The growing and ubiquitous digitalization trends embodied in eHealth initiatives have led to the widespread adoption of digital solutions in the healthcare sector. These initiatives have been heralded as a potent transformative force aiming to improve healthcare delivery, enhance patient outcomes and increase the efficiency of healthcare systems. However, despite the significant potential and possibilities offered by eHealth initiatives, the article highlights the importance of critically examining their implications and cautions against the misconception that technology alone can solve complex public health concerns and healthcare challenges. It emphasizes the need to critically consider the sociocultural context, education and training, organizational and institutional aspects, regulatory frameworks, user involvement and other important factors when implementing eHealth initiatives. Disregarding these crucial elements can render eHealth initiatives inefficient or even counterproductive. In view of that, the article identifies failures and fallacies that can hinder the success of eHealth initiatives and highlights areas where they often fall short of meeting rising and unjustified expectations. To address these challenges, the article recommends a more realistic and evidence-based approach to planning and implementing eHealth initiatives. It calls for consistent research agendas, appropriate evaluation methodologies and strategic orientations within eHealth initiatives. By adopting this approach, eHealth initiatives can contribute to the achievement of societal goals and the realization of the key health priorities and development imperatives of healthcare systems on a global scale.

This appearance condition of fallacies refers to the phenomenon of weak arguments, or moves in argumentation, appearing to be okay when really they aren\'t. Not all theorists agree that the appearance condition should be part of the conception of fallacies but this essay explores some of the consequences of including it. In particular, the differences between committing a fallacy, causing a fallacy and observing a fallacy are identified. The remainder of the paper is given over to discussing possible causes of mistakenly perceiving weak argumentation moves as okay. Among these are argument caused misperception, perspective caused misperception, discursive environment caused misperception and perceiver caused misperception. The discussion aims to be sufficiently general so that it can accommodate different models and standards of argumentation that make a place for fallacies.

Sleep disorders are categorized in line with traditional taxonomy. This conventional approach allows adequate management of many patients. Failure of treatment, however, may be due to nonspecificity of symptoms, coincidental association between symptoms and pathophysiological endotype, as well as co-occurrence of different pathologic mechanisms affecting sleep. Complex phenotypes often do not respond well to standard therapeutic interventions. In these cases, the clinical workup should aim at identifying treatable traits that will likely improve under targeted therapy. The challenge for sleep medicine is to further develop this innovative approach that is driven by the principles of systems medicine.

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Probability judgment is a vital part of many aspects of everyday life. In the present paper, we present a new theory of the way in which individuals produce probability estimates for joint events: conjunctive and disjunctive. We propose that a majority of individuals produce conjunctive (disjunctive) estimates by making a quasi-random adjustment, positive or negative, from the less (more) likely component probability with the other component playing no obvious role. In two studies, we produce evidence supporting propositions that follow from our theory. First, the component probabilities do appear to play the distinct roles we propose in determining the joint event probabilities. Second, contrary to probability theory and other accounts of probability judgment, we show that the conjunctive-less likely probability difference is unrelated to the more likely disjunctive probability difference (in normative theory these quantities are identical). In conclusion, while violating the norms of probability judgment, we argue that estimates produced in the manner we propose will be close enough to the normative values especially given the changing nature of the external environment and the incomplete nature of available information.

Controversies regarding the putative health effects of dietary sugar, salt, fat, and cholesterol are not driven by legitimate differences in scientific inference from valid evidence, but by a fictional discourse on diet-disease relations driven by decades of deeply flawed and demonstrably misleading epidemiologic research. Over the past 60 years, epidemiologists published tens of thousands of reports asserting that dietary intake was a major contributing factor to chronic non-communicable diseases despite the fact that epidemiologic methods do not measure dietary intake. In lieu of measuring actual dietary intake, epidemiologists collected millions of unverified verbal and textual reports of memories of perceptions of dietary intake. Given that actual dietary intake and reported memories of perceptions of intake are not in the same ontological category, epidemiologists committed the logical fallacy of \"Misplaced Concreteness.\" This error was exacerbated when the anecdotal (self-reported) data were impermissibly transformed (i.e., pseudo-quantified) into proxy-estimates of nutrient and caloric consumption via the assignment of \"reference\" values from databases of questionable validity and comprehensiveness. These errors were further compounded when statistical analyses of diet-disease relations were performed using the pseudo-quantified anecdotal data. These fatal measurement, analytic, and inferential flaws were obscured when epidemiologists failed to cite decades of research demonstrating that the proxy-estimates they created were often physiologically implausible (i.e., meaningless) and had no verifiable quantitative relation to the actual nutrient or caloric consumption of participants. In this critical analysis, we present substantial evidence to support our contention that current controversies and public confusion regarding diet-disease relations were generated by tens of thousands of deeply flawed, demonstrably misleading, and pseudoscientific epidemiologic reports. We challenge the field of nutrition to regain lost credibility by acknowledging the empirical and theoretical refutations of their memory-based methods and ensure that rigorous (objective) scientific methods are used to study the role of diet in chronic disease.

