The Integrated Information Theory is a theoretical framework that aims to elucidate the nature of consciousness by postulating that it emerges from the integration of information within a system, and that the degree of consciousness depends on the extent of information integration within the system. When consciousness is lost, the core complex of consciousness proposed by the Integrated Information Theory disintegrates, and Φ measures, which reflect the level of integrated information, are expected to diminish. This study examined the predictions of the Integrated Information Theory using the global brain network acquired via functional magnetic resonance imaging during various tasks and sleep. We discovered that the complex located within the frontoparietal network remained constant regardless of task content, while the regional distribution of the complex collapsed in the initial stages of sleep. Furthermore, Φ measures decreased as sleep progressed under limited analysis conditions. These findings align with predictions made by the Integrated Information Theory and support its postulates.

While falsifiability has been broadly discussed as a desirable property of a theory of consciousness, in this paper, we introduce the meta-theoretic concept of \"Universality\" as an additional desirable property for a theory of consciousness. The concept of universality, often assumed in physics, posits that the fundamental laws of nature are consistent and apply equally everywhere in the universe and remain constant over time. This assumption is crucial in science, acting as a guiding principle for developing and testing theories. When applied to theories of consciousness, universality can be defined as the ability of a theory to determine whether any fully described dynamical system is conscious or non-conscious. Importantly, for a theory to be universal, the determinant of consciousness needs to be defined as an intrinsic property of a system as opposed to replying on the interpretation of the external observer. The importance of universality originates from the consideration that given that consciousness is a natural phenomenon, it could in principle manifest in any physical system that satisfies a certain set of conditions whether it is biological or non-biological. To date, apart from a few exceptions, most existing theories do not possess this property. Instead, they tend to make predictions as to the neural correlates of consciousness based on the interpretations of brain functions, which makes those theories only applicable to brain-centric systems. While current functionalist theories of consciousness tend to be heavily reliant on our interpretations of brain functions, we argue that functionalist theories could be converted to a universal theory by specifying mathematical formulations of the constituent concepts. While neurobiological and functionalist theories retain their utility in practice, we will eventually need a universal theory to fully explain why certain types of systems possess consciousness.

Consciousness science is marred by disparate constructs and methodologies, making it challenging to systematically compare theories. This foundational crisis casts doubts on the scientific character of the field itself. Addressing it, we propose a framework for systematically comparing consciousness theories by introducing a novel inter-theory classification interface, the Measure Centrality Index (MCI). Recognizing its gradient distribution, the MCI assesses the degree of importance a specific empirical measure has for a given consciousness theory. We apply the MCI to probe how the empirical measures of the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNW), Integrated Information Theory (IIT), and Temporospatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) would fare within the context of the other two. We demonstrate that direct comparison of IIT, GNW, and TTC is meaningful and valid for some measures like Lempel-Ziv Complexity (LZC), Autocorrelation Window (ACW), and possibly Mutual Information (MI). In contrast, it is problematic for others like the anatomical and physiological neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) due to their MCI-based differential weightings within the structure of the theories. In sum, we introduce and provide proof-of-principle of a novel systematic method for direct inter-theory empirical comparisons, thereby addressing isolated evolution of theories and confirmatory bias issues in the state-of-the-art neuroscience of consciousness.

While subcellular components of cognition and affectivity that involve the interaction between experience, environment, and physiology -such as learning, trauma, or emotion- are being identified, the physical mechanisms of phenomenal consciousness remain more elusive. We are interested in exploring whether ancient, simpler organisms such as nematodes have minimal consciousness. Is there something that feels like to be a worm? Or are worms blind machines? \'Simpler\' models allow us to simultaneously extract data from multiple levels such as slow and fast neural dynamics, structural connectivity, molecular dynamics, behavior, decision making, etc., and thus, to test predictions of the current frameworks in dispute. In the present critical review, we summarize the current models of consciousness in order to reassess in light of the new evidence whether Caenorhabditis elegans, a nematode with a nervous system composed of 302 neurons, has minimal consciousness. We also suggest empirical paths to further advance consciousness research using C. elegans.
Mientras que los componentes subcelulares de fenómenos cognitivos y afectivos que involucran la interacción entre experiencia, ambiente y fisiología -tales como aprendizaje, trauma, o emociones- son identificados con cada vez mayor detalle, los mecanismos biofísicos de la consciencia fenoménica permanecen elusivos. Nos interesa explorar si organismos sencillos como los nemátodos presentan consciencia mínima. ¿Hay algo que se sienta como ser un gusano? ¿O acaso los gusanos son máquinas carentes de toda experiencia? Los modelos \"sencillos\" nos permiten extraer datos de múltiples niveles en simultáneo: dinámica neuronal rápida y lenta, conectividad estructural, dinámica molecular, conducta, toma de decisiones, etc., y así testear predicciones de las propuestas teóricas actuales en disputa. En esta revisión compendiamos los modelos actuales de consciencia para evaluar, considerando la evidencia reciente, si Caenorhabditis elegans, un nemátodo con un sistema nervioso de 302 neuronas, tiene consciencia mínima. Sugerimos además vías empíricas para desarrollar investigaciones en consciencia utilizando C. elegans.

