Abstract：
I.J. Good\'s \"On the Principle of Total Evidence\" (1967) looms large in decision theory and Bayesian epistemology. Good proves that in Savage\'s (1954) decision theory, a coherent agent always prefers to collect, rather than ignore, free evidence. It is now well known that Good\'s result was prefigured in an unpublished note by Frank Ramsey (Skyrms 2006). The present paper highlights another early forerunner to Good\'s argument, appearing in Janina Hosiasson\'s \"Why do We Prefer Probabilities Relative to Many Data?\" (1931), that has been neglected in the literature. Section 1 reviews Good\'s argument and the problem it was meant to resolve; call this the value of evidence problem. Section 2 offers a brief history of the value of evidence problem and provides biographical background to contextualize Hosiasson\'s contribution. Section 3 explicates the central argument of Hosiasson\'s paper and considers its relationship to Good\'s (1967).
摘要：
I.J.Good的“论全面证据原则”（1967年）在决策理论和贝叶斯认识论中显得尤为重要。很好证明了在萨维奇(1954)的决策理论中，一个连贯的代理人总是喜欢收集，而不是忽视，免费证据。现在众所周知，好的结果是弗兰克·拉姆齐（FrankRamsey，Skyrms2006）未发表的笔记中预先设定的。本文强调了古德论点的另一个早期先驱，出现在JaninaHosiasson的“为什么我们更喜欢相对于许多数据的概率？”(1931)，这在文献中被忽略了。第1节回顾了Good\的论点及其要解决的问题；将其称为证据问题的价值。第2节提供了证据问题价值的简要历史，并提供了传记背景来说明Hosiasson的贡献。第3节阐述了Hosiasson论文的中心论点，并考虑了其与Good\s（1967）的关系。
