Ethical questions surrounding withdrawal of life support can be complex. When life support therapies are the result of a suicide attempt, the potential ethical issues take on another dimension. Duties and principles that normally guide clinicians\' actions as caregivers may not apply as easily. We present a case of attempted suicide in which decisions surrounding withdrawal of life support provoked conflict between a patient\'s family and the medical team caring for him. We highlight the major unresolved philosophical questions and contradictory normative values about suicide that underlie this conflict. Finally, we show how these considerations were practically applied to this particular case.

This study measured the impact of the Decisions on Life-Sustaining Treatment Act by analyzing medical cost data from the National Health Insurance Service-National Sample Cohort. After identifying the patients who died in 2018 and 2019, the case and control groups were set using the presence of codes for managing the implementation of life-sustaining treatment with propensity score matching. Regarding medical costs, the case group had higher medical costs for all periods before death. The subdivided items of medical costs with significant differences were as follows: consultation, admission, injection, laboratory tests, imaging and radiation therapy, nursing hospital bundled payment, and special equipment. This study is the first analysis carried out to measure the impact of the Decision on Life-Sustaining Treatment Act through a cost analysis and to refute the common expectation that patients who decided to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment would go through fewer unnecessary tests or treatments.

BACKGROUND: Life-sustaining treatment limitation (LSV) is the medical act of withdrawing or not initiating measures that are considered futile in a patient\'s specific situation. LSV in critically ill patients remains a difficult topic to study, due to the multitude of factors that condition it.
OBJECTIVE: To determine factors related to LSV in ICU in cases of post-ICU in-hospital mortality, as well as factors associated with survival after discharge from ICU.
METHODS: Retrospective longitudinal study.
UNASSIGNED: Intensive care unit of a tertiary hospital.
METHODS: People who died in the hospitalization ward after ICU treatment between January 2014 and December 2019.
METHODS: None. This is an observational study.
METHODS: Age, sex, probability of death, type of admission, LSV in ICU, oncological disease, dependence, invasive mechanical ventilation, emergency hemodialysis, transfusion of blood products, nosocomial infection (NI), pre-ICU, intra-ICU and post-ICU stays.
RESULTS: Of 114 patients who died outside the ICU, 49 had LSV registered in the ICU (42.98%). Age and stay prior to ICU admission were positively associated with LSV (OR 1,03 and 1,08, respectively). Patients without LSV had a higher post-ICU stay, while it was lower for male patients.
CONCLUSIONS: Our results support that LSV established within the ICU can avoid complications commonly associated with unnecessary prolongation of stay, such as NI.

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Although death by neurologic criteria (brain death) is legally recognized throughout the United States, state laws and clinical practice vary concerning three key issues: (1) the medical standards used to determine death by neurologic criteria, (2) management of family objections before determination of death by neurologic criteria, and (3) management of religious objections to declaration of death by neurologic criteria. The American Academy of Neurology and other medical stakeholder organizations involved in the determination of death by neurologic criteria have undertaken concerted action to address variation in clinical practice in order to ensure the integrity of brain death determination. To complement this effort, state policymakers must revise legislation on the use of neurologic criteria to declare death. We review the legal history and current laws regarding neurologic criteria to declare death and offer proposed revisions to the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) and the rationale for these recommendations.

The diagnosis of brain death has generated numerous medical, legal, social and ethical controversies. The recent highly publicized case of Jahi McMath, a 13-year-old who was declared brain dead and transferred to a long-term care facility, illustrates these issues and raises new challenges and questions about the management of brain dead patients.

Jahi McMath\'s case has raised challenging uncertainties about one of the most profound existential questions that we can ask: how do we know whether someone is alive or dead? The case is striking in at least two ways. First, how can it be that a person diagnosed as dead by qualified physicians continued to live, at least in a biological sense, more than four years after a death certificate was issued? Second, the diagnosis of brain death has been considered irreversible; in fact, there has never been a case of a person correctly diagnosed as brain-dead who improved to the point that the person no longer fulfilled the diagnostic criteria. If the neurologist Alan Shewmon is correct that, prior to her cardiac arrest in June 2018, McMath no longer met the criteria for brain death and was actually in a minimally conscious state, this case could have momentous implications for how we think about this diagnosis going forward. In this essay, I will offer a hypothesis that could, perhaps, explain both these aspects of the case. The hypothesis is based on differences in how we distinguish between biological and legal categories. The law tends to prefer to draw bright-line distinctions between categories, whereas biological categories tend to fall along a spectrum, without sharp distinctions.

From the start, I followed the case of Jahi McMath with great interest. In December 2013, she clearly fulfilled the diagnostic criteria for brain death. As a neurologist with a special interest in chronic brain death, I was not surprised that, after she was flown to New Jersey, where she became statutorily resurrected and was treated as a comatose patient, Jahi\'s condition quickly improved. In 2014, her family reported that she sometimes responded to simple motor commands. I shared the general skepticism regarding these reports, assuming that the family was in denial and was misinterpreting spinal myoclonus (a rapid, involuntary twitch generated by the spinal cord) as volitional. The family had noticed that when Jahi\'s heart rate was above eighty beats per minute, she was more likely to respond, as though the heart rate reflected some sort of inner level of arousal. So they began to make video recordings. I have been privileged to be entrusted with copies of these recordings, forty-eight of which proved suitable for assessing alleged responsiveness. All have been certified by a forensic video expert as unaltered. The first thing that struck me was that the great majority of the alleged responses were not spinal myoclonus. In fact, they did not resemble any type of spontaneous, involuntary movement described in patients paralyzed from high spinal cord lesions.

For nearly five years, bioethicists and neurologists debated whether Jahi McMath, an African American teenager, was alive or dead. While Jahi\'s condition provides a compelling study for analyzing brain death, circumscribing her life status to a question of brain death fails to acknowledge and respond to a chronic, if uncomfortable, bioethics problem in American health care-namely, racial bias and unequal treatment, both real and perceived. Bioethicists should examine the underlying, arguably broader social implications of what Jahi\'s medical treatment and experience represented. On any given day, disparities in the quality of health care and health outcomes for people of color in comparison to whites are evidenced in American hospitals and clinics. These disparities are not entirely explained by differences in patient education, insurance status, employment, income, expressed preference for treatments, and severity of disease. Instead, research indicates that, even for African Americans able to gain access to health care services and navigate institutional nuances, disparities persist across a broad range of services, including diagnostic screening and general medical care, mental health diagnosis and treatment, pain management, HIV-related care, and treatments for cancer, heart disease, diabetes, and kidney disease.

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