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Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is currently one of the most influential scientific theories of consciousness. Here, we focus specifically on a metaphysical aspect of the theory\'s most recent version (IIT 4.0), what we may call its idealistic ontology, and its tension with a kind of realism about the external world that IIT also endorses. IIT 4.0 openly rejects the mainstream view that consciousness is generated by the brain, positing instead that consciousness is ontologically primary while the physical domain is just \"operational\". However, this philosophical position is presently underdeveloped and is not rigorously formulated in IIT, potentially leading to many misinterpretations and undermining its overall explanatory power. In the present paper we aim to address this issue. We argue that IIT\'s idealistic ontology should be understood as a specific combination of phenomenal primitivism, reductionism regarding Φ-structures and complexes, and eliminativism about non-conscious physical entities. Having clarified this, we then focus on the problematic tension between IIT\'s idealistic ontology and its simultaneous endorsement of realism, according to which there is some kind of external reality independent of our minds. After refuting three potential solutions to this theoretical tension, we propose the most plausible alternative: understanding IIT\'s realism as an assertion of the existence of other experiences beyond one\'s own, what we call a non-solipsistic idealist realism. We end with concluding remarks and future research avenues.

Under what conditions are material objects, such as particles, parts of a whole object? This is the composition question and is a longstanding open question in philosophy. Existing attempts to specify a non-trivial restriction on composition tend to be vague and face serious counterexamples. Consequently, two extreme answers have become mainstream: composition (the forming of a whole by its parts) happens under no or all conditions. In this paper, we provide a self-contained introduction to the integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness. We show that IIT specifies a non-trivial restriction on composition: composition happens when integrated information is maximized. We compare the IIT restriction to existing proposals and argue that the IIT restriction has significant advantages, especially in response to the problems of vagueness and counterexamples. An appendix provides an introduction to calculating parts and wholes with a simple system.

How consciousness arises in the brain has important implications for clinical decision-making. We summarize recent findings in consciousness studies to provide a toolkit for clinicians to assess deficits in consciousness and predict outcomes after brain injury. Commonly encountered disorders of consciousness are highlighted, followed by the clinical scales currently used to diagnose them. We review recent evidence describing the roles of the thalamocortical system and brainstem arousal nuclei in supporting awareness and arousal and discuss the utility of various neuroimaging studies in evaluating disorders of consciousness. We explore recent theoretical progress in mechanistic models of consciousness, focusing on 2 major models, the global neuronal workspace and integrated information theory, and review areas of controversy. Finally, we consider the potential implications of recent research for the day-to-day decision-making of clinical neurosurgeons and propose a simple \"three-strikes\" model to infer the integrity of the thalamocortical system, which can guide prognosticating return to consciousness.

Mediano et al. (The strength of weak integrated information theory. Trends Cogn Sci 2022;26: 646-55.) separate out strong and weak flavours of the integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness. They describe \'strong IIT\' as attempting to derive a universal formula for consciousness and \'weak IIT\' as searching for empirically measurable correlates of aspects of consciousness. We put forward that their overall notion of \'weak IIT\' may be too weak. Rather, it should be separated out to distinguish \'aspirational-IIT\', which aims to empirically test IIT by making trade-offs to its proposed measures, and \'IIT-inspired\' approaches, which adopt high-level ideas of IIT while dropping the mathematical framework it reaches through its introspective, first-principles approach to consciousness.

Human cerebral organoids are three-dimensional biological cultures grown in the laboratory to mimic as closely as possible the cellular composition, structure, and function of the corresponding organ, the brain. For now, cerebral organoids lack blood vessels and other characteristics of the human brain, but are also capable of having coordinated electrical activity. They have been usefully employed for the study of several diseases and the development of the nervous system in unprecedented ways. Research on human cerebral organoids is proceeding at a very fast pace and their complexity is bound to improve. This raises the question of whether cerebral organoids will also be able to develop the unique feature of the human brain, consciousness. If this is the case, some ethical issues would arise. In this article, we discuss the necessary neural correlates and constraints for the emergence of consciousness according to some of the most debated neuroscientific theories. Based on this, we consider what the moral status of a potentially conscious brain organoid might be, in light of ethical and ontological arguments. We conclude by proposing a precautionary principle and some leads for further investigation. In particular, we consider the outcomes of some very recent experiments as entities of a potential new kind.