Providers are essential to the delivery of abortion care. Yet, they often occupy an ambiguous space in political discourse around abortion. The introduction of a new abortion service in Ireland invites us to look afresh at providers. Since the Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act 2018 came into force, by far the most common form of abortion care has been early medical abortion (EMA). This is typically provided by General Practitioners (GPs), with approximately 10% of GPs having chosen to provide EMA. This article draws on an empirical study of providers to investigate their motivations for, and experiences of, provision and their views on colleagues who have not chosen to provide. The study shows that for many providers, the choice to provide was grounded in a moral commitment to protecting women\'s rights to autonomy and health and ensuring that the harms of the past were not repeated. The article argues that notwithstanding increased normalisation of EMA in Ireland, conscience still has a role to play in abortion care provision and it is important to reflect on the various aspects of this role.

\"Conscientious provision\" refers to situations in which clinicians wish to provide legal and professionally accepted treatments prohibited within their (usually Catholic) health care institutions. It mirrors \"conscientious objection,\" which refers to situations in which clinicians refuse to provide legal and professionally accepted treatments offered within their (usually secular) health care institutions. Conscientious provision is not protected by law, but conscientious objection is. In practice, this asymmetry privileges conservative religious or moral values (usually associated with objection) over secular moral values (usually associated with provision). In this article, we first argue for a legal right to one kind of conscientious provision: referral for procedures prohibited at Catholic hospitals. We then argue that a premise in that argument-the principle of comparably trivial institutional burdens-justifies legal protections for some additional forms of conscientious provision that include, for example, writing prescriptions for contraception or medical abortions. However, this principle cannot justify legal protections for other forms of conscientious provision, for instance, the right to perform surgical abortions or gender-affirming hysterectomies at Catholic hospitals.

Healthcare professionals often face ethical conflicts and challenges related to decision-making that have necessitated consideration of the use of conscientious objection (CO). No current guidelines exist within Spain\'s healthcare system regarding acceptable rationales for CO, the appropriate application of CO, or practical means to support healthcare professionals who wish to become conscientious objectors. As such, a procedural framework is needed that not only assures the appropriate use of CO by healthcare professionals but also demonstrates its ethical validity, legislative compliance through protection of moral freedoms and patients\' rights to receive health care. Our proposal consists of prerequisites of eligibility for CO (individual reference, specific clinical context, ethical justification, assurance of non-discrimination, professional consistency, attitude of mutual respect, assurance of patient rights and safety) and a procedural process (notification and preparation, documentation and confidentiality, evaluation of prerequisites, non-abandonment, transparency, allowance for unforeseen objection, compensatory responsibilities, access to guidance and/or consultative advice, and organizational guarantee of professional substitution). We illustrate the real-world utility of the proposed framework through a case discussion in which our guidelines are applied.

The past decade has seen a burgeoning of scholarly interest in conscientious objection in healthcare. While the literature to date has focused primarily on individual healthcare practitioners who object to participation in morally controversial procedures, in this article we consider a different albeit related issue, namely, whether publicly funded healthcare institutions should be required to provide morally controversial services such as abortions, emergency contraception, voluntary sterilizations, and voluntary euthanasia. Substantive debates about institutional responsibility have remained largely at the level of first-order ethical debate over medical practices which institutions have refused to offer; in this article, we argue that more fundamental questions about the metaphysics of institutions provide a neglected avenue for understanding the basis of institutional conscientious objection. To do so, we articulate a metaphysical model of institutional conscience, and consider three well-known arguments for undermining institutional conscientious objection in light of this model. We show how our metaphysical analysis of institutions creates difficulties for justifying sanctions on institutions that conscientiously object. Thus, we argue, questions about the metaphysics of institutions are deserving of serious attention from both critics and defenders of institutional conscientious objection.

In the United States, healthcare providers have the federally protected right to conscientiously refuse to provide treatments or services that they feel violate their moral or religious values. This refusal of services is colloquially known as \"conscientious objection,\" which has become a polarizing topic in today\'s medical and ethical landscape. Typically, physicians exercising their right to conscientious objection do not represent a barrier in access to care for most patient populations. This dynamic shifts, however, in rural America, where there are relatively few providers. In this commentary, we discuss some of the unique ramifications that are likely to occur when rural providers invoke conscientious objection in their medical practice and how this can in turn establish conscientious monopolies for the members of their communities.

