Abstract：
Low-carbon buildings (LCBs) are still in the early stages of development in China. The promotion and implementation of associated policies are not yet fully matured. Meanwhile, their status as public goods exacerbates the uncertainty and complexity regarding anticipated gains and potential losses. Few studies have explored the impact of perception parameters on the decision-making processes of LCBs\' stakeholders. Thus, combined with prospect theory, this paper establishes a tripartite game model composed of governments, developers, and consumers to explore their interactions and influences in different stages. Real-life scenarios are further utilized to validate the effectiveness of the model in predicting the behaviors under respective preferences. The results show that the increase in subsidy and penalty intensity instead diminishes the enthusiasm for LCBs. More specifically, the existing subsidy policies offer limited incentives to consumers. With the addition of the perception parameter, there exist differences in the sensitivity of consumers and developers towards risk levels and potential losses. The findings also highlight the importance of consumers in the LCBs market. Future policies should encourage developers and consumers to jointly promote the LCBs implementation.
摘要：
低碳建筑（LCB）在中国仍处于发展初期。相关政策的促进和实施尚未完全成熟。同时,它们作为公共产品的地位加剧了预期收益和潜在损失的不确定性和复杂性。很少有研究探讨感知参数对LCB利益相关者决策过程的影响。因此，结合前景理论，本文建立了一个由政府组成的三方博弈模型,开发者,和消费者探索他们在不同阶段的互动和影响。进一步利用现实生活场景来验证模型在预测各自偏好下的行为方面的有效性。结果表明，补贴和惩罚强度的增加反而降低了对LCB的热情。更具体地说,现有的补贴政策对消费者提供有限的激励。随着感知参数的增加，消费者和开发商对风险水平和潜在损失的敏感性存在差异。调查结果还强调了消费者在LCB市场的重要性。未来的政策应鼓励开发商和消费者共同推动LCB的实施。
