing approach entails a form of racism without racists in its attitude towards Black people. More specifically, we contend that by neglecting the idea that current societies are not post-racial, it privileges White individuals and disadvantages Black people in the triaging process, curtails equal opportunities for Black people, reinforces white normativity, and neglects African culture. We end the article by pointing towards an Afro-communitarian relational triaging approach that does not face the same difficulties as consequentialist life-maximizing approaches do.