In rational decision-making processes, the information interaction among individual robots is a critical factor influencing system stability. We establish a game-theoretic model based on mutual information to address division of labor decision-making and stability issues arising from differential information interaction among swarm robots. Firstly, a mutual information model is employed to measure the information interaction among robots and analyze its influence on the behavior of individual robots. Secondly, employing the Cournot model and the Stackelberg model, we model the diverse decision-making behaviors of swarm robots influenced by discrepancies in mutual information. The intricate decision dynamics exhibited by the system under the disparity mutual information values during the game process, along with the stability of Nash equilibrium points, are analyzed. Finally, dynamic complexity simulations of the game models are simulated under the disparity mutual information values: (1) When ν1 of the game model varies within a certain range, the Nash equilibrium point loses stability and enters a chaotic state. (2) As I(X;Y) increases, the decision-making pattern of robots transitions gradually from the Cournot game to the Stackelberg game. Concurrently, the sensitivity of swarm robotics systems to changes in decision parameter decreases, reducing the likelihood of the system entering a chaotic state.

Models of indirect reciprocity study how social norms promote cooperation. In these models, cooperative individuals build up a positive reputation, which in turn helps them in their future interactions. The exact reputational benefits of cooperation depend on the norm in place, which may change over time. Previous research focused on the stability of social norms. Much less is known about how social norms initially evolve when competing with many others. A comprehensive evolutionary analysis, however, has been difficult. Even among the comparably simple space of so-called third-order norms, there are thousands of possibilities, each one inducing its own reputation dynamics. To address this challenge, we use large-scale computer simulations. We study the reputation dynamics of each third-order norm and all evolutionary transitions between them. In contrast to established work with only a handful of norms, we find that cooperation is hard to maintain in well-mixed populations. However, within group-structured populations, cooperation can emerge. The most successful norm in our simulations is particularly simple. It regards cooperation as universally positive, and defection as usually negative-unless defection takes the form of justified punishment. This research sheds light on the complex interplay of social norms, their induced reputation dynamics, and population structure.

Greater knowledge is always an advantage for a rational individual. However, this article shows that for a group of rational individuals greater knowledge can backfire, leading to a worse outcome for all. Surprisingly, this can happen even when new knowledge does not mean the discovery of a new action but simply provides a deeper understanding of the interaction at stake. More specifically, enhanced knowledge about the current state of nature may hinder cooperation among purely self-interested individuals. The paper describes this paradoxical possibility-a \'knowledge curse\'-and analyses the evolutionary process that occurs if, initially, only a few people have access to the greater knowledge. It concludes with a tentative comment on ways to avert this potential knowledge backlash.

Learning is a taxonomically widespread process by which animals change their behavioural responses to stimuli as a result of experience. In this way, it plays a crucial role in the development of individual behaviour and underpins substantial phenotypic variation within populations. Nevertheless, the impact of learning in social contexts on evolutionary change is not well understood. Here, we develop game theoretical models of competition for resources in small groups (e.g. producer-scrounger and hawk-dove games) in which actions are controlled by reinforcement learning and show that biases in the subjective valuation of different actions readily evolve. Moreover, in many cases, the convergence stable levels of bias exist at fitness minima and therefore lead to disruptive selection on learning rules and, potentially, to the evolution of genetic polymorphisms. Thus, we show how reinforcement learning in social contexts can be a driver of evolutionary diversification. In addition, we consider the evolution of ability in our games, showing that learning can also drive disruptive selection on the ability to perform a task.

The promotion of green intelligent buildings (GIBs) is regarded as an effective way to reduce carbon emissions and environmental pollution. How to formulate a reasonable and practical subsidy mechanism is crucial to promote the development of GIBs. However, there is still a lack of research on dynamic subsidy mechanism. To solve the research gap, based on consumer utility maximization theory, combining Hotelling model, the paper constructs an evolutionary game model between local governments and developers, and discusses the decision-making and evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of both players under the dynamic subsidy mechanism. In addition, the paper defines a symbol event and analyzes in depth the possibility of effective diffusion of GIBs. Finally, the paper provides corresponding policy suggestions and draws the following conclusions: (1) ESS exists only after the introduction of dynamic subsidy mechanism, so it is necessary for local governments to formulate dynamic subsidy policies; (2) Under the dynamic subsidy mechanism, different subsidy adjustment rates will affect the evolutionary efficiency of the system; (3) The sensitivity of influence factors from high to low is as follows: subsidy adjustment rate, financial incentives for consumers, additional taxes for conventional buildings developers, carbon trading income for GIB developers and comprehensive residential benefits for GIB homebuyers. Improving these factors can increase the possibility of effective diffusion of GIBs.

