Laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) and accidental pathogen escape from laboratory settings (APELS) are major concerns for the community. A risk-based approach for pathogen research management within a standard biosafety management framework is recommended but is challenging due to reasons such as inconsistency in risk tolerance and perception. Here, we performed a scoping review using publicly available, peer-reviewed journal and media reports of LAIs and instances of APELS between 2000 and 2021. We identified LAIs in 309 individuals in 94 reports for 51 pathogens. Eight fatalities (2·6% of all LAIs) were caused by infection with Neisseria meningitidis (n=3, 37·5%), Yersinia pestis (n=2, 25%), Salmonella enterica serotype Typhimurium (S Typhimurium; n=1, 12·5%), or Ebola virus (n=1, 12·5%) or were due to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (n=1, 12·5%). The top five LAI pathogens were S Typhimurium (n=154, 49·8%), Salmonella enteritidis (n=21, 6·8%), vaccinia virus (n=13, 4·2%), Brucella spp (n=12, 3·9%), and Brucella melitensis (n=11, 3·6%). 16 APELS were reported, including those for Bacillus anthracis, SARS-CoV, and poliovirus (n=3 each, 18·8%); Brucella spp and foot and mouth disease virus (n=2 each, 12·5%); and variola virus, Burkholderia pseudomallei, and influenza virus H5N1 (n=1 each, 6·3%). Continual improvement in LAI and APELS management via their root cause analysis and thorough investigation of such incidents is essential to prevent future occurrences. The results are biased due to the reliance on publicly available information, which emphasises the need for formalised global LAIs and APELS reporting to better understand the frequency of and circumstances surrounding these incidents.

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Fungus-growing ants depend on a fungal mutualist that can fall prey to fungal pathogens. This mutualist is cultivated by these ants in structures called fungus gardens. Ants exhibit weeding behaviors that keep their fungus gardens healthy by physically removing compromised pieces. However, how ants detect diseases of their fungus gardens is unknown. Here, we applied the logic of Koch\'s postulates using environmental fungal community gene sequencing, fungal isolation, and laboratory infection experiments to establish that Trichoderma spp. can act as previously unrecognized pathogens of Trachymyrmex septentrionalis fungus gardens. Our environmental data showed that Trichoderma are the most abundant noncultivar fungi in wild T. septentrionalis fungus gardens. We further determined that metabolites produced by Trichoderma induce an ant weeding response that mirrors their response to live Trichoderma. Combining ant behavioral experiments with bioactivity-guided fractionation and statistical prioritization of metabolites in Trichoderma extracts demonstrated that T. septentrionalis ants weed in response to peptaibols, a specific class of secondary metabolites known to be produced by Trichoderma fungi. Similar assays conducted using purified peptaibols, including the two previously undescribed peptaibols trichokindins VIII and IX, suggested that weeding is likely induced by peptaibols as a class rather than by a single peptaibol metabolite. In addition to their presence in laboratory experiments, we detected peptaibols in wild fungus gardens. Our combination of environmental data and laboratory infection experiments strongly support that peptaibols act as chemical cues of Trichoderma pathogenesis in T. septentrionalis fungus gardens.

Omicron and its sublineages are currently predominant and have triggered epidemiological waves of SARS-CoV-2 around the world due to their high transmissibility and strong immune escape ability. Vaccines are key measures to control the COVID-19 burden. Omicron BA.2 caused a large-scale outbreak in Shanghai since March 2022 and resulted in over 0.6 million laboratory-confirmed infections. The vaccine coverage of primary immunization among residents aged 3 years and older in Shanghai exceeded 90%, and inactivated COVID-19 vaccines were mainly delivered. In the context of high vaccine coverage, we conducted a cohort study to assess vaccine effects on reducing the probability of developing symptoms or severity of disease in infections or nonsevere cases. A total of 48,243 eligible participants were included in this study, the majority of whom had asymptomatic infections (31.0%) and mild-to-moderate illness (67.9%). Domestically developed COVID-19 vaccines provide limited protection to prevent asymptomatic infection from developing into mild-to-moderate illness and durable protection to prevent nonsevere illness from progressing to severe illness caused by Omicron BA.2. Partial vaccination fails to provide effective protection in any situation. The level of vaccine effects on disease progression in the elderly over 80 years old was relatively lower compared with other age groups. Our study results added robust evidence for the vaccine performance against Omicron infection and could improve vaccine confidence.

