An organizational culture of biosafety and biosecurity is critical for effective management of transboundary animal diseases. One essential aspect of this work is keeping important pathogens studied in veterinary laboratories under control. Türkiye is among the countries that are both endemic and disease-free for foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) virus, and it has a unique institute dedicated to FMD diagnosis, control, and vaccine production. To build an organizational safety culture within this institute and strengthen awareness of the importance of safe and secure handling of FMD, 4 staff members previously trained in biorisk management developed and provided trainings to all institute staff. The institute\'s 173 personnel were divided into 3 groups by job description based on direct or indirect work with FMD virus. All 3 groups received training that addressed biosecurity, biosafety, biorisk awareness, and insider threat; the trainings varied in length by group. Three-quarters (n=130, 75%) of all institute staff completed their training and were asked to complete knowledge surveys using a Likert scale survey before and after their training. A majority (n=104, 80%) of those participants completed both the pretraining and posttraining surveys. All 3 training groups\' posttraining surveys showed improved awareness above baseline scores, and all 3 groups scores reached the targeted threshold goal. Group 2 demonstrated a realization that some of the knowledge and habits they had acquired through experience were incorrect. Scores for several individual questions decreased at posttraining, and these results will need further evaluation. The overall training results prompted the institute to provide periodic updates to employees to sustain the organizational safety culture. With this study, the institute now has a dedicated group of biorisk management representatives. This work serves as a wake-up call for established institutions that rely on staff experience to foster an organizational culture of biosafety and biosecurity.

AI-enabled synthetic biology has tremendous potential but also significantly increases biorisks and brings about a new set of dual use concerns. The picture is complicated given the vast innovations envisioned to emerge by combining emerging technologies, as AI-enabled synthetic biology potentially scales up bioengineering into industrial biomanufacturing. However, the literature review indicates that goals such as maintaining a reasonable scope for innovation, or more ambitiously to foster a huge bioeconomy do not necessarily contrast with biosafety, but need to go hand in hand. This paper presents a literature review of the issues and describes emerging frameworks for policy and practice that transverse the options of command-and-control, stewardship, bottom-up, and laissez-faire governance. How to achieve early warning systems that enable prevention and mitigation of future AI-enabled biohazards from the lab, from deliberate misuse, or from the public realm, will constantly need to evolve, and adaptive, interactive approaches should emerge. Although biorisk is subject to an established governance regime, and scientists generally adhere to biosafety protocols, even experimental, but legitimate use by scientists could lead to unexpected developments. Recent advances in chatbots enabled by generative AI have revived fears that advanced biological insight can more easily get into the hands of malignant individuals or organizations. Given these sets of issues, society needs to rethink how AI-enabled synthetic biology should be governed. The suggested way to visualize the challenge at hand is whack-a-mole governance, although the emerging solutions are perhaps not so different either.

Regulation of research on microbes that cause disease in humans has historically been focused on taxonomic lists of \'bad bugs\'. However, given our increased knowledge of these pathogens through inexpensive genome sequencing, 5 decades of research in microbial pathogenesis, and the burgeoning capacity of synthetic biologists, the limitations of this approach are apparent. With heightened scientific and public attention focused on biosafety and biosecurity, and an ongoing review by US authorities of dual-use research oversight, this article proposes the incorporation of sequences of concern (SoCs) into the biorisk management regime governing genetic engineering of pathogens. SoCs enable pathogenesis in all microbes infecting hosts that are \'of concern\' to human civilization. Here we review the functions of SoCs (FunSoCs) and discuss how they might bring clarity to potentially problematic research outcomes involving infectious agents. We believe that annotation of SoCs with FunSoCs has the potential to improve the likelihood that dual use research of concern is recognized by both scientists and regulators before it occurs.

Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC) is a zoonotic pathogen, that is transmitted from a variety of animals, especially cattle to humans via contaminated food, water, feaces or contact with infected environment or animals. The ability of STEC strains to cause gastrointestinal complications in human is due to the production of Shiga toxins (sxt). However, the transmission of multidrug-resistance STEC strains are linked with a severity of disease outcomes and horizontal spread of resistance genes in other pathogens. The result of this has emerged as a significant threat to public health, animal health, food safety, and the environment. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate the antibiogram profile of enteric E. coli O157 isolated from food products and cattle faeces samples in Zagazig City, Al-Sharkia, Egypt, and to reveal the presence of Shiga toxin genes stx1 and stx2 as virulence factors in multidrug-resistant isolates. In addition to this, the partial 16S rRNA sequencing was used for the identification and genetic recoding of the obtained STEC isolates.
There was a total of sixty-five samples collected from different geographical regions at Zagazig City, Al-Sharkia-Egypt, which were divided into: 15 chicken meat (C), 10 luncheon (L), 10 hamburgers (H), and 30 cattle faeces (CF). From the sixty-five samples, only 10 samples (one from H, and 9 from CF) were identified as suspicious E. coli O157 with colourless colonies on sorbitol MacConkey agar media with Cefixime- Telurite supplement at the last step of most probable number (MPN) technique. Eight isolates (all from CF) were identified as multidrug-resistant (MDR) as they showed resistance to three antibiotics with multiple antibiotic resistance (MAR) index ≥ 0.23, which were assessed by standard Kirby-Bauer disc diffusion method. These eight isolates demonstrated complete resistance (100%) against amoxicillin/clavulanic acid, and high frequencies of resistance (90%, 70%, 60%,60%, and 40%) against cefoxitin, polymixin, erythromycin, ceftazidime, and piperacillin, respectively. Those eight MDR E. coli O157 underwent serological assay to confirm their serotype. Only two isolates (CF8, and CF13), both from CF, were showed strong agglutination with antisera O157 and H7, as well as resistance against 8 out of 13 of the used antibiotics with the highest MAR index (0.62). The presence of virulence genes Shiga toxins (stx1 and stx2) was assessed by PCR technique. CF8 was confirmed for carrying stx2, while CF13 was carrying both genes stx1, and stx2. Both isolates were identified by partial molecular 16S rRNA sequencing and have an accession number (Acc. No.) of LC666912, and LC666913 on gene bank. Phylogenetic analysis showed that CF8, and CF13 were highly homologous (98%) to E. coli H7 strain, and (100%) to E. coli DH7, respectively.
The results of this study provides evidence for the occurrence of E. coli O157:H7 that carries Shiga toxins stx1 and/or stx2, with a high frequency of resistance to antibiotics commonly used in human and veterinary medicine, in Zagazig City, Al-Sharkia, Egypt. This has a high extent of public health risk posed by animal reservoirs and food products with respect to easy transmission causing outbreaks and transfer resistance genes to other pathogens in animal, human, and plants. Therefore, environmental, animal husbandry, and food product surveillance, as well as, clinical infection control, must be strengthened to avoid the extra spread of MDR pathogens, especially MDR STEC strains.

