We argue that contemporary conceptualizations of \"persons\" have failed to achieve the moral goals of \"person-centred care\" (PCC, a model of dementia care developed by Tom Kitwood) and that they are detrimental to those receiving care, their families, and practitioners of care. We draw a distinction between personhood and selfhood, pointing out that continuity or maintenance of the latter is what is really at stake in dementia care. We then demonstrate how our conceptualization, which is one that privileges the lived experiences of people with dementia, and understands selfhood as formed relationally in connection with carers and the care environment, best captures Kitwood\'s original idea. This conceptualization is also flexible enough to be applicable to the practice of caring for people at different stages of their dementia. Application of this conceptualization into PCC will best promote the well-being of people with dementia, while also encouraging respect and dignity in the care environment.

Adolescents\' sense of self has important implications for their mental health. Despite more than two decades of work, scholars have yet to amass evidence across studies to elucidate the role of selfhood in the mental health of adolescents. Underpinned by the conceptual model of selfhood, this meta-analytic review investigated the strength of associations of different facets of selfhood and their associated traits with depression and anxiety, moderating factors that attenuate or exacerbate these associations, and their causal influences. Using mixed-effects modeling, which included 558 effect sizes from 298 studies and 274 370 adolescents from 39 countries, our findings revealed that adolescents\' self-esteem/self-concept [r = -0.518, p < 0.0001; (95% CI -0.49 to -0.547)] and self-compassion [r = -0.455, p < 0.0001; (95% CI -0.568 to -0.343)] demonstrating largest effect sizes in their associations with depression. Self-esteem/self-concept, self-compassion, self-awareness, self-efficacy, and self-regulation had similar moderate negative associations with anxiety. Meta-regressions revealed that adolescent age and type of informants (parents v. adolescents) were important moderators. Findings on causal influences indicated bidirectional causations, particularly low self-esteem/self-concept, self-awareness and self-efficacy drive higher depression and vice-versa. In contrast, the different self traits did not demonstrate specific causal direction with anxiety. These results pinpoint self traits that are pivotal in relating to adolescent mental health functioning. We discussed the theoretical implications of our findings in terms of how they advance theory of selfhood for adolescent mental health, and the practical implications of building selfhood as cultivating psychological skills for mental health.

Is selfhood socially constituted and distributed? Although the view has recently been defended by some cognitive scientists, it has long been popular within anthropology and cultural psychology. Whereas older texts by Marcel Mauss, Clifford Geertz, Hazel Rose Markus, and Shinobu Kitayama often contrast a Western conception of a discrete, bounded, and individual self with a non-Western sociocentric conception, it has more recently become common to argue that subjectivity is a fluid intersectional construction fundamentally relational and conditioned by discursive power structures. I assess the plausibility of these claims and argue that many of these discussions of self and subjectivity remain too crude. By failing to distinguish different dimension of selfhood, many authors unwittingly advocate a form of radical social constructivism that is not only incapable of doing justice to first-person experience but which also fails to capture the heterogeneity of real communal life.

Alterations in one\'s sense of self are often considered a significant psychological symptom of dementia. However, the self is not a unified construct; it consists of a set of closely connected, yet substantive, manifestations which might not be equally impacted by dementia. Recognising the multidimensional nature of the self, the current scoping review aimed to explore the nature and scope of the evidence demonstrating change in the psychological self in people living with dementia. Adopting a cognitive psychological framework, a hundred and five (105) quantitative and qualitative studies were reviewed, and findings were organised into three main types of self-manifestations: high-order manifestations, functional aspects of the self, and foundational manifestations. Overall, the results show that although there are alterations in some of these different manifestations of the self, these do not imply a global loss of selfhood. Despite notable cognitive changes during dementia, it seems that preserved aspects of self may be enough to compensate for potential weakening of some self-processes such as autobiographical recall. Better understanding alterations in selfhood is key to addressing psychological symptoms of people living with dementia, such as feelings of disconnection and reduced agency, and may inform new pathways for dementia care interventions.

Major depressive disorder is a leading global cause of disability. There is a growing interest for memory in mood disorders since it might constitute an original tool for prevention, diagnosis, and treatment. MDD is associated with impaired autobiographical memory characterized by a tendency to overgeneral memory, rather than vivid episodic self-defining memory, which is mandatory for problem-solving and projection in the future. This memory bias is maintained by three mechanisms: ruminations, avoidance, and impaired executive control. If we adopt a broader and comprehensive perspective, we can hypothesize that all those alterations have the potential to impair self-identity updating. We posit that this update requires a double referencing process: (1) to internalized self-representation and (2) to an externalized framework dealing with the representation of the consequence of actions. Diagnostic and therapeutic implications are discussed in the light of this model and the importance of assessing autobiographical memory in MDD is highlighted. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Memory Psychology > Brain Function and Dysfunction Neuroscience > Clinical.

