Many decisions happen in social contexts such as negotiations, yet little is understood about how people balance fairness versus selfishness. Past investigations found that activation in brain areas involved in executive function and reward processing was associated with people offering less with no threat of rejection from their partner, compared to offering more when there was a threat of rejection. However, it remains unclear how trait reward sensitivity may modulate activation and connectivity patterns in these situations. To address this gap, we used task-based fMRI to examine the relation between reward sensitivity and the neural correlates of bargaining choices. Participants (N = 54) completed the Sensitivity to Punishment (SP)/Sensitivity to Reward (SR) Questionnaire and the Behavioral Inhibition System/Behavioral Activation System scales. Participants performed the Ultimatum and Dictator Games as proposers and exhibited strategic decisions by being fair when there was a threat of rejection, but being selfish when there was not a threat of rejection. We found that strategic decisions evoked activation in the Inferior Frontal Gyrus (IFG) and the Anterior Insula (AI). Next, we found elevated IFG connectivity with the Temporoparietal junction (TPJ) during strategic decisions. Finally, we explored whether trait reward sensitivity modulated brain responses while making strategic decisions. We found that people who scored lower in reward sensitivity made less strategic choices when they exhibited higher AI-Angular Gyrus connectivity. Taken together, our results demonstrate how trait reward sensitivity modulates neural responses to strategic decisions, potentially underscoring the importance of this factor within social and decision neuroscience.

The impact of COVID-19 on urban travel behavior has been unprecedented. It has significantly influenced the travel mode choices of different urban commuters in various countries across the globe. Given that the public transport providers need to tradeoff between minimizing the spread of COVID-19 and providing an affordable travel choice in this environment, we develop a strategic queueing model to analyze the effect of different pricing strategies on the commuter behavior. In particular, we consider a Markovian queue in front of a public transport ticket counter wherein strategic commuters arrive at the service facility and make joining or balking decisions based on their derived utilities. In contrast to conventional wisdom, we suggest that the public transport provider needs to decrease the price to filter out the wealthy commuters who possess feasible alternative travel options from using public transport and promote the commuters with no alternatives in using public transport.

Economist Nobelist Thomas C. Schelling (1921-2016) is known for his contribution to the analysis of international conflict and many see him as the Cold Warrior par excellence. At a time of great uncertainties and dangers, Schelling combined a deep understanding of strategic analysis, a detailed knowledge of US commitments around the world and an inimitable talent for dissecting everyday behavior, which made him a think tank all on his own. When he turned to the analysis of bargaining in the mid-1950s, one question dominated policy discussions: \"How to demonstrate the US commitment to the \'free world\'\"? Schelling answered unequivocally: By restricting one\'s choices so as to shift others\' expectations and thereby influence their behavior in the desired direction. By the mid-1970s, after he had broken with the US administration and joined the Committee on Substance Abuse and Habitual Behavior, Schelling transposed the tactics deployed in international conflict to the analysis of individuals trying to achieve self-control. In the process, he reproduced the logic of military conflict at the level of the self. The view of a conflicted self itself comprised of two selves made restricted choice the daily routine of individuals who wish to avoid the negative consequences of their present behavior in the future while it promised those who enjoy unbounded freedom of choice an unsettling future.

Many decisions happen in social contexts such as negotiations, yet little is understood about how people balance fairness versus selfishness. Past investigations found that activation in brain areas involved in executive function and reward processing was associated with people offering less with no threat of rejection from their partner, compared to offering more when there was a threat of rejection. However, it remains unclear how trait reward sensitivity may modulate activation and connectivity patterns in these situations. To address this gap, we used task-based fMRI to examine the relation between reward sensitivity and the neural correlates of bargaining choices. Participants (N = 54) completed the Sensitivity to Punishment (SP)/Sensitivity to Reward (SR) Questionnaire and the Behavioral Inhibition System/Behavioral Activation System scales. Participants performed the Ultimatum and Dictator Games as proposers and exhibited strategic decisions by being fair when there was a threat of rejection, but being selfish when there was not a threat of rejection. We found that strategic decisions evoked activation in the Inferior Frontal Gyrus (IFG) and the Anterior Insula (AI). Next, we found elevated IFG connectivity with the Temporoparietal junction (TPJ) during strategic decisions. Finally, we explored whether trait reward sensitivity modulated brain responses while making strategic decisions. We found that people who scored lower in reward sensitivity made less strategic choices when they exhibited higher AI-Angular Gyrus connectivity. Taken together, our results demonstrate how trait reward sensitivity modulates neural responses to strategic decisions, potentially underscoring the importance of this factor within social and decision neuroscience.

Current business challenges mean that understanding elements that can affect organizational performance represents a differential factor in maintaining competitiveness. In this context, the objective of this article is to conduct a Systematic Literature Review (SLR) of the relationship between dynamic capabilities, strategic behavior, and organizational performance. For this, A three-stage SLR protocol was used: (i) planning, (ii) conduct, and (iii) knowledge development. A total of 118 articles covering the publication period of 2006-2021 were included, which evidenced: (i) the grouping of words into three classes: \"Knowledge Management,\" \"Measurement Instrument,\" and \"Organizational Environment\"; (ii) the methodological framework; (iii) directions for future research. The findings reinforce the importance of the theoretical, methodological, and empirical relationship between the three constructs. Furthermore, the results indicate the relationship between the set of terms selected in each class, highlighting the strong connection between dynamic capabilities and competitive intensity. The main findings of the research show that organizations can expand or modify their processes by building and using dynamic capabilities as institutional factors, shaping strategic behavior to advance better performance.

