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Abstract：
This article provides a new interpretation of the linguistic aspects of Friedrich von Hardenberg\'s Fichte Studies. It argues that Hardenberg was searching, among other things, for a transcendental language for philosophy. The possibility of such a language was discussed intensely among his contemporaries, such as Maimon, Niethammer, Reinhold, Weißhuhn, and Fichte. Its necessity, however, had become apparent with Kant\'s Critique of Pure Reason. Readers had noticed a disturbing discrepancy between the objective knowledge of transcendental philosophy-which, according to Kant, was supposed to be generally communicable-and Kant\'s actual failure to communicate it. Hardenberg\'s original insight into the inseparable unity of sign and signified, anticipating modern linguistic theories, led him to the assumption of a lawful relationship between both. From his unsuccessful attempt to disclose these laws, he went on to discover language as an independent realm fundamentally opposed to nature. Precisely because language is a necessary illusion, only the \'presenting I\' ( das darstellende Ich) achieves its end, namely absolute freedom. Philosophy, therefore, is pure as long as it remains within the boundaries of language alone, that is a language which does not refer to anything outside itself.
摘要：
本文对弗里德里希·冯·哈登伯格的费希特研究的语言方面进行了新的解释。它认为哈登伯格在搜寻，除其他外，一种哲学的超验语言。这种语言的可能性在他同时代的人中得到了激烈的讨论，比如Maimon,Niethammer,Reinhold,魏斯胡恩,还有Fichte.其必要性,然而,随着康德的纯粹理性批判变得明显。读者注意到先验哲学的客观知识之间存在令人不安的差异，根据康德的说法,通常应该是可以沟通的，而康德实际上没有沟通。哈登伯格对符号和符号不可分割的统一的原始见解，期待现代语言学理论，他认为两者之间有合法的关系。从他试图披露这些法律的失败中，他继续发现语言是一个从根本上反对自然的独立领域。正因为语言是一种必要的幻觉，只有“呈现我”(dasdarstellendeIch)达到了它的目的，即绝对自由。哲学,因此,是纯粹的，只要它只停留在语言的界限内，这是一种语言，它不引用任何外部的东西。
