Traditional manufacturing industry is in the early stages of transition to low-carbon innovative production, and is in urgent need of a low-carbon innovation system to achieve the goal of carbon neutrality. In order to realize the effective supervision of enterprise carbon emissions, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model among the corporate, government and public from the perspective of dynamic subsidies and taxes. The main results are as follows. First, the increase in government subsidies to a certain extent will help encourage companies to choose low-carbon innovative production strategies, but more subsidies are not always better. Excessive subsidies will increase the cost of government regulation and reduce the probability of government regulation. Second, the tripartite evolutionary game system does not converge under the static subsidies and taxes mechanism. But the system could quickly converges to the stable condition under dynamic subsidies and taxes. The stable point is the situation of corporate low-carbon innovation, government regulation, and public supervision. Third, the public intervention and supervision can effectively prevent the phenomenon of government misconduct and enterprises over-emission production. And the influence of public reward and punishment is more effective for the government than for enterprises.

With an increase in the amount of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE), the waste of resources and environmental hazards caused by WEEE cannot be ignored. Meanwhile, the lack of environmental awareness among consumers and the existence of informal recyclers pose a great challenge to the government in governing the WEEE recycling industry. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model consisting of the government and formal and informal recyclers. Then, the payoff matrix, replicator dynamic equations and all the equilibrium points are obtained, and a stability analysis of the equilibrium points is performed to derive the evolutionary stability strategies (ESSs) and their formation conditions. Finally, the influence of important parameters on the WEEE recycling industry is examined through numerical analysis. The results suggest that the government cannot ignore the existence of informal recyclers but should take governance measures to intervene in informal recycling and guide such recyclers to upgrade their processing technology. Moreover, the willingness of informal recyclers to invest in processing technology increases with the increase in environmental damage taxes. Second, the government should provide formal recyclers with appropriate promotional subsidies. Third, the government should control its own cost of governance and reduce its financial burden. Fourth, with government subsidies, formal recyclers should decide whether to make promotional investments based on the investment cost and the sum of the benefits from the investment and government subsidy. Finally, under government tax pressure and the influence of formal recyclers\' promotional investments, informal recyclers should actively invest in processing technology.

Currently, waste management classification is a critical topic that concerns not only environmental protection, but also the advancement of a circular economy. To address this issue within the context of a circular economy, this study develops an uncooperative triumvirate paradigm consisting of \"central regulation, local promotion, and universal participation.\" The model analyzes the strategy choices of both the central and local governments while using an evolutionary game method to encourage residents to promote waste separation. Using numerical simulations, this study examines the variables that impact the strategy choices of the three parties over time. The results show that (1) the desire of the central government, local governments, and citizens to engage has varying effects on each of these entities; the conduct of local government is significantly influenced by the preparedness of the central government, but residents\' behavior is comparatively less influenced by the central government\'s intention; in comparison, it is mainly affected by psychological expectations of income and expenditure; (2) the impact of the local government and residents on each other is characterized by an unbalanced relationship, with the local government being more sensitive to residents\' willingness to participate and changes in policy support being more sensitive; and (3) residents show more sensitivity to incentive funds, compensation, penalties, and benefit distribution coefficients. To promote waste separation in China, it is crucial to establish a reasonable expectation of ecological civilization, establish an efficient mechanism for environmental protection supervision, refine local waste separation programs, increase local governments\' responsibility for promoting them, ensure legal methods for universal participation, and improve the regulatory mechanism for universal participation to protect the environment. In addition, it is essential to improve the education system for waste separation and continue research related to waste separation.

The practices of prefabricated buildings illustrate the incentives in prefabricated markets as well as the decision-making behavior of stakeholders, which can influence the transformation, upgrading, and sustainability of the buildings sector. The game between the stakeholders in the prefabricated buildings market becomes complicated by the fact that they dynamically adjust their strategies in response to changing market conditions. With the aim of quantitatively studying the implications of the dynamic decision behavior of prefabricated construction stakeholders on the prefabricated construction market, this study introduces component suppliers as participating agents and government subsidies and penalties as the main measures. And a three-way model of the evolutionary game involving government subsidies and punitive schemes is constructed by this study. The essay examines the evolutionary equilibrium strategies of each game subject as well as the effect of original strategies and different parameter choices on the decision-making of each subject using MATLAB. The findings reveal that (1) decision-making behaviors among the government, component suppliers, and developers are both interrelated and constrained, but governments are the dominant agents in the evolution of prefabricated buildings. (2) Parameters such as subsidies, penalties, costs, and benefits affect the stability of the tripartite evolutionary model, which remains consistent with the previous research. (3) Component suppliers have an equally important position in the development of prefabricated buildings as recognized entities such as developers and contractors. (4) When subsidies are kept at 40% of the incremental cost and penalties at 80% of the incremental cost, the model combines a fast evolutionary rate with stable model evolution. In conclusion, the article\'s research findings not only validate the rationality and feasibility of component suppliers as research subjects and confirm the importance of component suppliers but also propose a more reasonable boundary value for penalties and subsidies, which provides a reference for the government to improve the incentive and punishment measures as well as the dynamic adjustment strategy of stakeholders and also provides a new perspective to achieve the goal of sustainable development of construction.

With scientific and technological advancements and the diversification of residents\' demands, the pace of electronic product replacement is accelerating, generating a rapidly increasing number of waste electronics. The rapid development of information technologies, such as the Internet, has brought significant opportunities for recycling waste electronics. However, this is hindered by information safety concerns from residents. To achieve a win-win situation of promoting Internet recycling of waste electronics and preventing information leakage, this study performed a game analysis using key stakeholders in the Internet recycling of waste electronics. The game analysis of recycling waste electronics revealed that the lower the personal information leakage, the more residents would participate in recycling. Strict government regulation would increase the credibility of Internet recycling companies in protecting information security. Further, if the government imposed high fines on companies that breach information security, Internet recycling companies would endeavor to protect information security. In conclusion, this study offers policy recommendations and a theoretical basis to achieve a win-win situation of promoting Internet recycling of waste electronics and preventing information leakage from the perspective of stakeholders.

