Abstract：
It is worth investigating the existence of cooperation, which is costly for the actor but beneficial to the recipient (precisely because it is costly for the former). If players, when they approach defectors, stop their relationship with them, cooperation can pay off and favorably emerge in the course of evolutionary dynamics. The present study examines the situation in which animals, even when they want to cooperate, sometimes lack the necessary resources, and are thereby prevented from cooperating with others. In addition, it is also considered that the underlying information about the presence or absence of these resources can be conveyed to the opponent player. Here, the opponent who defects-has no resources for cooperation-may be a cooperator or a defector. Therefore, it is not clear which behavior is more likely to evolve, if it is keeping the interaction with such an opponent (i.e., being trustful) or stopping the interaction with such an opponent (i.e., being not trustful). By using evolutionary game theory, it is revealed that those who want to keep the interaction with those without the resources to cooperate are favored by natural selection. This study sheds new light on the role of keeping and stopping interaction in the evolution of cooperation under variable availability of resources.
摘要：
合作的存在值得研究,这对参与者来说是昂贵的，但对接受者来说是有益的（正是因为前者是昂贵的）。如果玩家,当他们接近叛逃者时，停止与他们的关系，合作可以在进化动态的过程中获得回报并顺利出现。本研究考察了动物的情况，即使他们想合作，有时缺乏必要的资源，从而阻止与他人合作。此外,还认为关于这些资源的存在或不存在的潜在信息可以传达给对手玩家。这里,有缺陷的对手——没有合作资源——可能是合作者或叛逃者。因此,尚不清楚哪种行为更有可能进化，如果它保持与这样的对手的互动(即，信任)或停止与这样的对手的互动(即，不信任)。通过使用进化博弈论，据透露，那些想要与没有资源合作的人保持互动的人受到自然选择的青睐。这项研究为在可变资源可用性下保持和停止互动在合作演变中的作用提供了新的思路。