The security of medical insurance fund is very important to health equity. In China, the expenditure of medical insurance fund has increased sharply year after year, and the balance of local medical insurance fund is difficult to sustain. To realize the equitable distribution of the medical insurance burden, the central government has to continuously increase transfer payments, which causes regional unfairness in the distribution of central financial resources. This paper explores the influence of central transfer payments on the balance of medical insurance fund, influential mechanisms, and the strategic behavior of local governments.
First, we constructed a dynamic game model between central government and local governments and analyzed the mechanism of central transfer payments affecting the balance of local medical insurance fund. Then, based on the provincial panel data of 28 provincial administrative regions in China from 2004 to 2014, an empirical test was made. The spatial regression model was constructed, and the transfer payments obtained by neighboring provinces in the previous year were taken as instrumental variables.
Central transfer payments led to strategic behaviors by local governments that resulted in increased local health insurance fund expenditures and lower balance rates. Moreover, the central transfer payments demonstrated \"path dependence\". Central transfer payments had a significant negative influence on the local NCMS fund balance rate. The local government subsidy and per capita GDP had a significant positive impact on the local NCMS fund balance rate. The obtained transfer payments of local governments had a significant space correlation. This study based on NCMS data remains valid.
Central transfer payments induced the strategic behavior of local governments, which neglected to supervise the expenditure of medical insurance fund, reducing the efficiency of medical insurance fund management and use. The financial resources of medical insurance fund are unevenly distributed among provinces. Measures such as strengthening the supervision ability and initiatives of local governments, refining the central transfer payment mechanism, promoting the economic growth of western regions, and increasing rates for individual contributions appropriately can ensure that the medical insurance fund are used well and distributed equitably.

Strategic interactions, where an individual\'s payoff depends on the decisions of multiple intelligent agents, are ubiquitous among social animals. They span a variety of important social behaviors such as competition, cooperation, coordination, and communication, and often involve complex, intertwining cognitive operations ranging from basic reward processing to higher-order mentalization. Here, we review the progress and challenges in probing the neural and cognitive mechanisms of strategic behavior of interacting individuals, drawing an analogy to recent developments in studies of reward-seeking behavior, in particular, how research focuses in the field of strategic behavior have been expanded from adaptive behavior based on trial-and-error to flexible decisions based on limited prior experience. We highlight two important research questions in the field of strategic behavior: (i) How does the brain exploit past experience for learning to behave strategically? and (ii) How does the brain decide what to do in novel strategic situations in the absence of direct experience? For the former, we discuss the utility of learning models that have effectively connected various types of neural data with strategic learning behavior and helped elucidate the interplay among multiple learning processes. For the latter, we review the recent evidence and propose a neural generative mechanism by which the brain makes novel strategic choices through simulating others\' goal-directed actions according to rational or bounded-rational principles obtained through indirect social knowledge. This article is categorized under: Economics > Interactive Decision-Making Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making Neuroscience > Cognition.

The impostor phenomenon (IP) refers to the tendency to perceive oneself as intellectually incompetent and to attribute one\'s own success to effort-related or external factors, such as fortunate circumstances. The present study (N=209) aimed to contribute to open questions regarding gender differences in the IP and the nomological network of the IP. The results show that the consistently found key correlates of the IP, that is, lower self-esteem and higher neuroticism, could also play a role in explaining why women report higher impostor feelings than men in many studies. Moreover, the results suggest that IP is characterized by the more maladaptive, socially prescribed perfectionism, which is related to the belief that others expect perfection from oneself, whereas self-oriented perfectionism, which is characterized by a critical view on oneself, plays a smaller role in differences in the IP. Finally, a strong association with the sandbagging construct challenges the conceptualization of the IP as a genuine doubt about one\'s own competence, because similarly to IP, sandbaggers present themselves negatively to others, but do so for very strategic reasons in order to create a low expectation base in other individuals. Regression analysis was used to assess the incremental value of the personality factors in explaining variance in the IP. It was found that sandbagging and IP are highly related but not interchangeable.

OBJECTIVE: The 340B Drug Pricing Program allows hospitals to purchase covered drugs at a discount and potentially generate profit if they are reimbursed at rates that exceed 340B acquisition prices. Disproportionate share hospitals (DSH) are eligible to participate in 340B if their DSH adjustment-a measure that identifies hospitals that treat a disproportionate share of low income Medicare or Medicaid patients-is above 11.75%. To assess whether hospitals behave strategically to gain access to the program, we examined data on the number of hospitals just above versus below the DSH adjustment threshold for 340B eligibility and conducted McCrary density tests to assess statistical significance.
RESULTS: In 2014-2016, the number of hospitals increases by 41% just above the 340B eligibility threshold. McCrary density tests found this increase to be statistically significant across a range of bandwidths in 2014-2016 (p < 0.01). From 2011-2013, the findings are sensitive to the bandwidth around the threshold, but insignificant in 2008-2010. We found no comparable change among hospitals ineligible for the 340B program. These data are consistent with the hypothesis that some hospitals adjust their DSH to gain 340B eligibility. Our findings support recent calls from the Government Accountability Office to improve oversight of the 340B program.

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