BACKGROUND: High clinical value national reimbursement anticancer medications (NRAMs) are pivotal treatments for patients with cancer. However, the availability of NRAMs in medical institutions is unknown. This study aimed to assess the availability of NRAMs in national and provincial medical institutions.
METHODS: This cross-sectional study utilized national health insurance data to access the availability of NRAMs in national and provincial medical institutions. Further statistical analyses and visualizations were conducted in terms of medical institution level and daily cost. Using the Spearman\'s rank correlation test (α = 0.05), we calculated the correlation between the availability rates of NRAMs and their negotiation access time, daily cost, per capita disposable income, provincial gross product, and number of policy releases.
RESULTS: Overall, 81 NRAMs, with an average availability rate of approximately 1.01% nationwide, were included. There were significant differences between provinces for each drug, and the availability of NRAMs gradually decreased in tertiary (13.41%), secondary (1.58%), and primary medical institutions (< 0.05%). Differences were also observed in the availability rate of NRAMs in various daily drug cost ranges. Among the factors examined, negotiation access time (r1 = 0.425), daily cost (r2 = - 0.326), per capita disposable income (r3 = 0.645), provincial gross product (r4 = 0.433), and number of policy releases (r5 = 0.461) were all correlated with the availability of NRAMs.
CONCLUSIONS: The low availability of NRAMs in national and provincial medical institutions indicates that their willingness to equip NRAMs needs to be improved. All factors examined in this study affected the availability of NRAMs. Our findings can guide policymakers in improving relevant policies.

BACKGROUND: The Diagnosis-Intervention Packet (DIP) payment system, initiated by China\'s National Healthcare Security Administration, is designed to enhance healthcare efficiency and manage rising healthcare costs. This study aims to evaluate the impact of the DIP payment reform on inpatient care in a specialized obstetrics and gynecology hospital, with a focus on its implications for various patient groups.
METHODS: To assess the DIP policy\'s effects, we employed the Difference-in-Differences (DID) approach. This method was used to analyze changes in total hospital costs and Length of Stay (LOS) across different patient groups, particularly within select DIP categories. The study involved a comprehensive examination of the DIP policy\'s influence pre- and post-implementation.
RESULTS: Our findings indicate that the implementation of the DIP policy led to a significant increase in both total costs and LOS for the insured group relative to the self-paying group. The study further identified variations within DIP groups both before and after the reform. In-depth analysis of specific disease groups revealed that the insured group experienced notably higher total costs and LOS compared to the self-paying group.
CONCLUSIONS: The DIP reform has led to several challenges, including upcoding and diagnostic ambiguity, because of the pursuit of higher reimbursements. These findings underscore the necessity for continuous improvement of the DIP payment system to effectively tackle these challenges and optimize healthcare delivery and cost management.

BACKGROUND: This study aimed to examine the reporting quality of existing economic evaluations for negotiated glucose-lowering drugs (GLDs) included in China National Reimbursement Drug List (NRDL) using the Consolidated Health Economic Evaluation Reporting Standards 2013 (CHEERS 2013).
METHODS: We performed a systematic literature research through 7 databases to identify published economic evaluations for GLDs included in the China NRDL up to March 2021. Reporting quality of identified studies was assessed by two independent reviewers based on the CHEERS checklist. The Kruskal-Wallis test and Mann-Whitney U test were performed to examine the association between reporting quality and characteristics of the identified studies.
RESULTS: We have identified 24 studies, which evaluated six GLDs types. The average score rate of the included studies was 77.41% (SD:13.23%, Range 47.62%-91.67%). Among all the required reporting items, characterizing heterogeneity (score rate = 4.17%) was the least satisfied item. Among six parts of CHEERS, results part scored least at 0.55 (score rate = 54.79%) because of the incompleteness of characterizing uncertainty. Results from the Kruskal-Wallis test and Mann-Whitney U test showed that model choice, journal type, type of economic evaluations, and study perspective were associated with the reporting quality of the studies.
CONCLUSIONS: There remains room to improve the reporting quality of economic evaluations for GLDs in NRDL. Checklists such as CHEERS should be widely used to improve the reporting quality of economic researches in China.

