Human standing balance relies on the continuous monitoring and integration of sensory signals to infer our body\'s motion and orientation within the environment. However, when sensory information is no longer contextually relevant to balancing the body (e.g., when sensory and motor signals are incongruent), sensory-evoked balance responses are rapidly suppressed, much earlier than any conscious perception of changes in balance control. Here, we used a robotic balance simulator to assess whether associatively learned postural responses are similarly modulated by sensorimotor incongruence and contextual relevance to postural control. Twenty-nine participants in three groups were classically conditioned to generate postural responses to whole-body perturbations when presented with an initially neutral sound cue. During catch and extinction trials, participants received only the auditory stimulus but in different sensorimotor states corresponding to their group: 1) during normal active balance, 2) while immobilized, and 3) throughout periods where the computer subtly removed active control over balance. In the balancing and immobilized states, conditioned responses were either evoked or suppressed, respectively, according to the (in)ability to control movement. Following the immobilized state, conditioned responses were renewed when balance was restored, indicating that conditioning was retained but only expressed when contextually relevant. In contrast, conditioned responses persisted in the computer-controlled state even though there was no causal relationship between motor and sensory signals. These findings suggest that mechanisms responsible for sensory-evoked and conditioned postural responses do not share a single, central contextual inference and assessment of their relevance to postural control, and may instead operate in parallel.

BACKGROUND: Major depressive disorder (MDD) is characterized by strong emotional dysregulation. Mechanisms driving the negative affect in depression may be fast processes existing on an unconscious level.
METHODS: A priming task was conducted using simultaneous EEG-fMRI measurement involving presentation of facial expressions (happy, sad, neutral) to examine the neurophysiological pathway of biased unconscious emotion processing in MDD. Priming prior to a target emotion created unconscious (16.7 ms primer) and conscious (150 ms primer) trials. A large sample of N = 126 was recruited, containing healthy controls (HC; n = 66; 37 women) and MDD (n = 60; 31 women).
RESULTS: HC showed a shorter reaction time in happy, but not in sad or neutral trials compared to MDD. N170 amplitudes were lower in trials with unconscious compared to conscious primer presentation. N170 amplitudes correlated with cortical (right fusiform gyrus (FFG), right middle temporal gyrus, right inferior temporal gyrus, left supplementary motor area, right middle frontal gyrus) and subcortical brain regions (right amygdala). The strength of N170 and brain activity correlation increased when the stimulus was consciously presented. Presented emotions did not affect the correlation of N170 values and brain activity.
CONCLUSIONS: Our findings show that MDD may exhibit biased emotion regulation abilities at a behavioral and neurophysiological level. Face-sensitive event-related potentials demonstrate a correlation with heightened brain activity in regions associated with both face recognition (FFG) and emotion processing (amygdala). These findings are evident in both MDD and HC, with lower effect sizes in MDD indicating reduced emotion recognition and processing abilities.

In prosopagnosia, brain lesions impair overt face recognition, but not face detection, and may coexist with residual covert recognition of familiar faces. Previous studies that simulated covert recognition in healthy individuals have impaired face detection as well as recognition, thus not fully mirroring the deficits in prosopagnosia. We evaluated a model of covert recognition based on continuous flash suppression (CFS). Familiar and unfamiliar faces and houses were masked while participants performed two discrimination tasks. With increased suppression, face/house discrimination remained largely intact, but face familiarity discrimination deteriorated. Covert recognition was present across all masking levels, evinced by higher pupil dilation to familiar than unfamiliar faces. Pupil dilation was uncorrelated with overt performance across subjects. Thus, CFS can impede overt face recognition without disrupting covert recognition and face detection, mirroring critical features of prosopagnosia. CFS could be used to uncover shared neural mechanisms of covert recognition in prosopagnosic patients and neurotypicals.

Identifying consciousness in other creatures, be they animals or exotic creatures that have yet to be discovered, remains a great scientific challenge. We delineate the first three steps that we think are necessary for identifying consciousness in other creatures. Step 1 is to define the particular kind of consciousness in which one is interested. Step 2 is to identify, in humans, the key differences between the brain processes that are associated with consciousness and the brain processes that are not associated with consciousness. For Step 2, to identify these differences, we focus on passive frame theory. Step 3 concerns how the insights derived from consciousness research on humans (e.g., concerning these differences) can be generalized to other creatures. We discuss the significance of examining how consciousness was fashioned by the process of evolution, a process that could be happenstance and replete with incessant tinkering, yielding adaptations that can be suboptimal and counterintuitive, far different in nature from our efficiently designed robotic systems. We conclude that the more that is understood about the differences between conscious processing and unconscious processing in humans, the easier it will be to identify consciousness in other creatures.

