Land public transport is an important link within and between cities, and how to control the transmission of COVID-19 in land public transport is a critical issue in our daily lives. However, there are still many inconsistent opinions and views about the spread of SARS-CoV-2 in land public transport, which limits our ability to implement effective interventions. The purpose of this review is to overview the literature on transmission characteristics and routes of the epidemic in land public transport, as well as to investigate factors affecting its spread and provide feasible measures to mitigate the infection risk of passengers. We obtained 898 papers by searching the Web of Science, Pubmed, and WHO global COVID database by keywords, and finally selected 45 papers that can address the purpose of this review. Land public transport is a high outbreak area for COVID-19 due to characteristics like crowding, inadequate ventilation, long exposure time, and environmental closure. Different from surface touch transmission and drop spray transmission, aerosol inhalation transmission can occur not only in short distances but also in long distances. Insufficient ventilation is the most important factor influencing long-distance aerosol transmission. Other transmission factors (e.g., interpersonal distance, relative orientation, and ambient conditions) should be noticed as well, which have been summarized in this paper. To address various influencing factors, it is essential to suggest practical and efficient preventive measures. Among these, increased ventilation, particularly the fresh air (i.e., natural ventilation), has proven to effectively reduce indoor infection risk. Many preventive measures are also effective, such as enlarging social distance, avoiding face-to-face orientation, setting up physical partitions, disinfection, avoiding talking, and so on. As research on the epidemic has intensified, people have broken down many perceived barriers, but more comprehensive studies on monitoring systems and prevention measures in land public transport are still needed.

Due to the intensive use of antibiotics, the drinking water distribution system (DWDS) has become one of the hotspots of antibiotic resistance. However, little is known about the role of biofilm in the aspect of spreading resistance in DWDS. In present study, four lab-scale biological annular reactors (BAR) were constructed to investigate the transmission of ARGs exposed to a certain amount of antibiotic (sulfamethoxazole) synergistic disinfectants. It was emphasized that pipe wall biofilm was an important way for ARGs to propagate in the pipeline, and the results were quantified by constructing an operational taxonomic unit (OTU) network map. The network analysis results showed the biofilm contribution to waterborne bacteria was finally estimated to be 51.45% and 34.27% in polyethylen (PE) pipe and ductile iron (DI) pipe, respectively. The proportion of vertical gene transfer (VGT) in biofilm was higher than that in water, and the occurrence of this situation had little relationship with the selection of pipe type. Overall, this study revealed how biofilm promoted the transmission of resistome in bulk water, which can provide insights into assessing biofilm-associated risks and optimizing pipe material selection for biofilm control in DWDS.

The aim of this study is to evaluate the infection risk of aircraft passengers seated within and beyond two rows of the index case(s) of the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus, and SARS-CoV-1. PubMed databases were searched for articles containing information on air travel-related transmission of SARS-CoV-2, influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus, and SARS-CoV-1 infections. We performed a meta-analysis of inflight infection data. In the eight flights where the attack rate could be calculated, the inflight SARS-CoV-2 attack rates ranged from 2.6% to 16.1%. The risk ratios of infection for passengers seated within and outside the two rows of the index cases were 5.64 (95% confidence interval (CI):1.94-16.40) in SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks, 4.26 (95% CI:1.08-16.81) in the influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus outbreaks, and 1.91 (95% CI:0.80-4.55) in SARS-CoV-1 outbreaks. Furthermore, we found no significant difference between the attack rates of SARS-CoV-2 in flights where the passengers were wearing masks and those where they were not (p = 0.22). The spatial distribution of inflight SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks was more similar to that of the influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus outbreaks than to that of SARS-CoV-1. Given the high proportion of asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic infection in SARS-CoV-2 transmission, we hypothesised that the proximity transmission, especially short-range airborne route, might play an important role in the inflight SARS-CoV-2 transmission.

Transmission of hepatitis E virus (HEV) occurs predominantly by the fecal-oral route. Large epidemics of hepatitis E in the developing countries of Asia and Africa are waterborne and spread through contaminated drinking water. The reservoir of HEV in developed countries is believed to be in animals with zoonotic transmission to humans, possibly through direct contact or the consumption of undercooked contaminated meat. And HEV transmission through blood transfusion, organ transplantation, and vertical transmission has been reported.

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The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic has lasted for two years and caused millions of infections and deaths in humans. Although the origin of SARS-CoV-2 infection in humans remains unknown, infection in animals has been frequently reported in varieties of animals all over the world. Both experimental and natural infections of SARS-CoV-2 in different animal species provide useful information on viral host range and pathogenicity. As the pandemic continues to evolve, SARS-CoV-2 infection in animals will be expanding. In this review, we summarized SARS-CoV-2 testing and infection in animals as well as SARS-CoV-2 strains and transmission in animals. Current data showed that at least 18 different animal species tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. These 18 animal species belong to pet, captive, farmed, and wild animals. Fifteen of the eighteen animal species were known to be positive for the Delta variant and ten animal species were infected with two different types of variants. Human-to-animal, animal-to-animal, and animal-to-human transmission events were suggested in different outbreaks involved in animal infection with SARS-CoV-2. Continued testing, immunization, and surveillance are warranted.