BACKGROUND: The potential role played by launch price and clinical value in reimbursement decisions has not been sufficiently established in China. This study aimed to investigate the association of launch price and clinical value with reimbursement decisions for anticancer drugs after the implementation of reimbursement-linked price negotiation in China.
METHODS: Anticancer drugs approved by the National Medical Products Administration (NMPA) of China from January 2017 to June 2022 were eligible for inclusion. Approval and reimbursement dates of included drug indications were retrieved from publicly available resources. We collected measures of clinical value, including survival, quality of life (QoL), and overall response rate from pivotal clinical trials and calculated treatment price at launch. Univariate and multivariate Cox proportional hazards models were employed to estimate the association between launch price, clinical value, and reimbursement decisions of anticancer drugs in China.
RESULTS: The median reimbursement lag was 579 days (interquartile range [IQR]: 402-936) for 93 indications supported by randomized controlled trials and 637 days (IQR: 373-858) for 42 indications supported by single-arm clinical trials. Reimbursement was granted to 60 (65%) and 23 (55%) indications supported by randomized controlled and single-arm clinical trials, respectively. The launch price of anticancer drugs was not associated with reimbursement decisions in multivariate regression analyses. Indications supported by randomized controlled trials with higher clinical value were more likely to be reimbursed (hazard ratio [HR] for survival=1.07, 95% CI: 1.00-1.15, P=.037), while the overall response rate of indications supported by single-arm clinical trials was not associated with the likelihood of being reimbursed (HR=2.09, 95% CI: 0.14-32.28, P=.595).
CONCLUSIONS: The launch price of anticancer drugs may not have a significant impact on reimbursement decisions, while the implementation of reimbursement-linked price negotiation in China has prioritized anticancer drugs with higher clinical value, but only for indications supported by randomized controlled trials. Efforts are needed to prioritize indications supported by single-arm clinical trials that have higher value during the process of price negotiation.

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BACKGROUND: Changes to the method of payment for healthcare providers, including pay-for-performance schemes, are increasingly being used by governments, health insurers, and employers to help align financial incentives with health system goals. In this review we focused on changes to the method and level of payment for all types of healthcare providers in outpatient healthcare settings. Outpatient healthcare settings, broadly defined as \'out of hospital\' care including primary care, are important for health systems in reducing the use of more expensive hospital services.
OBJECTIVE: To assess the impact of different payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings on the quantity and quality of health service provision, patient outcomes, healthcare provider outcomes, cost of service provision, and adverse effects.
METHODS: We searched CENTRAL, MEDLINE, Embase (searched 5 March 2019), and several other databases. In addition, we searched clinical trials platforms, grey literature, screened reference lists of included studies, did a cited reference search for included studies, and contacted study authors to identify additional studies. We screened records from an updated search in August 2020, with any potentially relevant studies categorised as awaiting classification.
METHODS: Randomised trials, non-randomised trials, controlled before-after studies, interrupted time series, and repeated measures studies that compared different payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient care settings.
METHODS: We used standard methodological procedures expected by Cochrane. We conducted a structured synthesis. We first categorised the payment methods comparisons and outcomes, and then described the effects of different types of payment methods on different outcome categories. Where feasible, we used meta-analysis to synthesise the effects of payment interventions under the same category. Where it was not possible to perform meta-analysis, we have reported means/medians and full ranges of the available point estimates. We have reported the risk ratio (RR) for dichotomous outcomes and the relative difference (as per cent change or mean difference (MD)) for continuous outcomes.
RESULTS: We included 27 studies in the review: 12 randomised trials, 13 controlled before-and-after studies, one interrupted time series, and one repeated measure study. Most healthcare providers were primary care physicians. Most of the payment methods were implemented by health insurance schemes in high-income countries, with only one study from a low- or middle-income country. The included studies were categorised into four groups based on comparisons of different payment methods. (1) Pay for performance (P4P) plus existing payment methods compared with existing payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings P4P incentives probably improve child immunisation status (RR 1.27, 95% confidence interval (CI) 1.19 to 1.36; 3760 patients; moderate-certainty evidence) and may slightly increase the number of patients who are asked more detailed questions on their disease by their pharmacist (MD 1.24, 95% CI 0.93 to 1.54; 454 patients; low-certainty evidence). P4P may slightly improve primary care physicians\' prescribing of guideline-recommended antihypertensive medicines compared with an existing payment method (RR 1.07, 95% CI 1.02 to 1.12; 362 patients; low-certainty evidence). We are uncertain about the effects of extra P4P incentives on mean blood pressure reduction for patients and costs for providing services compared with an existing payment method (very low-certainty evidence). Outcomes related to workload or other health professional outcomes were not reported in the included studies. One randomised trial found that compared to the control group, the performance of incentivised professionals was not sustained after the P4P intervention had ended. (2) Fee for service (FFS) compared with existing payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings We are uncertain about the effect of FFS on the quantity of health services delivered (outpatient visits and hospitalisations), patient health outcomes, and total drugs cost compared to an existing payment method due to very low-certainty evidence. The quality of service provision and health professional outcomes were not reported in the included studies. One randomised trial reported that physicians paid via FFS may see more well patients than salaried physicians (low-certainty evidence), possibly implying that more unnecessary services were delivered through FFS. (3) FFS mixed with existing payment methods compared with existing payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings FFS mixed payment method may increase the quantity of health services provided compared with an existing payment method (RR 1.37, 95% CI 1.07 to 1.76; low-certainty evidence). We are uncertain about the effect of FFS mixed payment on quality of services provided, patient health outcomes, and health professional outcomes compared with an existing payment method due to very low-certainty evidence. Cost outcomes and adverse effects were not reported in the included studies. (4) Enhanced FFS compared with FFS for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings Enhanced FFS (higher FFS payment) probably increases child immunisation rates (RR 1.25, 95% CI 1.06 to 1.48; moderate-certainty evidence). We are uncertain whether higher FFS payment results in more primary care visits and about the effect of enhanced FFS on the net expenditure per year on covered children with regular FFS (very low-certainty evidence). Quality of service provision, patient outcomes, health professional outcomes, and adverse effects were not reported in the included studies.
CONCLUSIONS: For healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings, P4P or an increase in FFS payment level probably increases the quantity of health service provision (moderate-certainty evidence), and P4P may slightly improve the quality of service provision for targeted conditions (low-certainty evidence). The effects of changes in payment methods on health outcomes is uncertain due to very low-certainty evidence. Information to explore the influence of specific payment method design features, such as the size of incentives and type of performance measures, was insufficient. Furthermore, due to limited and very low-certainty evidence, it is uncertain if changing payment models without including additional funding for professionals would have similar effects. There is a need for further well-conducted research on payment methods for healthcare providers working in outpatient healthcare settings in low- and middle-income countries; more studies comparing the impacts of different designs of the same payment method; and studies that consider the unintended consequences of payment interventions.

