This article combines ethnographic interpretations with analyses of the conceptual history of empathy. Moving beyond the more common notions, which often rely in psychological theories and terminologies, the conceptual-historical analyses trace its roots to 18th and 19th century notions of \'Einfühlung\'. As the ethnographic work follows the professional work with two young women with profound intellectual and multiple disabilities, the article makes a fivefold argument. First, we argue that empathy is often considered a matter of individual cognition but should be rethought as an embodied process of feeling-into. Second, we argue that this process is characterised by incompleteness-and hence must acknowledge that empathy is always partial, always on the way to understanding. Third, we argue that this incompleteness forces us to think about the underlying \'connecting force\', and that the conceptual history suggests that we should think about this force as a form of love. Fourth, we suggest that this \'love\' is highly embodied, and that this suggests that theoretical notions of empathy should relate to notions of kinship. Fifth, we suggest that the combination of this love (affection, appreciation), embodied kinship and incompleteness suggests a final rethinking, namely the notion of empathy as a form of longing.

An explosion of antiracism in medicine efforts have transpired since 2020. However, no ethical guidelines exist to guide them. This oversight is concerning because the racism and white supremacy rife within medicine can easily thwart them. This article addresses this gap by highlighting ethical guidelines for antiracism work in medicine. We present nine core tenets derived from our experience forming the Antiracist Healing Collaborative (AHC), a medical student-led initiative committed to developing bold and disruptive antiracist medical education content. Our lessons developing and implementing these tenets can guide other antiracism in medicine collaborations striving to promote liberation and healing, rather than recapitulating the racism and white supremacy culture embedded within medicine. We close by reflecting on how these tenets have steadied our recent decision to draw AHC to a close. They have allowed us to honour what we achieved together, strengthen the relationship that formed the foundation for our activism and bolster the shared antiracism mission that will guide our individual journeys moving forwards. The first of their kind, our ethical guidelines for antiracism work in medicine can facilitate greater recognition of the risks embedded in anti-oppression work transpiring in academic settings.

Canada\'s decriminalisation of assisted death has elicited significant ethical implications for the use of assisted death in healthcare contexts. Euthanasia by removal of vital organs (ERVO) is a theoretical extension of medically assisted death with an increased plausibility of implementation in light of the rapid expansion of assisted death eligibility laws and criteria in Canada. ERVO entails removing organs from a living patient under general anaesthesia as the mechanism of death. While ERVO is intended to maximise the viability of organs procured from the euthanised patient for donation to recipients, ending the lives of patient donors in this manner solely to benefit ill or dying recipient patients merits further ethical consideration. Specifically, the paper explores the application of personalist bioethics in determining whether the means of procuring organs through assisted death justifies the end of improving the lives of those who would benefit from receiving them. Further, by discussing the medical, social and ethical implications of ERVO, I will explicate a broader philosophical understanding of the influences of legalising assisted death on human dignity and conscience.

The functional-organic distinction attempts to differentiate disorders with diagnosable biological causes from those without and is a central axis on which diagnoses, medical specialities and services are organised. Previous studies report poor agreement between clinicians regarding the meanings of the terms and the conditions to which they apply, as well as noting value-laden implications of relevant diagnoses. Consequently, we aimed to understand how clinicians working in psychiatry and neurology services navigate the functional-organic distinction in their work. Twenty clinicians (10 physicians, 10 psychologists) working in psychiatry and neurology services participated in semistructured interviews that were analysed applying a constructivist grounded theory approach. The distinction was described as often incongruent with how clinicians conceptualise patients\' problems. Organic factors were considered to be objective, unambiguously identifiable and clearly causative, whereas functional causes were invisible and to be hypothesised through thinking and conversation. Contextual factors-including cultural assumptions, service demands, patient needs and colleagues\' views-were key in how the distinction was deployed in practice. The distinction was considered theoretically unsatisfactory, eventually to be superseded, but clinical decision making required it to be used strategically. These uses included helping communicate medical problems, navigating services, hiding meaning by making psychological explanations more palatable, tackling stigma, giving hope, and giving access to illness identity. Clinicians cited moral issues at both individual and societal levels as integral to the conceptual basis and deployment of the functional-organic distinction and described actively navigating these as part of their work. There was a considerable distance between the status of the functional-organic distinction as a sound theoretical concept generalisable across conditions and its role as a gatekeeping tool within the structures of healthcare. Ambiguity and contradictions were considered as both obstacles and benefits when deployed in practice and strategic considerations were important in deciding which to lean on.

Modern hospitals have succeeded in saving humans from numerous diseases owing to the rapid development of medical technology. However, modern medical science, combined with advanced technology, has developed a strong tendency to view human beings as mere targets of restoration and repair, with modern hospitals characterised as spaces centred on technology-focused treatment. This results in a situation where human beings are reduced to objects and alienated. This study, integrating Heidegger\'s concepts of dwelling and care, contends that \'care\' is a vital concept in terms of the fundamental spatiality of hospitals and needs to be restored as the key guiding principle affecting hospital space. The loss of the caring spirit in the development of modern hospitals affects how hospitals are conceived, built and managed, as well as how human experiences within hospitals are dealt with or allowed for appropriately. This study offers critical reflection on how future planning of hospital spaces can be better conducted to ensure that human experiences, and the care needed to appropriately value such experiences, are adequately expressed, and the complexity of human existence is suitably considered.

