This review aims to map the spread of the virus from Iran to the Middle East and the rest of the world and to help better understand the key trends that occurred during COVID-19 from this epidemic center. We performed a literature review which was undertaken from 16 June to 22 November 2020. We reviewed the available evidence on imported cases from Iran, in the electronic databases PubMed and Google Scholar, as well as gray literature. It is shown that 125 cases were imported from Iran, out of which most of the imported cases were asymptomatic, and PCR testing was the most common method of detection. It was also found that more than half of the imported cases were not quarantined or isolated at home. The review revealed that many countries, especially the Middle East had imported cases from Iran. The big gap between the date of arrival at the airport and the date of diagnosis emphasizes the importance of early detection and quarantine measures, to stop the spread of the virus.

Coccidioidomycosis is caused by the dimorphic fungi Coccidioides species which is endemic in the Western hemisphere. Reports on the characteristics of travel-related disseminated coccidioidomycosis in immunocompetent patients are rare, especially in non-endemic regions. The multifaceted symptoms of this condition present a diagnostic challenge to clinicians. This study aimed to review immunocompetent patients diagnosed with disseminated coccidioidomycosis in a tertiary hospital in Eastern China and other non-endemic areas, and to emphasize the importance of combining travel history with clinical manifestations and proper diagnostic examinations. This study retrospectively reviewed a case series of disseminated coccidioidomycosis diagnosed in an academic hospital in Eastern China. We conducted a global literature review of disseminated coccidioidomycosis in immunocompetent patients with travel history. We identified six patients in our case series and reviewed 42 cases in the literature. Travel history included Mexico, Arizona, California, and regions of low endemicity. Extrapulmonary sites of infection, which presented with diverse signs and symptoms, involved the skin and soft tissue, musculoskeletal system, lymph nodes, and central nervous system. Misdiagnoses and diagnostic delays were common. Next-generation sequencing substantially promoted precise diagnosis in our series. The overall prognosis for immunocompetent individuals was positive, mainly benefited from long-term azole therapies. The patients that succumbed had either central nervous system involvement or multiorgan dissemination. Progressive pneumonia with varied symptoms and travel history should alert healthcare professionals in non-endemic areas to consider the possibility of Coccidioides species infection. We recommend detailed history-taking and hypothesis-free detection of pathogens for cases with diagnostic delay.

BACKGROUND: The continuing circulation of MERS in the Middle East makes the international dissemination of the disease a permanent threat. To inform risk assessment, we investigated the spatiotemporal pattern of MERS global dissemination and looked for factors explaining the heterogeneity observed in transmission events following importation.
METHODS: We reviewed imported MERS cases worldwide up to July 2015. We modelled importations in time based on air travel combined with incidence in Middle East. We used the detailed history of MERS case management after importation (time to hospitalization and isolation, number of hospitals visited,…) in logistic regression to identify risk factors for secondary transmission. We assessed changes in time to hospitalization and isolation in relation to collective and public health attention to the epidemic, measured by three indicators (Google Trends, ProMED-mail, Disease Outbreak News).
RESULTS: Modelled importation events were found to reproduce both the temporal and geographical structure of those observed - the Pearson correlation coefficient between predicted and observed monthly time series was large (r = 0.78, p < 10(-4)). The risk of secondary transmission following importation increased with the time to case isolation or death (OR = 1.7 p = 0.04) and more precisely with the duration of hospitalization (OR = 1.7, p = 0.02). The average daily number of secondary cases was 0.02 [0.0,0.12] in the community and 0.20 [0.03,9.0] in the hospital. Time from hospitalisation to isolation decreased in periods of high public health attention (2.33 ± 0.34 vs. 6.44 ± 0.97 days during baseline attention).
CONCLUSIONS: Countries at risk of importation should focus their resources on strict infection control measures for the management of potential cases in healthcare settings and on prompt MERS cases identification. Individual and collective awareness are key to substantially improve such preparedness.