There is growing interest globally in using real-world data (RWD) and real-world evidence (RWE) for health technology assessment (HTA). Optimal collection, analysis, and use of RWD/RWE to inform HTA requires a conceptual framework to standardize processes and ensure consistency. However, such framework is currently lacking in Asia, a region that is likely to benefit from RWD/RWE for at least two reasons. First, there is often limited Asian representation in clinical trials unless specifically conducted in Asian populations, and RWD may help to fill the evidence gap. Second, in a few Asian health systems, reimbursement decisions are not made at market entry; thus, allowing RWD/RWE to be collected to give more certainty about the effectiveness of technologies in the local setting and inform their appropriate use. Furthermore, an alignment of RWD/RWE policies across Asia would equip decision makers with context-relevant evidence, and improve timely patient access to new technologies. Using data collected from eleven health systems in Asia, this paper provides a review of the current landscape of RWD/RWE in Asia to inform HTA and explores a way forward to align policies within the region. This paper concludes with a proposal to establish an international collaboration among academics and HTA agencies in the region: the REAL World Data In ASia for HEalth Technology Assessment in Reimbursement (REALISE) working group, which seeks to develop a non-binding guidance document on the use of RWD/RWE to inform HTA for decision making in Asia.

BACKGROUND: Most studies on the physician code creep (i.e., changes in case mix record-keeping practices to improve reimbursement) have focused on episodes (inpatient hospitalizations or outpatient procedures). Little is known regarding changes in diagnostic coding practices for better reimbursement among a fixed cohort of patients with chronic diseases.
METHODS: To examine whether physicians in tertiary medical centers changed their coding practices after the initiation of the Outpatient Volume Control Program (OVCP) in Taiwan, we conducted a retrospective observational study of four patient cohorts (two interventions and two controls) from January 2016 to September 2017 in Taiwan. The main outcomes were the number of outpatient visits with four coding practices: 1) OVCP monitoring code recorded as primary diagnosis; 2) OVCP monitoring code recorded as secondary diagnosis; 3) non-OVCP monitoring code recorded as primary diagnosis; 4) non-OVCP monitoring code recorded as secondary diagnosis.
RESULTS: The percentage change of the number of visits with coding practice 1 between 2016Q1 and 2017Q3 was - 74% for patients with hypertension and - 73% with diabetes in tertiary medical centers and - 23% and - 17% in clinics, respectively. By contrast, the percentage changes of coding practice 3 were + 73% for patients with hypertension and + 46% for patients with diabetes in tertiary medical centers and - 19% and - 2% in clinics, respectively.
CONCLUSIONS: Physician code creep occurred after the initiation of the OVCP. Education regarding appropriate outpatient coding for physicians will be relatively effective when proper coding is related to reimbursement.

Big infectious diseases do harm to the whole society, and it is highly crucial to control them on time. The major purpose of this article is to theoretically demonstrate that the Chinese government\'s intervention in large-scale infectious diseases is successful and efficient. Two potential strategies were considered: strategy 1 was infectious disease without government intervention, and strategy 2 was infectious disease with government intervention. By evolution model, this article illustrates the efficiency of big infectious disease reimbursement policy in China. Without government reimbursement, this article finds that high expenditures accelerate the disease infection. The number of infected persons decreases under big infectious disease reimbursement policy in China. The higher the treatment costs, the more important the government intervention. Big infectious disease reimbursement policy in China can serve as an efficient example to cope with big infectious diseases.