在实施股权激励制度时,本文探讨了上市企业股权激励的选择模式。虽然以前的研究已经广泛涵盖了这些影响,模型,股权激励的影响因素,需要有更深入的文献关注不同的激励模式及其对公司绩效的影响。值得注意的是,需要有更多的文献将企业家精神视为一种机制。它旨在探索不同激励模式下高管选择之间的关系,这些模式培育的企业家精神,以及它们对公司业绩的综合影响。研究结果表明,实施股权激励制度的上市企业采用限制性股票激励模式显著正向影响企业绩效。机理检验表明,公司实施限制性股票激励模式时,高管们优先考虑最大化他们的利益,导致他们在投资决策中承担更多风险。这种行为,反过来,激发高管的冒险精神,积极影响企业绩效,在执行力更集中的公司尤其明显。此外,高管可能更倾向于投资高风险,高回报的创新项目,一种表明创新的行为,在研发(R&D)投资较高的公司中更为普遍。然而,本文的局限性在于,本研究以我国上市公司为例,对我国股权激励制度的运行情况进行了评价,这不一定适合外国发达资本主义国家。本研究通过探索高管之间的关系,为研究委托代理问题做出了贡献。企业家精神和公司业绩。
In implementing the equity incentive system, this paper delves into the listed enterprises\' selection of equity incentive models. While previous research has extensively covered the effects, models, and influencing factors of equity incentives, there needs to be more in-depth literature focusing on the diverse incentive models and their impact on corporate performance. Notably, there needs to be more literature on considering entrepreneurial spirit as a mechanism. It aims to explore the relationship between executives\' choices under different incentive models, the entrepreneurial spirit fostered by these models, and their combined impact on corporate performance. The findings reveal that adopting the restricted stock incentive model by listed enterprises implementing the equity incentive system significantly positively affects enterprise performance. Mechanistic tests show that when a company implements the restricted stock incentive model, executives prioritize maximizing their interests, leading them to embrace more risk in their investment decisions. This behavior, in turn, stimulates the adventurous spirit of executives, positively impacting enterprise performance, particularly pronounced in companies with more concentrated executive power. Moreover, executives may be more inclined to invest in high-risk, high-reward innovative projects, a behavior indicative of innovation and more prevalent in firms with higher research and development (R&D) investment. However, the limitation of this paper is that the study evaluates the operation of the equity incentive system in
China by taking listed companies in
China as an example, which is not necessarily suitable for foreign developed capitalist countries. This study contributes to the study of principal-agent problems by exploring the relationship between executives, entrepreneurship and firm performance.