In this study, we compared admission incidence risk and the risk of mortality in the Omicron BA.4/BA.5 wave to previous waves.
Data from South Africa\'s SARS-CoV-2 case linelist, national COVID-19 hospital surveillance system, and Electronic Vaccine Data System were linked and analyzed. Wave periods were defined when the country passed a weekly incidence of 30 cases/100 000 population. In-hospital case fatality ratios (CFRs) during the Delta, Omicron BA.1/BA.2, and Omicron BA.4/BA.5 waves were compared using post-imputation random effect multivariable logistic regression models.
The CFR was 25.9% (N = 37 538 of 144 778), 10.9% (N = 6123 of 56 384), and 8.2% (N = 1212 of 14 879) in the Delta, Omicron BA.1/BA.2, and Omicron BA.4/BA.5 waves, respectively. After adjusting for age, sex, race, comorbidities, health sector, and province, compared with the Omicron BA.4/BA.5 wave, patients had higher risk of mortality in the Omicron BA.1/BA.2 wave (adjusted odds ratio [aOR], 1.3; 95% confidence interval [CI]: 1.2-1.4) and Delta wave (aOR, 3.0; 95% CI: 2.8-3.2). Being partially vaccinated (aOR, 0.9; 95% CI: .9-.9), fully vaccinated (aOR, 0.6; 95% CI: .6-.7), and boosted (aOR, 0.4; 95% CI: .4-.5) and having prior laboratory-confirmed infection (aOR, 0.4; 95% CI: .3-.4) were associated with reduced risks of mortality.
Overall, admission incidence risk and in-hospital mortality, which had increased progressively in South Africa\'s first 3 waves, decreased in the fourth Omicron BA.1/BA.2 wave and declined even further in the fifth Omicron BA.4/BA.5 wave. Mortality risk was lower in those with natural infection and vaccination, declining further as the number of vaccine doses increased.

The guinea pig was the original animal model developed for investigating spotted fever rickettsiosis (SFR). This model system has persisted on account of the guinea pig\'s conduciveness to tick transmission of SFR agents and ability to recapitulate SFR in humans through clinical signs that include fever, unthriftiness, and in some cases the development of an eschar. The guinea pig is the smallest animal model for SFR that allows the collection of multiple blood and skin samples antemortem for longitudinal studies. This unit provides the basic protocols necessary to establish, maintain, and utilize a guinea pig-tick-Rickettsia model for monitoring the course of infection and immune response to an infection by spotted fever group Rickettsia (SFGR) that can be studied at biosafety level 2 (BSL-2) and arthropod containment level 2 (ACL-2); adaptations must be made for BSL-3 agents. The protocols cover methods for tick feeding and colony development, laboratory infection of ticks, tick transmission of Rickettsia to guinea pigs, and monitoring of the course of infection through clinical signs, rickettsial burden, and immune response. It should be feasible to adapt these methods to study other tick-borne pathogens. © 2022 The Authors. Current Protocols published by Wiley Periodicals LLC. Basic Protocol 1: Tick transmission of SFGR to guinea pigs Support Protocol 1: Laboratory infection of ticks by injection Alternate Protocol 1: Needle inoculation of SFGR to guinea pigs Basic Protocol 2: Monitoring the course of guinea pig rickettsial infection: clinical signs Basic Protocol 3: Monitoring the course of guinea pig rickettsial infection: collection of biological specimens Support Protocol 2: Guinea pig anesthesia Basic Protocol 4: Monitoring rickettsial burden in guinea pigs by multiplex qPCR Basic Protocol 5: Monitoring guinea pig immune response to infection: blood leukocytes by flow cytometry Basic Protocol 6: Monitoring immune response to guinea pig rickettsial infection: leukocyte infiltration of skin at the tick bite site by flow cytometry Basic Protocol 7: Monitoring the immune response to guinea pig rickettsial infection: antibody titer by ELISA Support Protocol 4: Coating ELISA Plates Alternate Protocol 2: Monitoring immune response to guinea pig rickettsial infection: antibody titer by immunofluorescence assay.

