A policy solution to improve staffing and patient care.

OBJECTIVE: To illustrate the financial consequences of implementing different managed entry agreements (managed entry agreements for the Dutch healthcare system for autologous gene therapy atidarsagene autotemcel [Libmeldy]), while also providing a first systematic guidance on how to construct managed entry agreements to aid future reimbursement decision making and create patient access to high-cost, one-off potentially curative therapies.
METHODS: Three payment models were compared: (1) an arbitrary 60% price discount, (2) an outcome-based spread payment with discounts, and (3) an outcome-based spread payment linked to a willingness to pay model with discounts. Financial consequences were estimated for full responders (A), patients responding according to the predicted clinical pathway presented in health technology assessment reports (B), and unstable responders (C). The associated costs for an average patient during the time frame of the payment agreement, the total budget impact, and associated benefits expressed in quality-adjusted life-years of the patient population were calculated.
RESULTS: When patients responded according to the predicted clinical pathway presented in health technology assessment reports (scenario B), implementing outcome-based reimbursement models (models 2 and 3) had lower associated budget impacts while gaining similar benefits compared with the discount (scenario 1, €8.9 million to €6.6 million vs €9.2 million). In the case of unstable responders (scenario C), costs for payers are lower in the outcome-based scenarios (€4.1 million and €3.0 million, scenario 2C and 3C, respectively) compared with implementing the discount (€9.2 million, scenario 1C).
CONCLUSIONS: Outcome-based models can mitigate the financial risk of reimbursing atidarsagene autotemcel. This can be considerably beneficial over simple discounts when clinical performance was similar to or worse than predicted.

The fee-for-service funding model for US emergency department (ED) clinician groups is increasingly fragile. Traditional fee-for-service payment systems offer no financial incentives to improve quality, address population health, or make value-based clinical decisions. Fee-for-service also does not support maintaining ED capacity to handle peak demand periods. In fee-for-service, clinicians rely heavily on cross-subsidization, where high reimbursement from commercial payors offsets low reimbursement from government payors and the uninsured. Although fee-for-service survived decades of steady cuts in government reimbursement rates, it is increasingly strained because of visit volatility and the effects of the No Surprises Act, which is driving down commercial reimbursement. Financial pressures on ED clinician groups and higher hospital boarding and clinical workloads are increasing workforce attrition. Here, we propose an alternative model to address some of these fundamental issues: an all-payer-funded, voluntary global budget for ED clinician services. If designed and implemented effectively, the model could support robust clinician staffing over the long term, ensure stability in clinical workload, and potentially improve equity in payments. The model could also be combined with population health programs (eg, pre-ED and post-ED telehealth, frequent ED use programs, and other innovations), offering significant payer returns and addressing quality and value. A linked program could also change hospital incentives that contribute to boarding. Strategies exist to test and refine ED clinician global budgets through existing government programs in Maryland and potentially through state-level legislation as a precursor to broader adoption.

The American Society for Radiation Oncology has proposed the Radiation Oncology Case Rate Program (ROCR) to advocate for fair reimbursement for radiation oncologists. ROCR would replace Medicare fee-for-service with a case rate payment for each of the 15 most common cancer types treated with external beam or stereotactic radiation therapy. This topic discussion attempts to provide a concise overview of the practical implications for radiation oncologists should the ROCR payment program be legislated by Congress and subsequently implemented by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services. This topic discussion covers the practical changes to billing and reimbursement, the Health Equity Achievement in Radiation Therapy payment, the Quality of Care requirement, and the available tool to calculate the effect of the ROCR based on an individual practice\'s case mix.

BACKGROUND: Affordability and accessibility of hospital care are under pressure. Research on hospital care financing focuses primarily on incentives in the financial system outside the hospital. It is notable that little is known about (incentives in) internal funding in hospitals. Therefore, our study focuses on the budget allocation in hospitals: the distribution model. Based on our hypothesis that the reimbursement and distribution models in hospitals might interact, we gain knowledge about-, and insight into, the interaction of different reimbursement and distribution models used in Dutch hospitals, and how they affect the financial output of hospital care.
METHODS: An online survey with 22 questions was conducted among financial senior management as an expert group in 49 Dutch hospitals.
RESULTS: Ultimately, 38 of 49 approached experts fully completed the survey, which amounts to 78% of the hospitals we approached and 60% of all Dutch hospitals. The results on the reimbursement model indicate price * volume with adjusted prices above a maximum cap as the most common dominant contract type. On the internal distribution model, 75-80% of the experts reported incremental budgeting as the dominant budgeting method. Results on the interaction between the reimbursement and the distribution model show that both general and specific changes in contract agreements are only partially incorporated in hospital budgets. In 28 out of 31 hospitals with self-employed medical specialists, a relation is reported between the reimbursement model and the contracts with the Medical Consultant Group(s) in which the medical specialists are united.
CONCLUSIONS: Our results in Dutch setting indicate a limited interaction between the reimbursement model and the distribution model. This lack of congruence between both models might limit the desired effects of incentives in contractual agreements aimed at the financial output. This applies to different reimbursement and distribution models. Further research into the various interactions and incentives, as visualized in our conceptual framework, could result in evidence-based advice for achieving affordable and accessible hospital care.