UNASSIGNED: COVID-19 diagnosis was one of the most pressing needs during the early stages of the pandemic. Its entire procedure has inherent biosafety risks that if not properly managed and mitigated can be life threatening. Cognizant of this vital aspect, the Department of Health (DOH) imposed a biosafety training requirement to all laboratories and institutions before they could perform COVID-19 diagnostic testing. But with the mandatory lockdown, conventional face-to-face training could not be conducted. To address this need, the Biosafety Education and Awareness Training COVID-19 Online Program was offered by the National Training Center for Biosafety and Biosecurity of the University of the Philippines Manila.
UNASSIGNED: This online training program implemented a distance learning approach made available through the Canvas Learning Management System. It consisted of seven modules on biosafety that were sufficient enough to capacitate the participants with information for them to effectively implement a biorisk management system. The participants were evaluated based on quiz, examination, and case analysis. Certificates of completion were awarded to participants who passed all evaluation methods.
UNASSIGNED: A total of 3371 trainees from various medical professions passed and obtained the certificate. This resulted in >100 DOH-accredited COVID-19 testing laboratories by the end of 2020.
UNASSIGNED: The online availability of this program proved to be an effective innovative solution to a unique problem. Therefore, this training program demonstrated that biosafety training can be effectively conducted online and in a distance learning approach.

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The pervasive nature of infections causing major outbreaks have elevated biosafety and biosecurity as a fundamental component for resilient national laboratory systems. In response to international health security demands, the Global Health Security Agenda emphasizes biosafety as one of the prerequisites to respond effectively to infectious disease threats. However, biosafety management systems (BMS) in low-medium income countries (LMIC) remain weak due to fragmented implementation strategies. In addition, inefficiencies in implementation have been due to limited resources, inadequate technical expertise, high equipment costs, and insufficient political will. Here we propose an approach to developing a strong, self-sustaining BMS based on extensive experience in LMICs. A conceptual framework incorporating 15 key components to guide implementers, national laboratory leaders, global health security experts in building a BMS is presented. This conceptual framework provides a holistic and logical approach to the development of a BMS with all critical elements. It includes a flexible planning matrix with timelines easily adaptable to different country contexts as examples, as well as resources that are critical for developing sustainable technical expertise.

Novel coronavirus infection [coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)] has spread to more than 203 countries of various regions including Africa, America, Europe, South East Asia and Western Pacific. The WHO had declared COVID-19 as the global public health emergency and subsequently as pandemic because of its worldwide spread. It is now one of the top-priority pathogens to be dealt with, because of high transmissibility, severe illness and associated mortality, wide geographical spread, lack of control measures with knowledge gaps in veterinary and human epidemiology, immunity and pathogenesis. The quick detection of cases and isolating them has become critical to contain it. To meet the increasing demand of the diagnostic services, it is necessary to enhance and expand laboratory capabilities since existing laboratories cannot meet the emerging demand. Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is a BSL-2 (Biosafety Level 2) agent and needs to be handled in biosafety cabinet using standard precautions. This review highlights minimum requirements for the diagnostic laboratories opting testing of material for the diagnosis of COVID-19 and associated biorisk to the individuals and to the community.

The innovations and developments in microbiology, biomedical sciences, and biotechnology come along with the challenges of biological risk (biorisk). Biorisk is defined as the \"combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm where the source of harm is a biological agent or toxin.\" Biorisk is a borderless challenge to the global community. Hence, all universities, colleges, centers of bio-excellence, and institutions of higher learning can and should do their bit to educate technical members, academicians, students and stakeholders (LASS) for the efficient and comprehensive biorisk management (BRM) for our and future generations safety and sustainability.

Advances in biological engineering are likely to have substantial impacts on global society. To explore these potential impacts we ran a horizon scanning exercise to capture a range of perspectives on the opportunities and risks presented by biological engineering. We first identified 70 potential issues, and then used an iterative process to prioritise 20 issues that we considered to be emerging, to have potential global impact, and to be relatively unknown outside the field of biological engineering. The issues identified may be of interest to researchers, businesses and policy makers in sectors such as health, energy, agriculture and the environment.