背景:全球南方国家目前正面临重大的经济和社会挑战,包括主要的偿债问题。与以前的全球金融不稳定时期一样,越来越多的国家向国际货币基金组织(IMF)寻求财政援助。该组织长期以来一直倡导对借款人进行广泛的财政整顿,通常被称为“紧缩”。然而,近年来,国际货币基金组织宣布了确保其贷款支持社会支出的重大举措,从而帮助各国实现其发展目标和可持续发展目标。为了评估这个记录,我们收集了2020-2022年期间签署的21笔贷款的支出数据,包括截至2023年8月的所有定期审查。
结果:我们发现,紧缩措施仍然是该组织为其借款人制定的强制性政策的核心部分:在这里研究的21个国家中,有15个国家在其IMF计划过程中经历了财政空间的减少。在这样的财政背景下,社会支出楼层未能兑现他们的承诺。这些楼层没有流线型的定义,从而使它们的应用变得随意和不一致。但即使按照他们自己的条件,这些楼层缺乏雄心:他们往往没有预见到有意义的社会支出随着时间的推移而增加的轨迹,and,当他们这样做的时候,这些收益中的许多都被飙升的通货膨胀所吞噬。此外,三分之一的社会支出下限没有实施——比紧缩条件的实施率低得多,这是国际货币基金组织优先考虑的。在一些情况下,在实现楼层的地方,它们没有被有意义地超越,因此,在实践中,充当社会支出上限。
结论:国际货币基金组织的贷款计划仍然主要集中在紧缩政策上,其社会支出战略并不代表该组织宣传的巨变。充其量,社会支出下限是痛苦的预算削减的损害控制:它们是社会改善的工具,以针对处境不利群体的有针对性的援助原则为基础。可以采用植根于普遍主义原则的替代方法来建立持久和有弹性的社会保护体系。
BACKGROUND: Countries in the Global South are currently facing momentous economic and social challenges, including major debt service problems. As in previous periods of global financial instability, a growing number of countries have turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for financial assistance. The organization has a long track-record of advocating for extensive fiscal consolidation-commonly known as \'
austerity\'-for its borrowers. However, in recent years, the IMF has announced major initiatives for ensuring that its loans support social spending, thus aiding countries in meeting their development targets and the Sustainable Development Goals. To assess this track record, we collected spending data on 21 loans signed in the 2020-2022 period, including from all their periodic reviews up to August 2023.
RESULTS: We find that
austerity measures remain a core part of the organization\'s mandated policies for its borrowers: 15 of the 21 countries studied here experience a decrease in fiscal space over the course of their IMF programs. Against this fiscal backdrop, social spending floors have failed to live up to their promise. There is no streamlined definition of these floors, thus rendering their application haphazard and inconsistent. But even on their own terms, these floors lack ambition: they often do not foresee trajectories of meaningful social spending increases over time, and, when they do, many of these gains are eaten up by soaring inflation. In addition, a third of social spending floors are not implemented-a much lower implementation rate from that for
austerity conditions, which the IMF prioritizes. In several instances, where floors are implemented, they are not meaningfully exceeded, thus-in practice-acting as social spending ceilings.
CONCLUSIONS: The IMF\'s lending programs are still heavily focused on
austerity, and its strategy on social spending has not represented the sea-change that the organization advertised. At best, social spending floors act as damage control for the painful budget cuts: they are instruments of social amelioration, underpinned by principles of targeted assistance for highly disadvantaged groups. Alternative approaches rooted in principles of universalism can be employed to build up durable and resilient social protection systems.