Abstract：
Traditional manufacturing industry is in the early stages of transition to low-carbon innovative production, and is in urgent need of a low-carbon innovation system to achieve the goal of carbon neutrality. In order to realize the effective supervision of enterprise carbon emissions, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model among the corporate, government and public from the perspective of dynamic subsidies and taxes. The main results are as follows. First, the increase in government subsidies to a certain extent will help encourage companies to choose low-carbon innovative production strategies, but more subsidies are not always better. Excessive subsidies will increase the cost of government regulation and reduce the probability of government regulation. Second, the tripartite evolutionary game system does not converge under the static subsidies and taxes mechanism. But the system could quickly converges to the stable condition under dynamic subsidies and taxes. The stable point is the situation of corporate low-carbon innovation, government regulation, and public supervision. Third, the public intervention and supervision can effectively prevent the phenomenon of government misconduct and enterprises over-emission production. And the influence of public reward and punishment is more effective for the government than for enterprises.
摘要：
传统制造业正处于向低碳创新生产转型的初期,迫切需要低碳创新体系来实现碳中和的目标。为了实现对企业碳排放的有效监管,本文构建了一个企业间的三方演化博弈模型,从动态补贴和税收的角度来看政府和公众。主要结果如下。首先,政府补贴的增加在一定程度上有助于鼓励企业选择低碳创新生产战略，但是更多的补贴并不总是更好的。过度的补贴会增加政府监管的成本，降低政府监管的概率。第二,在静态补贴和税收机制下，三方进化博弈系统不收敛。但是，在动态补贴和税收的情况下，该系统可以迅速收敛到稳定状态。稳定点是企业低碳创新的状况,政府监管,和公众监督。第三，公众的干预和监督可以有效防止政府不当行为和企业过度排放生产的现象。而公共奖惩的影响对政府比对企业更有效。