BACKGROUND: The ethical discussion about abortion has been polarized in Finland and the Republic of Ireland, two European countries with very different abortion legislation (liberal vs. highly restrictive). The aim of the present study was to analyze experiential thinking patterns and argumentative strategies in political and layperson debates regarding induced abortion.
METHODS: The content of Finnish and Irish texts (n = 493), consisting of transcripts of parliamentary debates and online texts, such as blogs, was analyzed systematically. The texts were investigated for the aspects of experiential thinking, for selected argumentative moves and for any differences in the prevalence of these features between countries or between political vs. layperson debates.
RESULTS: The Finnish and Irish discussions about induced abortion relied heavily on experiential thinking patterns and emotionally laden arguments instead of objective research data. This was evident in the very high prevalence of testimonials, narratives, loaded language and appeals to emotion in both political and layperson debates regardless of the country or the debater\'s position on abortion issue. Research data that did not support the position of the debater were relatively often omitted by confirmation bias. The Irish debaters appealed to popularity more often than the Finnish ones, while magical/religious thinking was mainly observed in the Finnish layperson discussion. The national history and the prevailing cultural and religious atmosphere of the two countries could explain these differences.
CONCLUSIONS: The abortion debate mostly reinforces the opinions of one\'s peer group rather than convinces the opposite party to change their position. The stalemate and continuation of the same arguments being repeated could be associated with experiential thinking and emotional argumentative strategies in both political and layperson debates.

Computational biomechanics models constructed using nominal or average input parameters are often assumed to produce average results that are representative of a target population of interest. To investigate this assumption a stochastic Monte Carlo analysis of two common biomechanical models was conducted. Consistent discrepancies were found between the behavior of average models and the average behavior of the population from which the average models׳ input parameters were derived. More interestingly, broadly distributed sets of non-average input parameters were found to produce average or near average model behaviors. In other words, average models did not produce average results, and models that did produce average results possessed non-average input parameters. These findings have implications on the prevalent practice of employing average input parameters in computational models. To facilitate further discussion on the topic, the authors have termed this phenomenon the \"Generic Modeling Fallacy\". The mathematical explanation of the Generic Modeling Fallacy is presented and suggestions for avoiding it are provided. Analytical and empirical examples of the Generic Modeling Fallacy are also given.

OBJECTIVE: Previous discussions of the hot hand belief, wherein athletes believe that they have a greater chance of scoring after 2 or 3 hits (successes) compared with 2 or 3 misses, have focused on whether this is the case within game statistics. Researchers have argued that the perception of the hot hand in random sequences is a bias of the cognitive system. Yet most have failed to explore the impact of framing on the stability of the belief and the behavior based on it.
METHODS: The authors conducted 2 studies that manipulated the frame of a judgment task. In Study 1, framing was manipulated via instructions in a playmaker allocation paradigm in volleyball. In Study 2, the frame was manipulated by presenting videos for allocation decisions from either the actor or observer perspective.
RESULTS: Both manipulations changed the hot hand belief and sequential choices. We found in both studies that the belief in continuation of positive or negative streaks is nonlinear and allocations to the same player after 3 successive hits are reduced.
CONCLUSIONS: The authors argue that neither the hot hand belief nor hot hand behavior is stable, but rather, both are sensitive to decision frames. The results can inform coaches on the importance of how to provide information to athletes.

There has been a paradigm shift in the psychology of deductive reasoning. Many researchers no longer think it is appropriate to ask people to assume premises and decide what necessarily follows, with the results evaluated by binary extensional logic. Most every day and scientific inference is made from more or less confidently held beliefs and not assumptions, and the relevant normative standard is Bayesian probability theory. We argue that the study of \"uncertain deduction\" should directly ask people to assign probabilities to both premises and conclusions, and report an experiment using this method. We assess this reasoning by two Bayesian metrics: probabilistic validity and coherence according to probability theory. On both measures, participants perform above chance in conditional reasoning, but they do much better when statements are grouped as inferences, rather than evaluated in separate tasks.