My fundamental thesis is that Rachels dismisses the traditional Western account of the morality of killing without offering a viable replacement. In this regard, I will argue that the substitute account he offers is deficient in at least eight regards: (1) he fails to justify the foundational principle of utilitarianism, (2) he exposes preference utilitarianism to the same criticisms he lodges against classical utilitarianism, (3) he neglects to explain how precisely one performs the maximization procedure which preference utilitarianism requires, (4) his account of the sanctity of life is subject to the very criticism he levels against the traditional position, (5) he cannot justify the exceptions he makes to his interpretation of the sanctity of life, (6) his account could easily be used to justify murder, (7) his embrace of autonomy as an ethical principle undermines his preference utilitarianism, and (8) he cannot maintain the moral identification of acts of killing and letting die.

Consensual homicide remains a crime in jurisdictions where active voluntary euthanasia has been legalized. At the same time, both jurisdictions, in which euthanasia is legal and those in which it is not, recognize that all patients (whether severely ill or not) have the right to refuse or withdraw medical treatment (including life-saving treatment). In this paper, I focus on the tensions between these three norms (the permission of active euthanasia, the permission to reject life-saving treatment, and the prohibition of consensual homicide), assuming a justification of euthanasia based on the right to (personal) autonomy. I argue that the best way to provide a coherent account of these norms is to claim that patients have two distinct rights: the right to autonomy and the right to bodily integrity. This solution has some relevant implications for the discussion of the legalization of active euthanasia.

暂无摘要。

暂无摘要。

Previous research suggests that people, especially religious people, are more opposed to active euthanasia, such as a lethal injection, than to passive euthanasia, such as withdrawing life support. The current research proposes a possible explanation for this finding-that active euthanasia is viewed as interfering with the natural course of life and death, but passive euthanasia is viewed as allowing it to take place. Two studies yielded results consistent with this hypothesis and found that how people think about the natural course of life and death substantially explained the greater opposition to active euthanasia among more religious people.

This study aimed to investigate the health care providers\' attitudes toward the Do-Not-Resuscitate order (DNR) in COVID-19 patients. This study was conducted on 332 health care providers (HCPs) at the COVID-19 referral hospital in Shahroud, Iran by convenience sampling method. The study tools included a demographic information form and the DNR attitude questionnaire. Significance level was considered 0.05 for all tests. The mean scores of attitudes toward DNR order, the procedure of DNR, some aspects of passive euthanasia, and religious and cultural factors were 25.27 ± 2.78, 40.61 ± 5.99, 11.26 ± 2.51, and 6.12 ± 1.27, respectively. The death of relatives due to COVID-19 and female gender were associated with high and low scores of attitudes toward DNR order, respectively. Extended working hours and more work experience were correlated with high scores of DNR procedure. The history of COVID-19 increased the mean score of attitudes toward some aspects of passive euthanasia. In addition, an increase in following COVID-19 news decreased the score of religious and cultural factors affecting DNR order. Despite the legal ban on implementation of the DNR in Iran, the attitude of Iranian HCPs toward this was positive in COVID-19 patients.

暂无摘要。

暂无摘要。

The 2011 Shanbaug case has proved to be very important in shaping the debates about end-of-life care and assisted dying in India. Ostensibly dealing with the question of whether it was permissible to withdraw treatment from a patient in a persistent vegetative state, it became a case about the legality of passive euthanasia, which is how it was treated by the Law Commission of India in 2012, and by the Supreme Court bench considering the Common Cause case in 2018. However, questions about the legality of passive euthanasia depend on whether we have a coherent definition of \"passive euthanasia\". In this paper, I argue that such a definition was absent from both the Shanbaug and the Common Cause rulings. As a result, they are highly unreliable.

暂无摘要。