Prior research has found that various job candidate characteristics can influence hiring decisions. The current work used experimental methods to test how a novel, appearance-based cue known as a facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR) can bias hiring preferences. A first study provides evidence for our initial hypothesis: people believed high fWHR candidates would be a better fit for blue-collar jobs compared with low fWHR candidates, who were in turn favoured for white-collar jobs. A second study replicates this initial finding and extends it by demonstrating that the effect of fWHR-derived trait inferences of strength and intelligence on hireability predictably varies by job type. Finally, in a third study, we find that this bias reverses when traditional stereotypes of blue-collar and white-collar jobs requiring physicality and intellect are subverted, finding that perceptions of the fit between face type and presumed job requirements matter most for hiring preferences. Together, these findings demonstrate how a seemingly subtle appearance-based cue can have robust implications for hiring.

Recent advances in social neuroscience have highlighted the critical role of the cerebellum and especially the posterior cerebellar Crus in social mentalizing (i.e., theory of mind). Research in the past 5 years has provided growing evidence supporting the view that the posterior cerebellum builds internal action models of our social interactions to predict how other people\'s actions will be executed, and what our most likely responses to these actions will be. This paper presents an overview of a series of fMRI experiments on novel tasks involving a combination of (a) the learning or generation of chronological sequences of social actions either in an explicit or implicit manner, which (b) require social mentalizing on another person\'s mental state such as goals, beliefs, and implied traits. Together, the results strongly confirm the central role of the posterior cerebellar Crus in identifying and automatizing action sequencing during social mentalizing, and in predicting future action sequences based on social mentalizing inferences about others. This research program has important implications: It provides for the first time (a) fruitful starting points for diagnosing and investigating social sequencing dysfunctions in a variety of mental disorders which have also been related to cerebellar dysfunctions, (b) provides the necessary tools for testing whether non-invasive neurostimulation targeting the posterior cerebellum has a causal effect on social functioning, and (c) whether these stimulation techniques and training programs guided by novel cerebellar social sequencing insights, can be exploited to increase posterior cerebellar plasticity in order to alleviate social impairments in mental disorders.

The organic halo effect describes how individuals tend to ascribe positive attributes such as low-calorie content to organic food. In this contribution, we extend the organic halo effect to the inferences individuals make about organic food consumers regarding basic personality traits. In a first study (N = 608), we tested whether describing a person as a regular (vs. rare) consumer (man vs. woman) who buys and regularly (vs. rarely) consumes organic food influences inferences of the Big Six personality traits and other characteristics. Results showed that a person depicted as a regular consumer of organic food is perceived as more honest, more agreeable, more conscientious, and more open. A second study (N = 214) with a similar procedure tested whether the effects from the previous study were due to the frequency information by manipulating the type of food (organic vs. conventional) and the high-frequency information (present vs. absent). We also included a measure of the Dark Triads traits to see whether this effect only applies to positive traits. Results generally confirmed the previous pattern. However, organic consumers were also judged as more narcissistic. Merging the two studies, we also showed that the organic halo effect was stronger for participants who frequently consume organic food. We discuss results in light of the large effect sizes and the evidence suggesting that while positive valence plays a role, it cannot explain the trait inferences\' extent and specificity.

Despite the pervasiveness of facial inferences, scholars have debated whether our face reflects valid information regarding how we actually behave. Whereas previous research has largely focused on the accuracy of facial inferences, the present research examined the validity of face-based judgments. Specifically, we tested how accurate face-based judgments are, whether the accuracy of and confidence in face-based judgments are associated, and what mechanisms potentially link facial appearance to behaviors (N = 1,386 American and Korean adults). We found that although face-based judgments could accurately predict someone\'s behavior (Study 1), participants\' confidence about their face-based judgments was not associated with their accuracy (Studies 2a and 2b). Moreover, Study 3 demonstrated that the accuracy of facial inferences is possibly due to self-fulfilling effects of facial inferences. That is, accuracy is largely driven by perceivers\' beliefs rather than by the direct association between faces and behaviors.

Face recognition benefits from associating social information to faces during learning. This has been demonstrated by better recognition for faces that underwent social than perceptual evaluations. Two hypotheses were proposed to account for this effect. According to the feature-elaboration hypothesis, social-evaluations encourage elaborated processing of perceptual information from faces (Winograd, 1981). According to a social-representation hypothesis, social-evaluations convert faces from a perceptual representation to a socially meaningful representation of a person. To decide between these two hypotheses, we ran a functional MRI study in which we functionally localized the posterior face-selective brain areas and social processing brain areas. Participants watched video-clips of young adults and were asked to study them for a recognition test, while making either perceptual evaluations or social evaluations about them. During the fMRI scan, participants performed an old/new recognition test. Behavioural findings replicated better recognition for faces that underwent social then perceptual evaluations. fMRI results showed higher response during the recognition phase for the faces that were learned socially than perceptually, in the social-brain network but not in posterior face-selective network. These results support the social-representation hypothesis and highlight the important role that social processing mechanisms, rather than purely perceptual processes, play in face recognition.

