UNASSIGNED: Alterations in the experience of controlling oneself and one\'s environment are of high relevance to understanding the psychopathology of depression. This study investigated the relationship between Temporal Binding for action-event sequences, sense of agency, self-efficacy and symptom severity in Major Depressive Disorder.
UNASSIGNED: We employed the Sense of Agency Scale (SoAS) and the General Self-Efficacy Scale (GSE) to assess explicit Sense of Agency and self-efficacy in a group of 42 persons diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) [20 identifying as female, 19 as male; mean age 37.8 years (± 13.3)] and 40 control persons without a psychiatric diagnosis (CG) [22 identifying as female, 20 as male; mean age 38.0 years ( ± 13.3)]. Depressive symptom severity was measured using the BDI-II. We additionally performed a temporal binding paradigm as a potential correlate to Sense of Agency. Participants partook in a time estimation task judging three intervals (250ms, 450ms, 650ms) while either observing or causing stimulus presentations. The underestimation of intervals following intentional actions causing stimulus presentations (compared to merely observing the stimulus presentation) is interpreted as temporal binding.
UNASSIGNED: SoAS scores demonstrated an inverse correlation with depressive symptoms (CG: p=.032, R2=.113; MDD: p<.001, R2=.260) and a positive correlation with GSE scores (CG: p<.001, R2=.379; MDD: p<.001, R2=.254). We found distinct differences in temporal binding between healthy participants and the Major Depressive Disorder group without significant correlation between temporal binding and the SoAS or GSE scores. The data suggest group differences in time estimation particular pertaining to time intervals involving intentional action and increasingly complex multisensory stimuli.
UNASSIGNED: We investigated parameters of subjective control, namely Sense of Agency and Self Efficacy. Here, we were able to reveal their inverse relationship with depressive symptoms in patients with major depressive disorder, highlighting a profound experience of loss of control with increasing symptom load. Deficits in experiencing control, particularly involving intentional motor actions (and more complex multisensory stimuli), appear to be more pronounced in Major Depressive Disorder, involving not only negative self-efficacy expectations but also an altered Sense of Agency and temporal binding. Temporal binding and SoAS scores did not correlate, adding to the growing evidence that the two measures may not be directly related. We propose that future research be directed at this contiguous relationship between Sense of Agency and Self Efficacy in Major Depressive Disorder.

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Previous research on coercion has neglected the fact that agents under authoritative pressure may also suffer from coercive power, which can trigger anxiety-like emotional negativity on its victims. Furthermore, high levels of neuroticism and/or anxiety have been found to be associated with the compliance of various forms of social pressure. In this study, we investigate the effects of the anxiolytic GABA A (gamma-Aminobutyric acid) modulator, lorazepam, on behavioral and neural responses to coercive power. Here, we applied a virtual obedience to authority paradigm alongside lorazepam administration (versus placebo), and during functional magnetic resonance imaging scanning. Our results show that lorazepam administration exerted differential effects on the reaction times (RTs) when initiating harming versus helping behaviors, with longer harming RTs compared to helping RTs, despite comparable subjective ratings regarding perceived coercion. Coercive harming significantly increased activity in the amygdala, hippocampus, orbitofrontal cortex, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). Lorazepam administration decreased amygdala and hippocampus activity, but increased dlPFC and right temporoparietal junction activations. The lower activity in the hippocampus predicted higher ratings for perceived coercion. Furthermore, lorazepam significantly decreased the functional connectivity of the hippocampus with the dlPFC during coercive harming. In conclusion, we provide evidence -by incorporating multimodal indices, including neuroimaging, neuropharmacological interventions, and behavioral assessments- to posit that the GABA A agonist, lorazepam, might aid as a possible intervention in service of coping strategies against coercion.

Human-computer integration is an emerging area in which the boundary between humans and technology is blurred as users and computers work collaboratively and share agency to execute tasks. The sense of agency (SoA) is an experience that arises by a combination of a voluntary motor action and sensory evidence whether the corresponding body movements have somehow influenced the course of external events. The SoA is not only a key part of our experiences in daily life but also in our interaction with technology as it gives us the feeling of \"I did that\" as opposed to \"the system did that,\" thus supporting a feeling of being in control. This feeling becomes critical with human-computer integration, wherein emerging technology directly influences people\'s body, their actions, and the resulting outcomes. In this review, we analyse and classify current integration technologies based on what we currently know about agency in the literature, and propose a distinction between body augmentation, action augmentation, and outcome augmentation. For each category, we describe agency considerations and markers of differentiation that illustrate a relationship between assistance level (low, high), agency delegation (human, technology), and integration type (fusion, symbiosis). We conclude with a reflection on the opportunities and challenges of integrating humans with computers, and finalise with an expanded definition of human-computer integration including agency aspects which we consider to be particularly relevant. The aim this review is to provide researchers and practitioners with guidelines to situate their work within the integration research agenda and consider the implications of any technologies on SoA, and thus overall user experience when designing future technology.

