BACKGROUND: U.S. firearm sales surged during the COVID-19 pandemic, with many purchases by first-time firearm owners. The 2023 National Survey of Gun Policy sought to understand the public health implications of this surge by comparing the purchasing motivations and firearm policy views of pandemic-era first-time purchasers to prior gun owners.
METHODS: We fielded a nationally representative public opinion survey of U.S. adults (n = 3096) from 1/4/23 to 2/6/23. We oversampled for gun owners and Black, Hispanic, and Asian Americans. Survey weights were applied to generate representative estimates. New gun owners were identified through affirmative responses to: \"Have you bought any guns since January 1, 2020?\" and \"Did you buy your first gun after January 1, 2020?\" Recent purchasers were additionally asked whether concerns of 1) political or 2) racial violence motivated their purchase. Purchase motivations and gun policy support were examined among new and prior gun owners (n = 1002) and compared using logistic regression and predictive probabilities.
RESULTS: Overall, 11% of respondents reported purchasing a gun since 1/1/20, 35% for the first time. Among recent purchasers, larger proportions of Democrat, Black, Asian, and Hispanic respondents were new gun owners than Republican or white respondents. Compared to prior owners, odds were 4.5-times higher that new gun owners\' recent purchase was motivated by racial violence and 3.2-times higher for political violence. Majority support was found for protective gun policies, with few differences by purchase recency or motivations. The only policy for which support by new and prior gun owners differed significantly was the permit-to-purchase policy (76% v. 63%, respectively). Similarly, few significant differences in support were observed when stratifying by purchase motivation. Notably, both those who reported recent purchase motivations of racial violence and of political violence expressed significantly higher support for a \"stand-your-ground\" policy compared to those who did not report such motivations.
CONCLUSIONS: Racial and political violence appear to be larger concerns among new gun owners, motivating purchasing among demographic groups with traditionally lower gun ownership rates. These findings suggest a need for safety assurances amid racial and political tensions and growing gun ownership. Gun owners\' support for such policies remains strong.

UNASSIGNED: This study investigates the association between replacement thinking, status threat perceptions, and the endorsement of political violence among non-Hispanic white adults in the United States. It explores how perceived threats to social status can drive support for extreme measures aimed at preserving white hegemony, addressing a gap in research on factors contributing to political violence, a public health concern.
UNASSIGNED: The 2022 Life in America Survey provided data for this cross-sectional study, focusing on status threat and replacement thinking among non-Hispanic white respondents. Status threat was inferred from relative income, education level, and racial segregation in residential census tracts, while replacement thinking was derived through agreement with the statement \"in America, native-born white people are being replaced by immigrants.\" The outcome was the endorsement of political violence. Analysis utilized a survey-weighted robust modified Poisson model.
UNASSIGNED: Among 5,976 non-Hispanic white respondents, 18.7 % supported political violence in at least one scenario. A U-shaped relationship was observed between racial segregation and political violence endorsement: respondents from more diverse communities were less likely to support political violence. Those endorsing replacement thinking were 233 %-229 % more likely to endorse political violence than those who did not, dependent on income levels. White respondents without a high school degree were 29 % more likely to endorse political violence.
UNASSIGNED: The study found a positive association between replacement thinking, markers of status threat, and political violence endorsements among non-Hispanic white Americans. These findings emphasize the need for research and interventions to mitigate these perceptions and prevent political violence.

BACKGROUND: Surveys have found concerningly high levels of agreement that the United States will experience civil war soon. This study assesses variation in expectation of and perceived need for civil war with respondent sociopolitical characteristics, beliefs, firearm ownership, and willingness to engage in political violence.
METHODS: Findings are from Wave 2 of a nationally representative annual longitudinal survey of members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel, conducted May 18-June 8, 2023. All respondents to 2022\'s Wave 1 who remained in KnowledgePanel were invited to participate. Outcomes are expressed as weighted proportions and adjusted prevalence differences, with p-values adjusted for the false discovery rate and reported as q-values.
RESULTS: The completion rate was 84.2%; there were 9385 respondents. After weighting, half the sample was female (50.7%, 95% CI 49.4%, 52.1%); the weighted mean (± standard deviation) age was 48.5 (25.9) years. Approximately 1 respondent in 20 (5.7%, 95% CI 5.1%, 6.4%) agreed strongly or very strongly that \"in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States.\" About 1 in 25 (3.8%, 95% CI 3.2%, 4.4%), and nearly 40% (38.4%, 95% CI 32.3%, 44.5%) of those who strongly or very strongly agreed that civil war was coming, also agreed strongly or very strongly that \"the United States needs a civil war to set things right.\" Expectation of and perceived need for civil war were higher among subsets of respondents who in Wave 1 were more willing than others to commit political violence, including MAGA Republicans, persons in strong agreement with racist beliefs or statements of the potential need for violence to effect social change, persons who strongly approved of specified extreme right-wing political organizations and movements, firearm owners who purchased firearms in 2020 or later, and firearm owners who carried firearms in public all or nearly all the time.
CONCLUSIONS: In 2023, the expectation that civil war was likely and the belief that it was needed were uncommon but were higher among subsets of the population that had previously been associated with greater willingness to commit political violence. These findings can help guide prevention efforts.