Innovative products entering the market will cause dynamic changes in market demand, and consumers\' purchase regret and their return behavior make the market environment more and more complex, which in turn affects the dynamic decision-making in the supply chain. In this paper, under the situation of discrete decision time, combining with the objective reality, we make discrete modification to the classical Bass diffusion model (Bass model), construct a manufacturer-led, retailer-followed supply chain differential game model, analyze the optimal decision-making of the manufacturer and the retailer by combining with the theory of discrete optimal control, and then verify the conclusions by numerical simulation. The results show that: when retailers purchase directly from the manufacturer and sell in the market, the optimal pricing of the innovative product can make the supply chain as a whole, realizing Pareto optimality; consumer\'s purchase regret will increase the amount of returns, which will lead to the decrease of product sales and the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer; when the innovative product accounts for a different share of the market, the impact of purchase regret on the wholesale price and the retail price are also different. Therefore, manufacturers need to have an extensive comprehension of the market to minimize the negative effects of consumer regret and returns, and to formulate a reasonable pricing strategy for their products to gain as much profit as possible.

In this paper, we study the problem of cost optimisation of individual-based institutional incentives (reward, punishment, and hybrid) for guaranteeing a certain minimal level of cooperative behaviour in a well-mixed, finite population. In this scheme, the individuals in the population interact via cooperation dilemmas (Donation Game or Public Goods Game) in which institutional reward is carried out only if cooperation is not abundant enough (i.e., the number of cooperators is below a threshold 1 ≤ t ≤ N - 1 , where N is the population size); and similarly, institutional punishment is carried out only when defection is too abundant. We study analytically the cases t = 1 for the reward incentive under the small mutation limit assumption and two different initial states, showing that the cost function is always non-decreasing. We derive the neutral drift and strong selection limits when the intensity of selection tends to zero and infinity, respectively. We numerically investigate the problem for other values of t and for population dynamics with arbitrary mutation rates.

A major goal in evolutionary biology is to elucidate common principles that drive human and other animal societies to adopt either a warlike or peaceful nature. One proposed explanation for the variation in aggression between human societies is the democratic peace hypothesis. According to this theory, autocracies are more warlike than democracies because autocratic leaders can pursue fights for private gain. However, autocratic and democratic decision-making processes are not unique to humans and are widely observed across a diverse range of non-human animal societies. We use evolutionary game theory to evaluate whether the logic of democratic peace may apply across taxa; specifically adapting the classic Hawk-Dove model to consider conflict decisions made by groups rather than individuals. We find support for the democratic peace hypothesis without mechanisms involving complex human institutions and discuss how these findings might be relevant to non-human animal societies. We suggest that the degree to which collective decisions are shared may explain variation in the intensity of intergroup conflict in nature.

Understanding the interplay between social activities and disease dynamics is crucial for effective public health interventions. Recent studies using coupled behavior-disease models assumed homogeneous populations. However, heterogeneity in population, such as different social groups, cannot be ignored. In this study, we divided the population into social media users and non-users, and investigated the impact of homophily (the tendency for individuals to associate with others similar to themselves) and online events on disease dynamics. Our results reveal that homophily hinders the adoption of vaccinating strategies, hastening the approach to a tipping point after which the population converges to an endemic equilibrium with no vaccine uptake. Furthermore, we find that online events can significantly influence disease dynamics, with early discussions on social media platforms serving as an early warning signal of potential disease outbreaks. Our model provides insights into the mechanisms underlying these phenomena and underscores the importance of considering homophily in disease modeling and public health strategies.

Throughout the history of coal mining in all countries of the world, large areas of goaf have been left behind, and sudden collapses and surface subsidence of large areas of goaf may occur, especially for mining areas with long mining cycles. The northern new district of the Liaoyuan mining area has been subjected to nearly half a century of mining activities, accompanied by a gradual accumulation of disasters, which have occurred frequently in recent years. In order to assess the stability of the goaf in the study area, this paper proposes a hybrid decision-making multi-factor integrated evaluation method. The distribution of underground goafs was determined using geophysical exploration techniques (seismic survey and transient electromagnetic method) and geological drilling exploration. First, an evaluation index system was established based on the specifications of the goaf, the ecological and geological environment, and the mining conditions; the system included 14 indicators. Two weight calculation methods, AHP-EWM, were employed to determine the comprehensive weight of each indicator by combining subjective and objective weights on the basis of improved game theory. Subsequently, the fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method was utilised to complete the stability rating of each block in the study area, and MapGIS and ArcGIS were employed to complete the drawing of the stability zoning map of the northern new district goaf. The study area was divided into three zones of stability, basic stability and instability, according to the critical value. These zones accounted for 23.03%, 36.45% and 40.52% of the total area of the study area, respectively. The comprehensive on-site investigation revealed a decrease in the size and number of collapse pits and the rate of damage to the houses from the unstable zone to the stable zone. This indicates that the results of the division are consistent with the actual situation. The classification results are consistent with the actual ground disaster situation, thus verifying the rationality and validity of the evaluation method. The results indicate that the stability of the study area is generally at the lower middle level.