Abstract：
People desire agentic representations of their personal and collective selves, such as their own nation. When national agency is put into question, this should increase their inclination to restore it, particularly when they simultaneously lack perceptions of personal control. In this article, we test this hypothesis of group-based control in the context of political elections occurring during socio-economic crises. We propose that people who are reminded of low (vs. high) personal control will have an increased tendency to reject traditional political parties that stand for the maintenance of a non-agentic political system. We experimentally manipulated the salience of low vs. high personal control in five studies and measured participants\' intentions to support traditional and new political parties. Across four of five studies, in line with the predictions, low personal control reduced support for the main traditional conservative party (e.g., Partido Popular (PP) in Spain, the Republicans in France). These results appeared in contexts of national economic and/or political crisis, and were most pronounced when low (vs. high) national agency was made salient in Studies 4 and 5. The findings support the notion that rejecting the stability of the national political system can serve as a means to maintain a sense of control through the collective self.
摘要：
人们渴望个人和集体自我的真实表现，比如自己的国家。当国家机构受到质疑时，这应该会增加他们恢复它的倾向，特别是当他们同时缺乏个人控制的观念。在这篇文章中,我们在社会经济危机期间发生的政治选举的背景下检验了基于群体控制的假设。我们建议那些被提醒低的人(与高）个人控制将越来越倾向于拒绝代表维持非代理政治制度的传统政党。我们通过实验操纵了低与在五项研究中高度个人控制，并衡量参与者支持传统和新政党的意图。在五项研究中的四项中，根据预测，低个人控制减少了对主要传统保守党的支持(例如，partdo流行(PP)在西班牙,法国的共和党人）。这些结果出现在国家经济和/或政治危机的背景下，并且在低的时候最明显(与高)国家机构在研究4和5中得到重视。调查结果支持这样一种观点，即拒绝国家政治制度的稳定可以作为通过集体自我保持控制感的一种手段。