Murine Kobuvirus (MuKV) is a novel picornavirus of the genus Kobuvirus, and was first identified in the feces of murine rodents in the USA in 2011. There is limited information on the transmission route of MuKV. Thus, we conducted a study to investigate virus detection rates in fecal, serum, throat, and lung tissue samples from murine rodents.
A total of 413 fecal samples, 385 lung samples, 269 throat swab samples, and 183 serum samples were collected from 413 murine rodents (Rattus norvegicus, Rattus tanezumi, and Rattus rattus) captured in urban Shenzhen. Kobuviruses were detected via RT-PCR. Only fecal samples were positive, with prevalence rates of 34.9% in Rattus norvegicus and 29.4% in Rattus tanezumi. Phylogenetic analysis based on partial 3D and complete VP1 sequence regions indicated that all of the MuKV sequences obtained belonged to Aichivirus A, and were genetically closely related to other MuKVs reported in China, Hungary, and the USA. Twenty-eight full-length MuKV sequences were acquired. Phylogenetic analysis of two sequences randomly selected from the two species (SZ59 and SZ171) indicated that they shared very high nucleotide and amino acid identity with one another (94.0 and 99.3%, respectively), and comparison with human Kobuvirus revealed amino acid identity values of ~80%. Additionally, a sewage-derived sequence shared high similarity with the rat-derived sequences identified in this study, with respective nucleotide and amino acid identity values from 86.5 and 90.7% to 87.2 and 91.1%.
The results of the current study provide evidence that murine Kobuvirus is transmitted via the fecal-oral route.

Personal protective behaviors of healthcare workers (HCWs) and dynamic changes in them are known to play a major role in the hospital transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). In this study, 1,499 HCWs in Chinese hospitals completed an online survey about their knowledge on SARS-CoV-2 transmission and their personal protective behaviors before and after coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) vaccination. Of all the respondents, 89% were vaccinated at the time of the survey and 96% believed that the vaccine was effective or highly effective. Further, 88% of the vaccinated HCWs expressed that they would get revaccinated if the vaccination failed. Compared with HCWs with a lower education level, those with a higher education level had less fear of being infected with SARS-CoV-2 and reported a lower negative impact of the pandemic on how they treated patients. Physicians and nurses were willing to believe that short-range airborne and long-range fomite are possible transmission routes. HCWs with a higher education level had a better knowledge of COVID-19 but worse personal protective behaviors. The fact that HCWs with a longer work experience had worse personal protective behaviors showed that HCWs gradually relax their personal protective behaviors over time. Moreover, vaccination reduced the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on how the HCWs treated patients. Importantly, the survey revealed that after vaccination, HCWs in China did not relax their personal protective behaviors, and it may bring a low potential risk for following waves of variant virus (e.g., delta).

BACKGROUND: The incidence of hepatitis A virus (HAV) infection is low in Beijing, China, but the risk of outbreaks still exists. It is difficult to identify possible sources of infection among sporadic cases based on a routine surveillance system. Therefore, a more effective surveillance system needs to be established.
METHODS: The epidemiological data of hepatitis A were obtained from a routine surveillance system. Patients with HAV confirmed at the local hospitals were asked to complete a questionnaire that included additional case information and possible sources of infection. Serum and fecal specimens were also collected for testing HAV RNA by polymerase chain reaction. In addition, the 321-nucleotide segment of the VP1/2A junction region was sequenced to determine the HAV genotype.
RESULTS: In 2019, 110 HAV cases were reported in Beijing, with an incidence rate of 0.51/100,000. 61(55.5%) of these patients were male. The greatest proportion of these patients were aged from 30 to 60 years. The rate was lower in suburban and rural areas compared to urban areas. Contaminated food consumption, particularly seafood consumption, was the primary potential source of infection. Among the 16 specimens of confirmed HAV cases that could be sequenced, 93.8% were HAV IA, and 6.3% were HAV IB. In addition, the samples collected from all HAV sequences in this investigation showed 89.4-100% nucleotide homology. Two groups (each with three sporadic cases) showed 100% nucleotide homology. The three sporadic cases in one group had the same possible source of infection: contaminated salad with raw vegetables and seafood. In the other group, the three sporadic cases did not have an epidemiological connection.
CONCLUSIONS: In a low HAV prevalent area, such as in Beijing, incorporating molecular epidemiology into the routine surveillance system could help inform possible clusters of outbreaks and provide support for earlier control of HAV transmission. Nevertheless, increased sampling from detected cases and improved specimen quality are needed to implement such a system.

The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic is still spreading all over the world. Although China quickly brought the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) under control in 2020, sporadic outbreaks have recurred from time to time. Outbreaks since June 2020 have suggested that the imported cold food supply chain is a major cause for the recurrence and spread of COVID-19. Here we review recurrent outbreaks in China from June 2020 to March 2021, and we analyse the main causes for recurrence and transmission by the supply of imported cold food from port to fork. Contaminated cold food or food packaging material can transmit the virus through \'person-to-thing-to-person\', by contrast with the classical \'person-to-person\' pathway. We decribe safety precautions for the food system, operating environment and people along the cold chain logistics. Surface disinfection and nucleic acid inspection are needed in each stage of the logistics of imported cold food supply.