Abortion was decriminalised in Northern Ireland in October 2019. Following decriminalisation, the new regulations set out legal provision for abortion up until 12 weeks, with conditions thereafter. This cross-sectional descriptive survey, conducted in late 2019 in Northern Ireland, gathered the views of health professionals on decriminalisation, and their willingness to provide abortion services. This article provides a thematic analysis of answers to narrative questions from the online survey, and identifies priority areas of engagement with healthcare professionals. We assess how healthcare professional roles and responsibilities, abortion procedures, the foetus, and women and pregnant people were discursively constructed by respondents who are willing or unwilling to provide abortion services in Northern Ireland. We identify a narrow understanding of \'harm\', and gendered norms of women as irresponsible or duplicitous, as inhibitory factors to the normalisation of abortion services in Northern Ireland.

Bioethicists aim to provide moral guidance in policy, research, and clinical contexts using methods of moral analysis (e.g., principlism, casuistry, and narrative ethics) that aim to satisfy the constraints of public reason. Among other objections, some critics have argued that public reason lacks the moral content needed to resolve bioethical controversies because discursive reason simply cannot justify any substantive moral claims in a pluralistic society. In this paper, the authors defend public reason from this criticism by showing that it contains sufficient content to address one of the perennial controversies in bioethics-the permissibility and limits of clinician conscientious objection. They develop a \"reasonability view\" grounded in public reason and apply it to some recent examples of conscientious objection.

This column examines conscientious objection and institutional objection in Australian voluntary assistance in dying. It reviews the current legislative regimes and then examines these practices from an ethical perspective, and raises particular concerns and suggestions with how conscientious objection and institutional objection should be operationalised.

There is a global shortage of health providers in abortion care. Public discourse presents abortion providers as dangerous and greedy and links \'conscience\' with refusal to participate. This may discourage provision. A scoping review of empirical evidence is needed to inform public perceptions of the reasons that health providers participate in abortion.
The study aimed to identify what is known about health providers\' reasons for participating in abortion provision.
Studies were eligible if they included health providers\' reasons for participating in legal abortion provision. Only empirical studies were eligible for inclusion.
We searched the following databases from January 2000 until January 2022: Medical Literature Analysis and Retrieval System Online, Excerpta Medica Database, Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature, ScienceDirect and Centre for Agricultural and Biosciences International Abstracts. Grey literature was also searched.
Dual screening was conducted of both title/abstract and full-text articles. Health providers\' reasons for provision were extracted and grouped into preliminary categories based on the existing research. These categories were revised by all authors until they sufficiently reflected the extracted data.
From 3251 records retrieved, 68 studies were included. In descending order, reasons for participating in abortion were as follows: supporting women\'s choices and advocating for women\'s rights (76%); being professionally committed to participating in abortion (50%); aligning with personal, religious or moral values (39%); finding provision satisfying and important (33%); being influenced by workplace exposure or support (19%); responding to the community needs for abortion services (14%) and participating for practical and lifestyle reasons (8%).
Abortion providers participated in abortion for a range of reasons. Reasons were mainly focused on supporting women\'s choices and rights; providing professional health care; and providing services that aligned with the provider\'s own personal, religious or moral values. The findings provided no evidence to support negative portrayals of abortion providers present in public discourse. Like conscientious objectors, abortion providers can also be motivated by conscience.

While most countries that allow abortion on women\'s request also grant physicians a right to conscientious objection (CO), this has proven to constitute a potential barrier to abortion access. Conscientious objection is regarded as an understudied phenomenon the effects of which have not yet been examined in Germany. Based on expert interviews, this study aims to exemplarily reconstruct the processes of abortion in a mid-sized city in Germany, and to identify potential effects of conscientious objection.
Five semi-structured interviews with experts from all instances involved have been conducted in April 2020. The experts gave an insight into the medical care structures with regard to abortion procedures, the application and manifestations of conscientious objection in medical practice, and its impact on the care of pregnant women. A content analysis of the transcribed interviews was performed.
Both the procedural processes and the effects of conscientious objection are reported to differ significantly between early abortions performed before the 12th week of pregnancy and late abortions performed at the second and third trimester. Conscientious objection shows structural consequences as it is experienced to further reduce the number of possible providers, especially for early abortions. On the individual level of the doctor-patient relationship, the experts confirmed the neutrality and patient-orientation of the vast majority of doctors. Still, it is especially late abortions that seem to be vulnerable to barriers imposed by conscientious objection in individual medical encounters.
Our findings indicate that conscientious objection possibly imposes barriers to both early and late abortion provision and especially in the last procedural steps, which from an ethical point of view is especially problematic. To oblige hospitals to partake in abortion provision in Germany has the potential to prevent negative impacts of conscientious objection on women\'s rights on an individual as well as on a structural level.