目标:人们认为什么是道德例外与他人的区别?为了解决人们可能不同意谁有资格成为道德例外的问题,我们要求受试者选择和评价他们自己的道德异常的例子,道德平均,不道德的人。
方法:受试者根据道德行为的几个推动者和道德行为的几个方向对每个选定的样本进行评分。通过在实验设计中应用刺激采样的逻辑基础,我们评估了感知者对道德例外特征的认同水平,即使感知者评估了不同的目标。
结果:在三项研究中,关于谁在道德上是例外的,有强烈的主观共识:那些同情和容易内疚的人,那些反思道德问题并认同道德的人,那些有自制力并实际制定道德行为的人,那些关心伤害的人,同情,公平,和诚实。关于那些被视为道德例外的人所追求的道德方向,也存在着深刻的争议:人们评估那些追求相似价值观并做出更有利决定的人。
结论:强烈的共识表明,可能会促使一个人超出正常预期的特征,关于道德例外的研究并没有因为关于谁是道德例外的分歧而受到过度阻碍,不同阵营之间有一些共同点。
OBJECTIVE: What do people see as distinguishing the morally exceptional from others? To handle the problem that people may disagree about who qualifies as morally exceptional, we asked subjects to select and rate their own examples of morally exceptional, morally average, and immoral people.
METHODS: Subjects rated each selected exemplar on several enablers of moral action and several directions of moral action. By applying the logic underlying stimulus sampling in experimental design, we evaluated perceivers\' level of agreement about the characteristics of the morally exceptional, even though perceivers rated different targets.
RESULTS: Across three studies, there was strong subjective
consensus on who is morally exceptional: those who are empathetic and prone to guilt, those who reflect on moral issues and identify with morality, those who have self-control and actually enact moral behaviors, and those who care about harm, compassion, fairness, and honesty. Deep controversies also existed about the moral directions pursued by those seen as morally exceptional: People evaluated those who pursued similar values and made similar decisions more favorably.
CONCLUSIONS: Strong
consensus suggests characteristics that may push a person to go beyond normal expectations, that the study of moral exceptionality is not overly hindered by disagreement over who is morally exceptional, and that there is some common ground between disagreeing camps.