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Abstract：
Public tolerance for corruption within a society significantly influences the prevalence of corrupt practices, but less is known about how this tolerance evolves with social norms. This paper presents experimental evidences demonstrating that the descriptive social norm indicating widespread corruption can lead to increased tolerance for corruptive acts. We introduce an asymmetric information ultimatum game to simulate the interactions between embezzlers and citizens. Game theoretical analysis reveals that victims anticipating corruption will exhibit greater compliance with embezzlement when the offers are evaluated based on descriptive norms. To test the hypothesis, we employ a framing effect to induce variations in descriptive norms within a behavioral experiment. Although the treatment effect is significant only in the subgroup of student cadres, this subgroup demonstrated increased beliefs about embezzlement, greater tolerance for corruption, and a heightened propensity to embezzle when exposed to framings with hierarchical implications. This paper contributes to the corruption literature by examining the effects of descriptive norms on victims\' responses to embezzlement. It offers a more comprehensive perspective on how social standards shape public opinions and corrupt actions, enhancing our understanding of the self-reinforcing nature of corruption.
摘要：
社会中公众对腐败的容忍度会极大地影响腐败行为的普遍性，但很少有人知道这种宽容是如何随着社会规范而演变的。本文提供了实验证据，证明表明广泛腐败的描述性社会规范可以导致对腐败行为的容忍度提高。我们引入了一个非对称信息最后通牒博弈来模拟盗用者与公民之间的互动。博弈论分析表明，当根据描述性规范评估要约时，预期腐败的受害者将表现出对挪用公款的更大遵守。为了检验假设，我们使用框架效应来诱导行为实验中描述性规范的变化。虽然治疗效果仅在学生干部亚组显著,这个小组对挪用公款的信念越来越高，对腐败有更大的容忍度，当暴露于具有等级影响的框架时，贪污的倾向会增加。本文通过研究描述性规范对受害者对挪用公款的反应的影响，为腐败文献做出了贡献。它为社会标准如何塑造公众舆论和腐败行为提供了更全面的视角，增强我们对腐败自我强化性质的理解。