When encountering a stranger for the first time, adults spontaneously attribute to them a wide variety of character traits based solely on their physical appearance, most notably from their face. While these trait inferences exert a pervasive influence over our behaviour, their origins remain unclear. Whereas nativist accounts hold that first impressions are a product of gene-based natural selection, the Trait Inference Mapping framework (TIM) posits that we learn face-trait mappings ontogenetically as a result of correlated face-trait experience. Here, we examine the available anthropological evidence on ritual in order to better understand the mechanism by which first impressions from faces are acquired. Consistent with the TIM framework, we argue that examination of ritual body modification performed by communities around the world demonstrates far greater cross-cultural variability in face-trait mappings than currently appreciated. Furthermore, rituals of this type may be a powerful mechanism through which face-trait associations are transmitted from one generation to the next. This article is part of the theme issue \'Ritual renaissance: new insights into the most human of behaviours\'.

We tested whether there are age-related declines in detecting cues to trustworthiness, a skill that has been demonstrated to be rapid and automatic in younger adults. Young (M age = 21.2 years) and older (M age = 70.15 years) adults made criminal appearance judgments to unfamiliar faces, which were presented at a duration of 100, 500 or 1,000 ms. Participants\' response times and judgment confidence were recorded. Older were poorer than young adults at judging trustworthiness at 100 ms, and were slower overall in making their judgments. Further, the cues (i.e. perceptions of anger, trustworthiness and happiness) underlying criminality judgments were the same across age groups. Judgment confidence increased with increasing exposure duration for both age groups, while older adults were less confident in their judgments overall than their young counterparts. The implications are discussed.

As children and adults interact with new individuals, they make and revise inferences about these individuals\' traits and intentions; they build and refine psychological profiles. Here, we examined how this ability develops during early childhood and manifests during adulthood by focusing on the construction of psychological profiles for individuals who have repeatedly provided inaccurate information. Children aged 4-7 years (n = 66) and adults (n = 62) played six rounds of a game in which they needed to find a hidden sticker. In each round, an informant made a claim about the sticker\'s location, and then participants guessed the sticker\'s location. In each round, after participants guessed, it was revealed that the informant\'s claim was incorrect. Across trials, children and adults quickly lost trust in the informant\'s claims. Children\'s impressions of the informant\'s smartness, niceness, and intentions became slightly more negative across trials. In contrast, adults\' impressions of the informant\'s smartness increased, whereas their impressions of the informant\'s niceness decreased, and adults nearly unanimously judged the informant to be purposely (rather than mistakenly) inaccurate. In sum, children and adults track the accuracy of an informant over time and use this information to update their epistemic trust in the informant. However, based on the same data, children and adults end up with different interpretations of the informant\'s psychological characteristics-her traits and intentions.

What factors contribute to children\'s tendency to view individuals as having different traits and abilities? The present research tested whether young children are influenced by adults\' nonverbal behaviors when making inferences about peers. In Study 1, participants (5-6 years) viewed multiple videos of interactions between a \'teacher\' and two \'students;\' all individuals were unfamiliar to participants. In each clip, the students behaved similarly, but the teacher did not: She either smiled, nodded, touched, or shook her head at one student, and looked at the other student with a neutral expression. In Study 1, children tended to infer that students were smarter, nicer, and stronger if the teacher behaved more positively toward them. Study 2 pitted differences in the teacher\'s behavior against differences in the students\' performance. When asked who was smarter, children selected lower-performing students who received more positive nonverbal cues from the teacher rather than higher-performing students who received less positive cues. The findings indicate that an authority figure\'s nonverbal behaviors can influence children\'s inferences about others, shedding light on one mechanism guiding young children\'s evaluations of people in their social world.

Group biases guide social interactions by promoting in-group favouritism, but the neural mechanisms underpinning group biases remain unclear. While neuroscience research has shown that distributed brain circuits are associated with seeing in-group and out-group members as \"us\" and \"them\", it is less clear how these networks exchange signals. This fMRI study uses functional connectivity analyses to investigate the contribution of functional integration to group bias modulation of person perception. Participants were assigned to an arbitrary group and during scanning they observed bodies of in-group or out-group members that cued the recall of positive or negative social knowledge. The results showed that functional coupling between perceptual and cognitive neural networks is tuned to particular combinations of group membership and social knowledge valence. Specifically, coupling between body perception and theory-of-mind networks is biased towards seeing a person that had previously been paired with information consistent with group bias (positive for in-group and negative for out-group). This demonstrates how brain regions associated with visual analysis of others and belief reasoning exchange and integrate signals when evaluating in-group and out-group members. The results update models of person perception by showing how and when interplay occurs between perceptual and extended systems when developing a representation of another person.