Since he first proposed it, Carl Jung\'s \"archetype\" theory has faced resistance from a pervasive but seldom examined set of underlying Cartesian assumptions embedded in mainstream psychology. This paradigm assumed a physical universe (and hence body) free of psyche that coincided with an essentially disembodied mind largely concerned with abstract symbol manipulation. This situation led archetype theory to remain largely within insulated psychoanalytic circles for decades. Since the 1980s, however, cognitive psychology has increasingly become embodied from a variety of standpoints. This article shows how the results of embodied cognition and spontaneous thought \"demystify\" many of the attributes Jung described in his archetype theory, making archetype theory not only more comprehensible but clinically applicable. Combining approaches suggests new avenues of inquiry for experimental research and enriches the psychoanalytic perspective.

How situated embodied agents may achieve goals using knowledge is the classical question of natural and artificial intelligence. How organisms achieve this with their nervous systems is a central challenge for a neural theory of embodied cognition. To structure this challenge, we borrow terms from Searle\'s analysis of intentionality in its two directions of fit and six psychological modes (perception, memory, belief, intention-in-action, prior intention, desire). We postulate that intentional states are instantiated by neural activation patterns that are stabilized by neural interaction. Dynamic instabilities provide the neural mechanism for initiating and terminating intentional states and are critical to organizing sequences of intentional states. Beliefs represented by networks of concept nodes are autonomously learned and activated in response to desired outcomes. The neural dynamic principles of an intentional agent are demonstrated in a toy scenario in which a robotic agent explores an environment and paints objects in desired colors based on learned color transformation rules.

Large language models can handle sophisticated natural language processing tasks. This raises the question of how their understanding of semantic meaning compares to that of human beings. Supporters of embodied cognition often point out that because these models are trained solely on text, their representations of semantic content are not grounded in sensorimotor experience. This paper contends that human cognition exhibits capabilities that fit with both the embodied and artificial intelligence approaches. Evidence suggests that semantic memory is partially grounded in sensorimotor systems and dependent on language-specific learning. From this perspective, large language models demonstrate the richness of language as a source of semantic information. They show how our experience with language might scaffold and extend our capacity to make sense of the world. In the context of an embodied mind, language provides access to a valuable form of ungrounded cognition.This article is part of the theme issue \'Minds in movement: embodied cognition in the age of artificial intelligence\'.

The \"embodied\" position on language comprehension proposes that metaphor or metonymy understanding can be presented in a distributed network based on previous sensorimotor experience. The current study attempted to investigate how children understood metaphor and metonymy.in the context of daily diet that provides rich sensory experience for children. We implemented an eye-tracking experiment where a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed design was employed. Thirty Chinese pupils aging from 6 to 12 were instructed to appreciate Chinese menus denoting metaphoric or metonymic expressions. Results of eye-tracking indicated that the dish image captioned with metaphorical names held the greatest attention of pupils, which held especially true for junior pupils. Moreover, the inclusion of Chinese pinyin in the menu served as a distractor that reduced pupils\' attention to other menu elements. This study adds to the state of the art on embodied account of language by inspecting how the under-explored children perceived metaphorical and metonymic expressions. The context of everyday diet abundant in sensory experience managed to provide a more vivid scenario on this topic. It also provides practical insight into how to design menus to invoke particular sensory experience of infants who are undergoing both physical and mental development.

With an understanding of dementia through the lens of embodied cognition and a musical sense of the dynamics of the body, a fundamental continuity of personhood is possible. With music and singing, body and mind are positively affected for persons with dementia, and with promising evidence on emotional wellbeing during choir-singing. Based on this, we carried out a pilot-study to explore the effect of choir-singing on self-reported embodied cognition in persons with dementia. As part of a Danish TV documentary on choir-singing, 17 participants with a mean age of 71 years took part in choir rehearsals and a concert. The majority of the participants had moderate/severe dementia, and 29% mild dementia. Altogether 164 self-report forms were analysed and showed a highly significant increase in embodied cognition from before to after choir-singing. The results provide initial evidence that choir-singing for persons with dementia positively influence the participants\' self-reported embodied cognition. Further, the positive effect seemed to increase in line with increasing level of dementia. The 8-item Embodied Cognition in Dementia Assessment Scales (EmDAS) showed good internal reliability and promising properties for evaluating the effect of embodied cognition. For future research, controlled trials with larger samples are needed to provide evidence of choir-singing for persons in various stages of dementia.