One of the most important requirements for the personnel of microbiological laboratories working with pathogenic and infectious agents is the observance of precautionary measures and the implementation of a set of preventive measures, collectively interpreted as biological safety (biosafety). To a large extent, biosafety problems are also relevant for all clinical laboratories working with biosubstrates, with the potential threat of containing pathogens of bloodborne infections in them. On December 30, 2020, the President of the Russian Federation signed Federal Law № 492 «On the Biological Safety of the Russian Federation» (№ 492-FZ), which regulates the basic legal norms and regulation of biosafety issues, as well as a list of measures to prevent the risks of the spread of infections due to accidents, bioterrorist acts and sabotage. The current pandemic of the coronavirus infection COVID-19 has demonstrated, on the one hand, the epidemiological vulnerability of the single world space, and on the other hand, the decisive influence of biological emergencies on the emergence of negative political and economic processes in the world community. In this regard, the issues of ensuring biosafety in the work of microbiological laboratories in the context of protecting personnel and the environment from accidental or unintentional spread of infections are relevant. Working with pathogenic biological agents in microbiological laboratories is constantly associated with the risk of accidents and possible laboratory infection (laboratory-acquired infections) of employees, environmental pollution if the requirements of regulatory documents on biological safety are not met. In accordance with the requirements of № 492-FZ, in order to prevent biological threats, it is necessary to create a system for monitoring biological risks in microbiological laboratories when working with any infected material.

A laboratory-acquired E. coli O157:H7 infection with associated severe sequelae including hemolytic uremic syndrome occurred in an individual working in the laboratory with a mixture of nalidixic acid-resistant (NalR) O157:H7 mutant strains in a soil-biochar blend. The patient was hospitalized and treated with an intravenous combination of metronidazole and levofloxacin. The present study investigated the source of this severe laboratory acquired infection and further examined the influence of the antibiotics used during treatment on the expression and production of Shiga toxin. Genomes of two Stx2a-and eae-positive O157:H7 strains isolated from the patient\'s stool were sequenced along with two pairs of the wt strains and their derived NalR mutants used in the laboratory experiments. High-resolution SNP typing determined the strains\' individual genetic relatedness and unambiguously identified the two laboratory-derived NalR mutant strains as the source of the researcher\'s life-threatening disease, rather than a conceivable ingestion of unrelated O157:H7 isolates circulating at the same time. It was further confirmed that in sublethal doses, the antibiotics increased toxin expression and production. Our results support a simultaneous co-infection with clinical strains in the laboratory, which were the causative agents of previous O157:H7 outbreaks, and further that the administration of antibiotics may have impacted the outcome of the infection.

An inadequacy in sanitizing processes in a biopharmaceutical plant in Lanzhou, China, during July and August 2019, led to the aerosolization of Brucella that was subsequently spread through wind to nearby settlements and academic institutes, resulting in >10 000 human brucellosis cases, as of November 2020. The leak, possibly the largest laboratory accident in the history of infectious diseases, underlines the particular characteristics of Brucella that have made the pathogen a historical entity in biodefense research and a major cause of laboratory-associated infections. It further underlines the need for enhanced vigilance and strict regulatory interventions in similar facilities.

Developing countries face various challenges in implementing bio-risk management systems in the laboratory. In addition, educational settings are considered as workplaces with biohazard risks. Every activity in a laboratory facility carries many potential hazards that can impact human health and the environment and may cause laboratory incidents, including Laboratory Acquired Infections (LAIs). In an effort to minimize the impact and occurrence of these incidents, it is necessary to evaluate the implementation of a bio-risk management system in every activity that involves handling biological agents. This study was conducted in an Indonesian higher-education institution, herein coded as University Y. This is a descriptive, semi-quantitative study aimed at analysing and evaluating the implementation of the bio-risk management systems used in laboratories by analysing the achievements obtained by each laboratory. The study used primary data that were collected using a checklist which referred to ISO 35001:2019 on Laboratory Bio-risk Management. The checklist consisted of 202 items forming seven main elements. In addition, secondary data obtained from literature and document review were also used. The results show that out of 11 laboratories examined, only 2 laboratories met 50% of the requirements, which were Laboratory A and B, achieving good performance. Regarding the clauses of standards, a gap analysis identified leadership, performance evaluation, and support as elements with the lowest achievement. Therefore, corrective action should be developed by enhancing the commitment from management as well as improving documentation, policy, education and training.