Abstract：
A key question in disability studies, philosophy, and bioethics concerns the relationship between disability and well-being. The mere difference view, endorsed by Elizabeth Barnes, claims that physical and sensory disabilities by themselves do not make a person worse off overall-any negative impacts on welfare are due to social injustice. This article argues that Barnes\'s Value Neutral Model does not extend to intellectual disability. Intellectual disability is (1) intrinsically bad-by itself it makes a person worse off, apart from a non-accommodating environment; (2) universally bad-it lowers quality of life for every intellectually disabled person; and (3) globally bad-it reduces a person\'s overall well-being. While people with intellectual disabilities are functionally disadvantaged, this does not imply that they are morally inferior-lower quality of life does not mean lesser moral status. No clinical implications concerning disability-based selective abortion, denial of life-saving treatment, or rationing of scarce resources follow from the claim that intellectual disability is bad difference.
摘要：
残疾研究中的一个关键问题，哲学,生物伦理学关注残疾和幸福之间的关系。仅仅是不同的观点，由伊丽莎白·巴恩斯（ElizabethBarnes）认可，声称身体和感官残疾本身并不会使一个人的整体状况恶化-对福利的任何负面影响都是由于社会不公正造成的。本文认为，巴恩斯的价值中立模型并没有扩展到智力残疾。智力残疾(1)本质上是不好的——它本身会让一个人的境况变得更糟，除了不适应的环境；（2）普遍糟糕-它降低了每个智力残疾人的生活质量；（3）全球糟糕-它降低了一个人的整体幸福感。虽然智障人士在功能上处于不利地位，这并不意味着他们在道德上低劣——生活质量较低并不意味着道德地位较低。没有关于基于残疾的选择性流产的临床意义，拒绝挽救生命的治疗,或稀缺资源的配给源于智力残疾是不好的差异。