This study aims to determine the optimal strategy and driving factors of the critical nodes of pesticide packaging waste recycling by constructing the recycling process of \"village collection-town transport-county management.\" Counties, towns, and villages are the central nodes of collection, coordination, and communication in the recycling process. Their strategy selection and influencing factor analysis are related to the development of recycling. The county processing center, township transit center, and village recycling center were selected to construct a game model, and strategy and parameter assumptions were made to obtain the optimal strategy combination. The results showed that strict supervision, professional transportation and strict implementation are the best strategies for counties, towns and villages, respectively. Simulation analysis confirmed that factors such as cost, reward restricted the strategy selection of each subject. The higher the supervision, transport, and input costs, the lower the enthusiasm of counties, towns, and villages to participate in recycling, respectively. Reasonable control of reward could help each participant choose a stable strategy. The study provided the idea of a pilot before promotion for the government and emphasized the importance of controlling incentive policies and relative costs to improve the recycling process of pesticide packaging waste.

Public participation is essential to the success of ecological civilization. Whether public participation can effectively play a role in the outgoing audit of natural resources (OANR) is an important issue that remains to be explored. This paper uses the tripartite evolutionary game to explore the mechanism of the audit subjects, the leading cadres, and the public in the OANR. The research finds that there is a two-way linkage relationship between the audit subjects and the leading cadres. The audit subjects and the leading cadres affect the behavior strategies of the public in the indirect way and direct way, respectively. However, the public lacks the path to directly affect the other two subjects. The tripartite ideal audit model of \"the audit subjects conduct due diligence audits, leading cadres perform duties, the public participate\" cannot be realized. The external effect of the public\'s strategic choice is not enough to make the profit or loss of leading cadres change structurally and then change their behaviors. This paper demonstrates the reasons why the public cannot effectively participate in the OANR at the current stage from three aspects, which are the interpretation of the equations for replication dynamics, the particularity of the audit system, and the effectiveness of public participation. Three suggestions are put forward which are encouraging citizens\' indirect participation in the OANR, disclosing information about the OANR, and improving citizens\' awareness of the OANR. This paper has important guiding significance for other developing countries to promote public participation in natural resource auditing.

Benign exit has become the main theme of the transformation in China\'s peer-to-peer (P2P) lending industry. To protect the interests of investors in the benign exit process, this paper proposes a social co-governance pattern using a tripartite evolutionary game model to capture the behavior strategies of P2P lending platforms, investors, and financial regulators. The results demonstrate that there are four evolutionary stable strategies for the game model, among which the positive disposal of P2P lending platforms, the participation of the investors, and the co-governance policy of financial regulators is the optimal strategy in the benign exit process. The results also show that the initial proportion of P2P lending platforms, investors, and financial regulators would significantly affect the convergence speed of the evolutionary stable strategy. The proposed social co-governance pattern would effectively safeguard the interests of investors if incentive, penalty, and reputation mechanisms are well-designed. This paper provides in-depth implications for protecting investors\' interests in the transformation of the P2P lending industry and enhancing the sustainable development of the FinTech industry.

The problem of fraud in China\'s health insurance has existed for a long time and is becoming more serious, which needs to be solved urgently. This article constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model to study the formation mechanism of the Health Insurance fraud, game participants including medical administrative organization (MAO, a government department responsible for health insurance supervision), medical institutions (MI, such as hospitals), and insured individuals (II, who participating in medical and healthcare insurance). By analyzing the equilibrium of the tripartite evolutionary game, this paper makes an in-depth study on the formation and resolution of health insurance fraud. The results show that: (1) How to prevent the fraud behavior of the medical institutions is the difficulty and core of the problem. It is necessary to achieve effective supervision of the MAO, improve the internal management of the MI and give play to the supervisory role of the II. (2) The regulatory behavior of the MAO needs to focus on protecting the interests of the II, not only to encourage them to actively play the role of supervision and reporting but also to prevent their collusion with MI. (3) On the one hand, the MAO needs to strengthen supervision and increase the punishment for fraud. On the other hand, they also need to take incentive measures to guide all subjects to form a sound internal management mechanism.

With the rapid development of modern agriculture, non-point source nitrogen pollution from higher polluting farms has become one of the main contributions to the eutrophication of the watershed. This paper first constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model concerning local governments, higher polluting farms, and consumers, all of which participate in the reduction of nitrogen pollution in the river basin. Secondly, the evolution process of evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) and the impact of critical parameters on the strategies of the three stakeholders were analyzed through numerical simulation. The results demonstrated that (1) six ESSs of the system are determined, only (1, 0, 1) is regarded as the most ideal ESS: regulation by local governments, higher polluting farms adopting not purchasing emission rights, and consumers purchasing green agricultural products. (2) The regulation strategy of local governments depends on comparing political losses with the sum of emission reduction subsidies and the supervision cost. (3) The marginal abatement costs, the price of nitrogen emission permits, nitrogen use efficiency, and the subsidy standard for unit emission reduction are the main factors that affect the ESS of higher polluting farms. (4) The ESS of consumers is significantly affected by low-nitrogen preference, government subsidies, and nitrogen use efficiency. This study suggests that the government should strengthen the supervision of the watershed environment from the aspects of improving the market mechanism of nitrogen trading, establishing a dynamic monitoring system, and innovating a subsidy mechanism.