The study of consciousness has developed well-controlled, rigorous methods for manipulating and measuring consciousness. Yet, in the process, experimental paradigms grew farther away from everyday conscious and unconscious processes, which raises the concern of ecological validity. In this review, we suggest that the field can benefit from adopting a more ecological approach, akin to other fields of cognitive science. There, this approach challenged some existing hypotheses, yielded stronger effects, and enabled new research questions. We argue that such a move is critical for studying consciousness, where experimental paradigms tend to be artificial and small effect sizes are relatively prevalent. We identify three paths for doing so-changing the stimuli and experimental settings, changing the measures, and changing the research questions themselves-and review works that have already started implementing such approaches. While acknowledging the inherent challenges, we call for increasing ecological validity in consciousness studies.

Unconscious processing has been widely examined using diverse and well-controlled methodologies. However, the extent to which these findings are relevant to real-life instances of information processing without awareness is limited. Here, we present a novel inattentional blindness (IB) paradigm in virtual reality (VR). In three experiments, we managed to repeatedly induce IB while participants foveally viewed salient stimuli for prolonged durations. The effectiveness of this paradigm demonstrates the close relationship between top-down attention and subjective experience. Thus, this method provides an ecologically valid setup to examine processing without awareness.

One widely used scientific approach to studying consciousness involves contrasting conscious operations with unconscious ones. However, challenges in establishing the absence of conscious awareness have led to debates about the extent and existence of unconscious processes. We collected experimental data on unconscious semantic priming, manipulating prime presentation duration to highlight the critical role of the analysis approach in attributing priming effects to unconscious processing. We demonstrate that common practices like post-hoc data selection, low statistical power, and frequentist statistical testing can erroneously support claims of unconscious priming. Conversely, adopting best practices like direct performance-awareness contrasts, Bayesian tests, and increased statistical power can prevent such erroneous conclusions. Many past experiments, including our own, fail to meet these standards, casting doubt on previous claims about unconscious processing. Implementing these robust practices will enhance our understanding of unconscious processing and shed light on the functions and neural mechanisms of consciousness.

Despite its centrality to human experience, the functional role of conscious awareness is not yet known. One hypothesis suggests that consciousness is necessary for allowing high-level information to refine low-level processing in a \"top-down\" manner. To test this hypothesis, in this work we examined whether consciousness is needed for integrating contextual information with sensory information during visual object recognition, a case of top-down processing that is automatic and ubiquitous to our daily visual experience. In three experiments, 137 participants were asked to determine the identity of an ambiguous object presented to them. Crucially, a scene biasing the interpretation of the object towards one option over another (e.g., a picture of a tree when the object could equally be perceived as a fish or a leaf) was presented either before, after, or alongside the ambiguous object. In all three experiments, the scene biased perception of the ambiguous object when it was consciously perceived, but not when it was processed unconsciously. The results therefore suggest that conscious awareness may be needed for top-down contextual processes.

This review aimed to evaluate whether the association between \'anosognosia for hemiplegia\' and lesions of the right hemisphere points to a special self-awareness role of the right side of the brain, or could instead be due to a working mode typical of the right hemisphere. This latter viewpoint is consistent with a recently proposed model of human brain asymmetries that assumes that language lateralization in the left hemisphere might have increased the left hemisphere\'s level of consciousness and intentionality in comparison with the right hemisphere\'s less conscious and more automatic functioning. To assess these alternatives, I tried to ascertain whether anosognosia is greater for left-sided hemiplegia than for other disorders provoked by right brain lesions, or whether unawareness prevails in tasks more clearly related to the disruption of the right hemisphere\'s more automatic (and less conscious) functioning. Data consistent with the first alternative would support the existence of a specific link between anosognosia for hemiplegia and self-awareness, whereas data supporting the second option would confirm the model linking anosognosia to a poorly conscious working mode typical of the right hemisphere. Analysis results showed that the incidence of anosognosia of the highly automatic syndrome of unilateral neglect was greater than that concerning the unawareness of left hemiplegia, suggesting that anosognosia for left-sided hemiplegia might be due to the poorly conscious working mode typical of the right hemisphere.

For decades, researchers have been presenting participants with stimuli and instructing the participants not to respond to the stimuli in some way. Today, researchers are studying the effects that such stimuli have, not only on behavior, but on conscious experience. To this end, researchers have used several laboratory tasks, including the reflexive imagery task (RIT). In the RIT, participants are instructed not to respond in a specific way to stimuli. Participants often cannot suppress such responses. Knowledge of the conditions under which RIT effects fail to arise can illuminate the limitations of involuntary processes. We observed that the RIT effect can survive with brand symbols (Experiment 1, n = 30), which are different from everyday objects in interesting ways. In addition, we investigated systematic effects. Systematic effects are unlikely to be due to experimental demand. In Experiment 2 (n = 48), we observed that RIT effects could arise from associations learned, not across the participant\'s lifetime, but only in the laboratory. Participants studied nonsense shapes that were associated with pseudowords that preceded or followed the shapes. Afterward, these new associations led to RIT effects. In addition, RIT effects were more likely for pseudowords that preceded the shapes rather than for the pseudowords that followed the shapes (a systematic effect). In Experiment 3 (n = 46), systematic effects involving two sensory modalities were observed: olfactory stimuli were more likely to elicit involuntary visual imagery than visual stimuli were to elicit involuntary olfactory imagery. We discuss the theoretical implications of these effects.