关键词: evolution game theory knowledge welfare

来  源:   DOI:10.1098/rsos.240358   PDF(Pubmed)

Abstract:
Greater knowledge is always an advantage for a rational individual. However, this article shows that for a group of rational individuals greater knowledge can backfire, leading to a worse outcome for all. Surprisingly, this can happen even when new knowledge does not mean the discovery of a new action but simply provides a deeper understanding of the interaction at stake. More specifically, enhanced knowledge about the current state of nature may hinder cooperation among purely self-interested individuals. The paper describes this paradoxical possibility-a \'knowledge curse\'-and analyses the evolutionary process that occurs if, initially, only a few people have access to the greater knowledge. It concludes with a tentative comment on ways to avert this potential knowledge backlash.
摘要:
对于一个理性的个体来说,更多的知识总是一个优势。然而,这篇文章表明,对于一群理性的个体来说,更多的知识可能适得其反,给所有人带来更糟糕的结果。令人惊讶的是,即使新知识并不意味着发现新行动,而只是提供了对利害关系的相互作用的更深入理解,这种情况也可能发生。更具体地说,增强对当前自然状态的了解可能会阻碍纯粹自利的个人之间的合作。本文描述了这种自相矛盾的可能性-“知识诅咒”-并分析了在以下情况下发生的进化过程:最初,只有少数人能获得更多的知识。最后对避免这种潜在知识反弹的方法进行了初步评论。
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