Artificial intelligence has not achieved defining features of biological intelligence despite models boasting more parameters than neurons in the human brain. In this perspective article, we synthesize historical approaches to understanding intelligent systems and argue that methodological and epistemic biases in these fields can be resolved by shifting away from cognitivist brain-as-computer theories and recognizing that brains exist within large, interdependent living systems. Integrating the dynamical systems view of cognition with the massive distributed feedback of perceptual control theory highlights a theoretical gap in our understanding of nonreductive neural mechanisms. Cell assemblies-properly conceived as reentrant dynamical flows and not merely as identified groups of neurons-may fill that gap by providing a minimal supraneuronal level of organization that establishes a neurodynamical base layer for computation. By considering information streams from physical embodiment and situational embedding, we discuss this computational base layer in terms of conserved oscillatory and structural properties of cortical-hippocampal networks. Our synthesis of embodied cognition, based in dynamical systems and perceptual control, aims to bypass the neurosymbolic stalemates that have arisen in artificial intelligence, cognitive science, and computational neuroscience.

Numerical cognition is a field that investigates the sociocultural, developmental, cognitive, and biological aspects of mathematical abilities. Recent findings in cognitive neuroscience suggest that cognitive skills are facilitated by distributed, transient, and dynamic networks in the brain, rather than isolated functional modules. Further, research on the bodily and evolutionary bases of cognition reveals that our cognitive skills harness capacities originally evolved for action and that cognition is best understood in conjunction with perceptuomotor capacities. Despite these insights, neural models of numerical cognition struggle to capture the relation between mathematical skills and perceptuomotor systems. One front to addressing this issue is to identify building block sensorimotor processes (BBPs) in the brain that support numerical skills and develop a new ontology connecting the sensorimotor system with mathematical cognition. BBPs here are identified as sensorimotor functions, associated with distributed networks in the brain, and are consistently identified as supporting different cognitive abilities. BBPs can be identified with new approaches to neuroimaging; by examining an array of sensorimotor and cognitive tasks in experimental designs, employing data-driven informatics approaches to identify sensorimotor networks supporting cognitive processes, and interpreting the results considering the evolutionary and bodily foundations of mathematical abilities. New empirical insights on the BBPs can eventually lead to a revamped embodied cognitive ontology in numerical cognition. Among other mathematical skills, numerical magnitude processing and its sensorimotor origins are discussed to substantiate the arguments presented. Additionally, an fMRI study design is provided to illustrate the application of the arguments presented in empirical research.

Anticipation is key to performance in many sports. By definition, anticipation as a perceptual-cognitive process is meant to inform action and help athletes reduce potential motor costs under spatiotemporal pressure. Anticipation research has repeatedly been criticized for neglecting action and raised the need for predominant testing under conditions of perception-action coupling (PAC). To the best of our knowledge, however, there is a lack of explicit criteria to characterize and define PAC conditions. This can lead to blurred terminology and may complicate interpretation and comparability of PAC conditions and results across studies. Here, we make a first proposal for a 7-level classification of PAC conditions with the defining dimensions of stimulus presentation and response mode. We hope this classification may constitute a helpful orientation for study planning and reporting in research on anticipation. Further, we illustrate the potential utilization of the PAC classification as a template for experimental protocol analysis in a review on anticipation in racket sports. Analysis of N = 115 studies reported in N = 91 articles confirms an underrepresentation of representative PAC conditions and reveals little change in PAC approaches over more than 40 years of research in that domain. We discuss potential reasons for these findings, the benefits of adopting the proposed PAC classification and reiterate the call for more action in anticipation research.

Responsibility is an essential part of our social life. Although responsibility is an abstract concept, it can be represented with concrete ideas through conceptual metaphor. Expressions like \"carry a lot of responsibility,\" \"shoulder the responsibility\" shows that responsibility can be understood as a load on shoulder that one has to carry. Accordingly, this study tests the question that does putting a burden on one\'s shoulder makes him/her more responsible or not. In order to investigate this, on each trial, we asked participants to decide between risky situations that vary in magnitude, probability of win/lose, and the ambiguity level in two conditions: \"self\" and \'group.\" Each subject wears a vest with a load on each shoulder in half of the trials. As expected, Most of participants choose to defer on the group trials more than on the self-trials. This difference between numbers of deferring in group and self conditions is called responsibility aversion. Results indicate that responsibility aversion scores are lower (responsibility-taking was greater) in the state of wearing the vest than in the form of not wearing the vest significantly. We provided evidence that the abstract concept of responsibility is linked to bodily experiences of feeling load on the shoulder consistent with an embodied cognition theory.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1354719.].