People who suffer political violence (PV) are at risk of developing mental illness, chronic noncommunicable diseases, chronic pain, and decreased life expectancy. However, these indicators have been studied primarily in war veterans and refugees. The objective of this study was to estimate the prevalence of chronic musculoskeletal pain (CMP) and central sensitization-related symptoms (CSRS) in Chilean victims of PV during the 1973 to 1990 dictatorship. A cross-sectional observational multicenter study was conducted. Three hundred twenty-five people from six centers of a Ministry of Health of Chile program participated. The presence of CMP was determined by a history of pain ≥3 months, and CSRS was determined using the central sensitization inventory. About 69.23% of the sample had CMP (76.85% of females and 56.56% of males). About 60% of people with CMP showed a high level of CSRS severity (66.67% females and 44.93% males). Females presented significantly higher proportions of CMP (p < .001), and there was an association between CSRS severity and being female (p = .004). Chilean victims of PV during the 1973 to 1990 dictatorship presented a high prevalence of CMP and high-level CSRS severity. Both conditions affected females more than males. Future studies are needed to further delve into these variables\' behavior and their influence on the quality of life in this population.

BACKGROUND: A 2022 survey in the USA found concerningly high prevalences of support for and personal willingness to engage in political violence, of beliefs associated with such violence, and of belief that civil war was likely in the near future. It is important to determine the durability of those findings.
METHODS: Wave 2 of a nationally representative cohort survey was conducted May 18-June 8, 2023; the sample comprised all respondents to 2022\'s Wave 1. Outcomes are expressed as weighted proportions; changes from 2022 to 2023 are for respondents who participated in both surveys, based on aggregated individual change scores.
RESULTS: The completion rate was 84.2%; there were 9385 respondents. After weighting, 50.7% (95% confidence interval (CI) 49.4%, 52.1%) were female; weighted mean (SD) age was 48.5 (25.9) years. About 1 in 20 respondents (5.7%, 95% CI 5.1%, 6.4%) agreed strongly/very strongly that \"in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States,\" a 7.7% decrease. In 2023, fewer respondents considered violence to be usually/always justified to advance at least 1 of 17 specific political objectives [25.3% (95% CI 24.7%, 26.5%), a 6.8% decrease]. However, more respondents thought it very/extremely likely that within the next few years, in a situation where they consider political violence justified, \"I will be armed with a gun\" [9.0% (95% CI 8.3%, 9.8%), a 2.2% increase] and \"I will shoot someone with a gun\" [1.8% (95% CI 1.4%, 2.2%), a 0.6% increase]. Among respondents who considered violence usually/always justified to advance at least 1 political objective, about 1 in 20 also thought it very/extremely likely that they would threaten someone with a gun (5.4%, 95% CI 4.0%, 7.0%) or shoot someone (5.7%, 95% CI 4.3%, 7.1%) to advance such an objective.
CONCLUSIONS: In this cohort, support for political violence declined from 2022 to 2023, but predictions of firearm use in political violence increased. These findings can help guide prevention efforts, which are urgently needed.

BACKGROUND: Youth involvement in violence and delinquency has received widespread attention in the literature. However, little is known about youth involvement in political violence, especially among youth who live in conflict areas. The current study examined the mechanisms that underlie youth involvement in serious physical and political violence. We explored the similarities and differences in the association between both individual factors (including religiosity and school commitment) and parental factors (including parental control and education), and the two types of violent behaviors.
METHODS: A large representative sample of 814 Arab male students from neighborhoods located in East Jerusalem, aged 12-18 years, completed a structured, anonymous, self-report questionnaire. The data was collected between February and May 2019.
RESULTS: Over half of the participants reported that they had been involved in political violence (55.1%) or serious physical violence (58.8%) during the previous year. Youth involvement in serious physical violence was positively associated with involvement in political violence. Furthermore, we found that greater parental control and lower impulsivity are associated with lower levels of political and physical violence. School commitment was associated negatively with serious physical violence but not with involvement in political violence. Youth work was positively correlated with involvement in political violence but not in serious physical violence.
CONCLUSIONS: The results of the current study show that Arab youth from East Jerusalem are highly involved in political and serious physical violence. The risk and protective factors identified here should inform the design of specific intervention strategies.

