OBJECTIVE: This study aimed to critically analyse Australia\'s current and proposed policy actions to reduce added sugar consumption. Over-consumption of added sugar is a significant public health nutrition issue. The competing interests, values and beliefs among stakeholders mean they have disparate views regarding which policy actions are preferable to reduce added sugar consumption.
METHODS: Semi-structured interviews using purposive, snowball sampling and policy mapping. Policy actions were classified by two frameworks: NOURISHING (e.g. behaviour change communication, food environment and food system) and the Orders of Change (e.g. first order: technical adjustments, second order: reforming the system, third order: transforming the system).
METHODS: Australia.
METHODS: Twenty-two stakeholders from the food industry, food regulation, government, public health groups and academia.
RESULTS: All proposed and existing policy actions targeted the food environment/behaviour change; most were assessed as first-order changes, and reductionist (nutrient specific) in nature. Influences on policy actions included industry power, stakeholder fragmentation, government ideology/political will and public pressure. Few stakeholders considered potential risks of policy actions, particularly of non-nutritive sweetener substitution or opportunity costs for other policies.
CONCLUSIONS: Most of Australia\'s policy actions to reduce added sugar consumption are reductionist. Preferencing nutrient specific, first-order policy actions could reflect the influence of vested interests, a historically dominant reductionist orientation to nutrition science and policy, and the perceived difficulty of pursuing second- or third-order changes. Pursuing only first-order policy actions could lead to \'regrettable\' substitutions and creates an opportunity cost for more comprehensive policy aimed at adjusting the broader food system.

Rationale: There is a need for medicine to deliver more whole-person care. This is a narrative review of several models of whole-person care and studies that illustrate the business case for whole-person models in primary care. Objectives: To provide an overview of what whole-person care models exist and explore evidence to support these models. Study Selection: Representative whole-person care models widely used in the United States are summarized and evaluated. Selected studies focused on outpatient primary care with examples from programs that integrate the delivery of conventional medical care, complementary and alternative medicine, and self-care within the context of social and cultural environments. Methods: Pubmed search conducted December 2020-February 2021. Two iterative searches using terms for \"Whole Health Veterans Administration,\" \"integrative medicine,\" \"integrative health,\" \"complementary and alternative medicine,\" and, as they related to the outcomes, of \"health outcomes,\" \"cost-effectiveness,\" \"cost reduction,\" \"patient satisfaction,\" and \"physician satisfaction.\" Additional studies were identified from an initial search and the authors\' experience of over 50 years. We looked for studies of whole-person care used in general primary care, those not using a single modality and only from United States practices. Results: A total of 125 (out of 1746) studies were found and met our inclusion criteria. We found that whole-person models of primary care exist, are quite heterogeneous in their approaches, and routinely report substantial benefits for improving the patient experience, clinical outcomes and in reducing costs. Conclusions: Evidence for the benefit of whole-person care models exist but definitions are quite heterogenous and unfocused. There is a need for more standardization of whole-person models and more research using whole systems approaches rather than reductionistic attempts using isolated components.

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The Movement for Global Mental Health (MGMH) argues that there is a moral imperative that psychiatric treatments should be made available to all communities across the world. But psychiatric theories, categories and interventions emerged in the Western world are based on a set of assumptions about the nature of the self and society, nature and the supernatural, health and healing that are not universally accepted. In this paper we argue that there is a stronger moral case for caution with regard to the export of psychiatric thinking. Without a critical interrogation of such thinking the MGMH is at risk of doing a great deal of harm to the diverse, and sometimes fragile, systems of care that already exist across the world.

The aim of this paper is to argue that a strictly reductionist approach to psychiatry represents a theoretical and clinical obstacle to a fruitful synthesis between neurobiological and sociocultural aspects of the sciences of mind. We examine the theoretical and practical motivations underlying this approach, by analyzing the case of depressive disorders, as defined in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), and the related removal of the \"bereavement exclusion clause.\" We first explore the claim that DSM is atheoretical, observing that, far from being atheoretical, DSM adopts an implicit, biologically inspired view of the mind; we show that such a view leads to a sort of circularity in the definition of depressive disorders, in which psychopharmacology seems to play a key role. We then turn to further problems deriving from this position, analyzing the issue of placebo effects in the treatment of depressive disorders and the philosophical question of normative preconditions for psychopathological diagnosis. Finally, we address the issue of subjectivity, which, together with the related aspect of the subject\'s relational context, appears to be crucial to any scientific theorizing about mental disorders, despite DSM\'s attempt to exclude it. Our defense of a non-reductionist view of mental disorders, however, does not imply that we endorse any sort of metaphysical dualism, or anti-diagnostic or anti-psychiatric positions. On the contrary, we argue that the adoption of a reductionist position actually undermines the theoretical and clinical accuracy in explaining depressive disorders.