In this study, we conduct a detailed analysis of qualitative survey data focusing on adult populations in the UK, Japan and Mexico to address the following question: How has the COVID-19 pandemic changed people\'s lived experience of their bodies, other people\'s bodies and the world? We identify five themes: (i) fear and danger, (ii) bodily doubt and hypervigilance, (iii) risk and trust, (iv) adapting and enduring and (v) changes in perspective. We use two theoretical frameworks: first, Mary Douglas\' anthropological work on purity, risk, danger and symbolism is applied to understand how social and cultural meanings attached to the body have changed during the pandemic. Second, we use the concept of bodily doubt developed by Havi Carel to interpret how people experience their bodies and other people\'s bodies differently during the pandemic. While we recognise the significant variation in people\'s embodied experience of the pandemic, our findings suggest there are commonalities that span different countries and cultures. Specifically, we look at responses to COVID-19 protective countermeasures such as national lockdowns and physical distancing which we suggest have reduced people\'s ability to put faith in their own bodies, trust other people and trust the political leadership. We conclude by proposing that the changes to our lived experience during the COVID-19 pandemic have prompted changes in perspective and a renewed focus on what people consider important in life from a social, moral, cultural and political point of view.

Since the advent of more effective, new-generation treatment for hepatitis C, immense resources have been devoted to delivering cure to as many people with the virus as possible. The scale-up of treatment aims to prevent liver disease, liver cancer and onward transmission of hepatitis C, but social research shows that people also approach treatment with its social promises in mind, including the hope that it might reduce or eradicate stigma from their lives. Such hopes reflect broader ideas about medical cure, which is seen as an end point to illness and its effects, and capable of restoring the self to a (previous) state of health and well-being. But what does cure mean among people for whom treatment does not produce an end to the social effects of a heavily stigmatised disease? While new treatments promise to eliminate hepatitis C, accounts of post-cure life suggest that hepatitis C can linger in various ways. This article draws on interviews with people who have undergone treatment with direct-acting antivirals (n=30) in Australia to explore the meanings they attach to cure and their experiences of post-cure life. We argue that dominant biomedical understandings of cure as an \'ending\' and a \'restoration\' can foreclose insight into the social and other effects of illness that linger after medical cure, and how individuals grapple with those afterlives. Drawing on recent conceptual re-framings of cure from medical anthropology and disability studies, we suggest that thinking at the limits of \'curative reason\' helps to better address the afterlives of chronic illness. In the case of hepatitis C, reconceptualising cure could inform improved and less stigmatising ways of addressing people\'s post-cure needs. And in the era of hepatitis C elimination, such reconceptualisation is increasingly important as the cohort of people undergoing treatment and cure expands worldwide.

Describing someone as disabled means evaluating their relationship with their environment, body, and self. Such descriptions pivot on the person\'s perceived limitations due to their atypical embodiment. However, impairments are not inherently pathological, nor are disabilities necessarily deviations from biological normality, a discrepancy often articulated in science fiction via the presentation of radically altered environments. In such settings, non-impaired individuals can be shown to be unsuited to the world they find themselves in. One prime example of this comes courtesy of H. G. Wells\'s \"The Country of the Blind.\" This paper demonstrates science fiction\'s capacity to decouple disability\'s normative quality from classical medical models stemming from the medical Enlightenment movement by challenging the idea of the biologically normal. It first provides a brief account of disability before exploring the concept of medical normality. It then problematizes the biologically consistent being, arguing that health is only understandable when environmentally situated. Next, the paper provides an overview of \"The Country of the Blind\" before analyzing how it challenges the idea of biological normality, framing it as a social product rather than a universal constant. Finally, the paper concludes that science fiction narratives effectively interrogate our world\'s seemingly consistent trends by envisioning (un)desirable alternatives.

This paper examines the topic of physician burn-out from a philosophical lens. We explore the question of how the rise of physician burn-out may be related to an underlying erosion of meaning in medicine, characterised by the breakdown of the intersubjective relationship between doctors and patients. We argue that while commonly cited strategies for addressing burnout-including promoting work-life integration, cultivating workplace community, and fostering resilience-are critical for enhancing physician well-being, the common thread linking these approaches is that each identifies the physician as the primary locus of intervention. We propose that physician-centric approaches alone may be insufficient in addressing burnout, as the work might also involve shifting our attention to the intersubjective space that exists between the physician and the patient. To further elucidate the connection between intersubjectivity and the creation of meaning in medicine, we call on twentieth-century philosopher Emmanuel Levinas. Applying Levinas\'s philosophy to the clinical context, we discuss the phenomenon of \'depersonalisation\' and ask whether, rather than a mere consequence of burnout, depersonalisation might be a core cause of this condition. With these points we shed light on an idea that is relatively absent from the burn-out literature: that a person-oriented approach is vital not only for patient well-being but for physician wellness as well, as a process that \'de-personalizes\' patients might result in a simultaneous dehumanisation of physicians themselves. Drawing inspiration from Levinas, we explore how a reorientation towards the intersubjective, dialogical dimension of the doctor-patient dyad could serve as one important ingredient in healing not only the patient, but the physician as well.

The electronic health record (EHR) is a focus of contentious debate, having become as essential to contemporary clinical practice as it is polarising. Debates about the EHR raise questions about physicians\' professional identity, the nature of clinical work, evolution of the patient/practitioner relationship, and narratives of technological optimism and pessimism. The metaphors by which clinicians stake our identities-are we historians, detectives, educators, technicians, or something else?-animate the history of the early computer-based medical record in the mid-to-late twentieth-century USA. Proponents and detractors were equally interested in what the EHR revealed about clinician identity, and how it might fundamentally reshape it. This paper follows key moments in the history of the early computer-based patient record from the late 1950s to the EHR of the present day. In linking physician identity development, clinical epistemological structures, and the rise of the computer-based medical record in the USA in the mid-to-late twentieth century, we ask why the EHR is such a polarising entity in contemporary medicine, and situate clinician/EHR tensions in a longer history of aspirational physician identity and a kind of technological optimism that soon gave way to pessimism surrounding computer-based clinical work.