Medical well-regarded policy recommendations for patients with disorders of consciousness (DoC) are almost exclusively relied on behavioural examination and evaluation of higher-order cognition, and largely disregard the patients\' self. This is so because practically establishing the presence of self-awareness or Selfhood is even more challenging than evaluating the presence of consciousness. At the same time, establishing the potential (actual physical possibility) of Selfhood in DoC patients is crucialy important from clinical, ethical, and moral standpoints because Selfhood is the most central and private evidence of being an independent and free agent that unites intention, embodiment, executive functions, attention, general intelligence, emotions and other components within the intra-subjective frame (first-person givenness). The importance of Selfhood is supported further by the observation that rebooting of self-awareness is the first step to recovery after brain damage. It seems that complex experiential Selfhood can be plausibly conceptualized within the Operational Architectonics (OA) of brain-mind functioning and reliably measured by quantitative electroencephalogram (qEEG) operational synchrony.

The idea that a disorder of the basic self is a central feature in schizophrenia has recently been corroborated in a meta-analysis and a systematic review. Manifestations of the self-disorder can be systematically explored with the Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE). In this study, we examined the factorial structure of EASE, and diagnostic efficacy of EASE. We hypothesized that EASE will have a monofactorial structure as an instability of the basic self will result in multiple deformations of self-experience which would be meaningfully interrelated as aspects of a unifying Gestalt.
EASE data for 226 patients suffering from various mental disorders were analyzed under a confirmatory factor analysis framework (CFA). Area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC) was calculated for the total EASE sums, and sensitivity and specificity values for prediction of schizophrenia spectrum disorders based on different cut-offs were obtained.
Fit indices for the CFA model: RMSEA = 0.036, SRMR = 0.100, CFI = 0.983, TLI = 0.981. The AUC value was 0.946 (95% confidence interval: 0.919-0.974). Sensitivity as well as specificity for schizophrenia spectrum disorders were high.
Our results lend support for EASE exhibiting a monofactorial structure and the notion of self-disorders as a central phenotypic feature of schizophrenia spectrum disorders.

Death, which was once accepted as an incalculable otherworld journey initiated by the cessation of biological functions, became an object of socio-political regulation in late modernity. Euthanasia, a form of managing death and dying, has grown in popularity with accompanying controversy. What remains under-explored, however, are conceptions of selfhood animating different framings in moral and ethical debates around euthanasia from professional perspectives. Drawing on 20 interviews with physicians and other key professionals in the euthanasia field in Belgium, this study finds that moral division among participants lies in different attributes of selfhood related to euthanasia, which emphasize autonomous, social, or embodied aspects. This paper demonstrates that the diminishing role of religion in appeasing existential anxiety about death, combined with an increasing emphasis on choice as the basis of selfhood, facilitates the contemporary desire to control one\'s own demise.

The phrase \'person-centred care\' (PCC) reminds us that the fundamental philosophical goal of caring for people is to uphold or promote their personhood. However, such an idea has translated into promoting individualist notions of autonomy, empowerment and personal responsibility in the context of consumerism and neoliberalism, which is problematic both conceptually and practically. From a conceptual standpoint, it ignores the fact that humans are social, historical and biographical beings, and instead assumes an essentialist or idealized concept of personhood in which a person is viewed as an individual static object. From a practical standpoint, the application of such a concept of personhood can lead to neglect of a person\'s fundamental care needs and exacerbate the problems of social inequity, in particular for older people and people with dementia. Therefore, we argue that our understanding of PCC must instead be based on a dynamic concept of personhood that integrates the relevant social, relational, temporal and biographical dimensions. We propose that the correct concept of personhood in PCC is one in which persons are understood as socially embedded, relational and temporally extended subjects rather than merely individual, autonomous, asocial and atemporal objects. We then present a reconceptualization of the fundamental philosophical goal of PCC as promoting selfhood rather than personhood. Such a reconceptualization avoids the problems that beset the concept of personhood and its application in PCC, while also providing a philosophical foundation for the growing body of empirical literature that emphasizes the psychosocial, relational, subjective and biographical dimensions of PCC.

BACKGROUND: LSD is the prototypical psychedelic. Despite a clear central role of the 5HT2a receptor in its mechanism of action, the contributions of additional receptors for which it shows affinity and agonist activity remain unclear.
OBJECTIVE: We employed receptor-enriched analysis of functional connectivity by targets (REACT) to explore differences in functional connectivity (FC) associated with the distributions of the primary targets of LSD-the 5HT1a, 5HT1b, 5HT2a, D1 and D2 receptors.
METHODS: We performed secondary analyses of an openly available dataset (N = 15) to estimate the LSD-induced alterations in receptor-enriched FC maps associated with these systems. Principal component analysis (PCA) was employed as a dimension reduction strategy for subjective experiences associated with LSD captured by the Altered States of Consciousness (ASC) questionnaire. Correlations between these principal components as well as VAS ratings of subjective effects with receptor-enriched FC were explored.
RESULTS: Compared to placebo, LSD produced differences in FC when the analysis was enriched with each of the primary serotonergic and dopaminergic receptors. Altered receptor-enriched FC showed relationships with the subjective effects of LSD on conscious experience, with serotonergic and dopaminergic systems being predominantly associated with perceptual effects and perceived selfhood as well as cognition respectively. These relationships were dissociable, with different receptors showing the same relationships within, but not between, the serotonergic and dopaminergic systems.
CONCLUSIONS: These exploratory findings provide new insights into the pharmacology of LSD and highlight the need for additional investigation of non-5HT2a-mediated mechanisms.