Abstract：
My fundamental thesis is that Rachels dismisses the traditional Western account of the morality of killing without offering a viable replacement. In this regard, I will argue that the substitute account he offers is deficient in at least eight regards: (1) he fails to justify the foundational principle of utilitarianism, (2) he exposes preference utilitarianism to the same criticisms he lodges against classical utilitarianism, (3) he neglects to explain how precisely one performs the maximization procedure which preference utilitarianism requires, (4) his account of the sanctity of life is subject to the very criticism he levels against the traditional position, (5) he cannot justify the exceptions he makes to his interpretation of the sanctity of life, (6) his account could easily be used to justify murder, (7) his embrace of autonomy as an ethical principle undermines his preference utilitarianism, and (8) he cannot maintain the moral identification of acts of killing and letting die.
摘要：
我的基本论点是，拉赫尔斯在没有提供可行替代品的情况下，驳斥了西方对杀戮道德的传统说法。在这方面,我认为他提供的替代帐户至少在八个方面是有缺陷的：（1）他未能证明功利主义的基本原则，（2）他将偏爱功利主义暴露于他对古典功利主义的批评中，(3)他忽略了解释一个人执行偏好功利主义要求的最大化程序的精确度，(4)他对生命神圣性的描述受到了他对传统立场的批评，（5）他不能证明他对生命神圣性的解释的例外，(6)他的说法很容易被用来为谋杀辩护，（7）他将自治作为一种道德原则，破坏了他偏爱的功利主义，（8）他不能保持杀人和放生行为的道德认同。