In this article, I examine \'underground memories\' to demonstrate how they serve as resources for resistance in the margins of Colombia. I focus on their relations with the urban fabric, looking at the ways the walls of Bogota and Medellin are used as canvases for spreading images and narratives about the conflict. I suggest that murals representing the violence serve as a repository for memories; they challenge hegemonic narratives and contribute to the recovery of public space. This analysis draws on three case studies. In the first one, I examine the impact of a mural in Bogota that denounced extrajudicial killings involving the Colombian army. The second case focuses on a community initiative aimed at collecting testimonies from residents in a marginalized district of Medellin. Finally, the last case study analyses the touristification of some of the many murals depicting the violence in Medellin. I argue that, to different degrees, all the memorial projects presented in this study challenge state narratives. Through representations of murdered teenagers, suspect military officers and even drug cartel bosses, they raise questions of social justice, impunity, illegality and the dramatic banalization of violence in the country. They broaden the narrative on the recent past, through histories and images that the Colombian state is still reluctant to unearth.

This study examines the profound impact of political violence and repression on the mental and physical health of Academics for Peace (AfP) in Turkey. The research combines quantitative and qualitative data to explore the interplay between violence, stigmatization, and health outcomes among the affected academics. This study particularly focuses on the aftermath of the State of Emergency in Turkey in 2016, which led to the dismissal of thousands of academics. We employ the World Health Organization\'s definition of violence to understand the broad nature of violent acts, encompassing power dynamics and systemic repression. The findings highlight the extensive physical and mental health consequences faced by AfP due to political violence. The prevalence of diagnosed mental illness among respondents is notably high, indicating that exposure to trauma, threats, and repression leads to severe mental distress. Anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and musculoskeletal diseases are among the common health issues reported. The research underscores how political violence disrupts psychosocial pillars including safety and security, bonds and networks, justice, roles and identities, and existential meaning, and explores how these disruptions contribute to communal mental health deterioration. It also identifies the impact on well-being of economic losses, uncertainties, and isolation from social and academic networks.

Children exposed political violence deploy resources to maintain functioning, hope and life satisfaction.
We sought to explore whether or not children promote hope and life satisfaction trough agency, psychological difficulties, potentially traumatic experiences and symptoms in Palestine.
965 children (494 males and 471 females) in multiple geographical contexts, and areas were involved.
We administered the War Child Agency Assessment Scale, Child Hope Scale, Multilevel Students\'Life Satisfaction Scale-Bref, the Strength and difficulties scale, the Child Revised Impact of events Scale, and Trauma Checklist, and performed regression analysis; hope and life satisfaction were dependent and agency, strength and difficulties, trauma symptoms and traumatic events independent variables.
Specific forms of agency predicted life satisfaction (β = 0.219; ** p < .01, social agency; β = 0.11; ** p < .01, with agency in education) and hope (β = 0.07; ** p < .05, agency on free movement), while mental difficulties (conduct problems, β = -0.09; ** p < .01; hyperactivity, β = -0.07; ** p < .05; β = -0.15; ** p < .01 with life satisfaction) (conduct problems, β = -0.06; ** p < .05, and difficulties in pro-social behaviour, β = -0.21; ** p < .01 with hope), traumatic events (β = -0.16; ** p < .01, with life satisfaction; β = -0.15; ** p < .01, with hope) and trauma symptoms (β = -0.09; ** p < .05, with hope) were negatively associated with the dependents variables.
We found a positive role of social, educational, and freedom of movement agentic behaviours in fostering hope and life satisfaction.

BACKGROUND: Current conditions in the USA suggest an increasing risk for political violence. Little is known about the prevalence of beliefs that might lead to political violence, about support for and personal willingness to engage in political violence, and about how those measures vary with individual characteristics, lethality of violence, political objectives that violence might advance, or specific populations as targets.
METHODS: This cross-sectional US nationally representative survey was conducted on May 13 to June 2, 2022, of adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel. Outcomes are weighted, population-representative proportions of respondents endorsing selected beliefs about American democracy and society and violence to advance political objectives.
RESULTS: The analytic sample included 8620 respondents; 50.5% (95% confidence interval (CI) 49.3%, 51.7%) were female; and weighted mean (± standard deviation) age was 48.4 (± 18.0) years. Nearly 1 in 5 (18.9%, 95% CI 18.0%, 19.9%) agreed strongly or very strongly that \"having a strong leader for America is more important than having a democracy\"; 16.2% (95% CI 15.3%, 17.1%) agreed strongly or very strongly that \"in America, native-born white people are being replaced by immigrants,\" and 13.7% (95% CI 12.9%, 14.6%) agreed strongly or very strongly that \"in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States.\" One-third of respondents (32.8%, 95% CI 31.7%, 33.9%) considered violence to be usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 17 specific political objectives. Among all respondents, 7.7% (95% CI 7.0%, 8.4%) thought it very or extremely likely that within the next few years, in a situation where they believe political violence is justified, \"I will be armed with a gun\"; 1.1% (95% CI 0.9%, 1.4%) thought it very or extremely likely that \"I will shoot someone with a gun.\" Support for political violence and for the use of firearms in such violence frequently declined with increasing age, education, and income.
CONCLUSIONS: Small but concerning proportions of the population consider violence, including lethal violence, to be usually or always justified to advance political objectives. Prevention efforts should proceed urgently based on the best evidence available.