Self-generated auditory input is perceived less loudly than the same sounds generated externally. The existence of this phenomenon, called Sensory Attenuation (SA), has been studied for decades and is often explained by motor-based forward models. Recent developments in the research of SA, however, challenge these models. We review the current state of knowledge regarding theoretical implications about the significance of Sensory Attenuation and its role in human behavior and functioning. Focusing on behavioral and electrophysiological results in the auditory domain, we provide an overview of the characteristics and limitations of existing SA paradigms and highlight the problem of isolating SA from other predictive mechanisms. Finally, we explore different hypotheses attempting to explain heterogeneous empirical findings, and the impact of the Predictive Coding Framework in this research area.

In the present study we tested whether sense of agency (SoA) is reflected by changes in coupling between right medio-frontal/supplementary motor area (SMA) and inferior parietal cortex (IPC). Twelve healthy adult volunteers participated in the study. They performed a variation of a line-drawing task (Nielsen, 1963; Fourneret and Jeannerod, 1998), in which they moved a cursor on a digital tablet with their right hand without seeing the hand. Visual feedback displayed on a computer monitor was either in correspondence with or deviated from the actual movement. This made participants uncertain as to the agent of the movement and they reported SoA in approximately 50% of trials when the movement was computer-generated. We tested whether IPC-preSMA coupling was associated with SoA, using dynamic causal modeling (DCM) for induced responses (Chen et al., 2008; Herz et al., 2012). Nine different DCMs were constructed for the early and late phases of the task, respectively. All models included two regions: a superior medial gyrus (preSMA) region and a right supramarginal gyrus (IPC) region. Bayesian models selection (Stephan et al., 2009) favored a model with input to IPC and modulation of the forward connection to SMA in the late task phase, and a model with input to preSMA and modulation of the backward connection was favored for the early task phase. The analysis shows that IPC source activity in the 50-60 Hz range modulated preSMA source activity in the 40-70 Hz range in the presence of SoA compared with no SoA in the late task phase, but the test of the early task phase did not reveal any differences between presence and absence of SoA. We show that SoA is associated with a directionally specific between frequencies coupling from IPC to preSMA in the higher gamma (ɣ) band in the late task phase. This suggests that SoA is a retrospective perception, which is highly dependent on interpretation of the outcome of the performed action.

A large body of fMRI and lesion-literature has provided evidence that the Inferior Parietal Cortex (IPC) is important for sensorimotor integration and sense of agency (SoA). We used repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to explore the role of the IPC during a validated SoA detection task. 12 healthy, right-handed adults were included. The effects of rTMS on subjects\' SoA during self-controlled movements were explored. The experiment consisted of 1/3 self-controlled movements and (2)/3 computer manipulated movements that introduced uncertainty as to whether the subjects were agents of an observed movement. Subjects completed three sessions, in which subjects received online rTMS over the right IPC (active condition), over the vertex (CZ) (sham condition) or no TMS but a sound-matched control. We found that rTMS over right IPC significantly altered SoA of the non-perturbed movements. Following IPC stimulation subjects were more likely to experience self-controlled movements as being externally perturbed compared to the control site (P = 0.002) and the stimulation-free control (P = 0.042). The data support the importance of IPC activation during sensorimotor comparison in order to correctly determine the agent of movements.

Existing accounts of the sense of agency tend to focus on the proximal causal history of the feeling. That is, they explain the sense of agency by describing the cognitive mechanism that causes the sense of agency to be elicited. However, it is possible to elicit an unconscious representation of one\'s own agency that plays a different role in a cognitive system. I use the \"occasionality problem\" to suggest that taking this distinction seriously has potential theoretical pay-offs for this reason. We are faced, then, with a need to distinguish instances of the representation of one\'s own agency in which the subject is aware of their sense of own agency from instances in which they are not. This corresponds to a specific instance of what Dennett calls the \"Hard Question\": once the representation is elicited, then what happens? In other words, how is a representation of one\'s own agency used in a cognitive system when the subject is aware of it? How is this different from when the representation of own agency remains unconscious? This phrasing suggests a Functionalist answer to the Hard Question. I consider two single function hypotheses. First, perhaps the representation of own agency enters into the mechanisms of attention. This seems unlikely as, in general, attention is insufficient for awareness. Second, perhaps, a subject is aware of their sense of agency when it is available for verbal report. However, this seems inconsistent with evidence of a sense of agency in the great apes. Although these two single function views seem like dead ends, multifunction hypotheses such as the global workspace theory remain live options which we should consider. I close by considering a non-functionalist answer to the Hard Question: perhaps it is not a difference in the use to which the representation is put, but a difference in the nature of the representation itself. When it comes to the sense of agency, the Hard Question remains, but there are alternatives open to us.