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Background: Global payment system is a kind of case-based payment system which pays for 60 commonly surgical operations by the average cost for each specified surgery case in Iran. The aim of the study was to determine the effect of this payment system on the number of services provided for each global surgical case versus fee-for-service (FFS) for the same operation. Methods: This is a retrospective study based on data from a large referral teaching hospital in Iran in the period of 2012-2015. Information related to 46 surgeries was performed which both global and FFS documents were gathered (N=7672). Statistical analysis was done on variables including Length of stay (LOS), Blood test (BT), Radiology (RA) and a mixed variable named VC (visit and consult number). Data were analyzed by a zero-inflated negative binomial regression model using STATA 11. Results: Descriptive analysis showed the mean of each service was significantly (p<0.001) higher in the FFS document\'s group rather than the global payment group. Regression estimates showed the amounts of each service including LOS, BT, RA and VC were significantly (p<0.001) higher in FFS surgery than global documents for the 15 selected surgery. LOS and BT have shown a significantly higher amount in 100% of surgeries for FFS above global document. Same as for Radiology test and VC variables, there were significantly higher amounts in 93% of surgeries for FFS above global hospital documents. Conclusion: The findings can reinforce the presence of a relationship between providing more clinical services in FFS document form and providers\' incentives to adjust profits against their Costs. The significantly higher service provision in FFS documents can be controlled with a prospective global payment mechanism.

UNASSIGNED: Under current reimbursement (CR) practice even though an add-on drug in a combination therapy may produce marginal value in terms of health gain, the original therapy may also share in the reward for this additional value. We examine an alternative \'marginal value-based reimbursement\' (MVBR) model in which an original therapy would not share in the marginal value.
UNASSIGNED: In a case study for treatment of HER2+ metastatic breast cancer, we computed the incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) of adding pertuzumab to trastuzumab and docetaxel (PHT) vs. trastuzumab and docetaxel (HT) under the CR and the MVBR models, respectively. We further estimated the revised cost of pertuzumab under three alternative willingness-to-pay thresholds based on (a) using the current ICER of PHT vs. HT, (b) the historical ICER of HT vs. docetaxel, and (c) applying the oft-used $150,000/quality-adjusted life year (QALY) gained.
UNASSIGNED: If reimbursement were changed from CR to MVBR, at the current price of pertuzumab, the ICER would decline from $409,213 to $323,236/QALY gained. If the price were adjusted under the three thresholds, the payment for pertuzumab would be increased by between 32% and 93%.
UNASSIGNED: The proposed MVBR model would provide a stronger economic incentive to develop add-on drugs.

The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services stipulate shared decision-making (SDM) counseling as a prerequisite to lung cancer screening (LCS) reimbursement, despite well-known challenges implementing SDM in practice.
How have health-care organizations implemented SDM for LCS?
For this qualitative study, we used data from in-depth, semistructured interviews with key informants directly involved in implementing SDM for LCS, managing SDM for LCS, or both. We identified respondents using a snowball sampling technique and used template analysis to identify and analyze responses thematically.
We interviewed 30 informants representing 23 health-care organizations located in 12 states and 4 Census regions. Respondents described two types of SDM for LCS programs: centralized models (n = 7), in which front-end practitioners (eg, primary care providers) referred patients to an LCS clinic where trained staff (eg, advanced practice nurses) delivered SDM at the time of screening, or decentralized models (n = 10), in which front-end practitioners delivered SDM before referring patients for screening. Some organizations used both models simultaneously (n = 6). Respondents discussed tradeoffs between SDM quality and access. They perceived centralized models as enhancing SDM quality, but limiting patient access to care, and vice versa. Respondents reported ongoing challenges with limited resources and budgetary constraints, ambiguity regarding what constitutes SDM, and an absence of benchmarks for evaluating SDM for LCS quality.
Those responsible for developing and managing SDM for LCS programs voiced concerns regarding both patient access and SDM quality, regardless of organizational context, or the SDM for LCS model implemented. The challenge facing these organizations, and those wanting to help patients and clinicians balance the tradeoffs inherent with LCS, is how to move beyond a check-box documentation requirement to a process that enables LCS to be offered to all high-risk patients, but used only by those who are informed and for whom screening represents a value-concordant service.

We aim to assess whether system providers perform better than nonsystem providers under an alternative payment model that incentivizes high-quality, cost-efficient care. We posit that the payment environment and the incentives it provides can affect the relative performance of vertically integrated health systems. To examine this potential influence, we compare system and nonsystem hospitals participating in Medicare\'s Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) model.
We used hospital cost and quality data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services linked to data from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality\'s Compendium of US Health Systems and hospital characteristics from secondary sources. The data include 706 hospitals in 67 metropolitan areas.
We estimated regressions that compared system and nonsystem hospitals\' 2017 cost and quality performance providing lower joint replacements among hospitals required to participate in CJR.
Among CJR hospitals, system hospitals that provided comprehensive services in their local market had 5.8 percent ($1612) lower episode costs (P = .01) than nonsystem hospitals. System hospitals that did not provide such services had 3.5 percent ($967) lower episode costs (P = .14). Quality differences between system hospitals and nonsystem hospitals were mostly small and statistically insignificant.
When operating under alternative payment model incentives, vertical integration may enable hospitals to lower costs with similar quality scores.