与普通关注数学和物理学发展的现象相比,在分析哲学的早期历史中,生命科学似乎受到了相对稀疏的关注。本文讨论了这一现象的两个相关方面。一方面,它问:在某种程度上,生命科学的重要性确实被早期的分析哲学家所淡化,这个问题的答案可以在BertrandRussell的1914年关于生物学和哲学之间关系的讨论中找到。与人们对分析哲学史的看法相反,罗素提出了自己的“逻辑原子主义”,不仅反对英国的理想主义,也是进化论。另一方面,我将质疑这种所谓的对生命科学的忽视是否确实准确地描述了分析哲学史。在回答这个问题时,我首先谈谈苏珊·斯特宾对罗素忽视生物学的批评,她对J.H.Woodger的影响,以及她对T.H.Huxley和C.H.Waddington将进化论观点应用于哲学问题的批判性讨论。然后我讨论MoritzSchlick的案子,他的进化论哲学在最近关于逻辑经验主义与生物学哲学的关系的辩论中被忽视了。
Comparative to the commonplace focus onto developments in mathematics and physics, the life sciences appear to have received relatively sparse attention within the early history of analytic philosophy. This paper addresses two related aspects of this phenomenon. On the one hand, it asks: to the extent that the significance of the life sciences was indeed downplayed by early analytic philosophers, why was this the case? An answer to this question may be found in Bertrand
Russell\'s 1914 discussions of the relation between biology and philosophy. Contrary to received views of the history of analytic philosophy,
Russell presented his own \'logical atomism\' in opposition not only to British Idealism, but also to \'evolutionism\'. On the other hand, I will question whether this purported neglect of the life sciences does indeed accurately characterise the history of analytic philosophy. In answering this, I turn first to Susan Stebbing\'s criticisms of
Russell\'s overlooking of biology, her influence on J.H. Woodger, and her critical discussion of T.H. Huxley\'s and C.H. Waddington\'s application of evolutionary views to philosophical questions. I then discuss the case of Moritz Schlick, whose evolutionist philosophy has been overlooked within recent debates concerning Logical Empiricism\'s relation to the philosophy of biology.