In this paper, I grapple with the question of why we, at times, experience ourselves as not free. In doing so I outline a crude theory of agency (and our experience of ourselves as free) as a dynamic process happening in irreversible time. In attempting to answer this question, I define agency as the ability to pursue our desires, and I claim that we experience ourselves as free as long as we can do this - with the caveat that the ability to reason is a necessary criterion. I show that agency is a sociocultural development that manifests as the ability to reason gradually develops through social interaction during infancy and into adulthood. Crucially, I point out that reason is a double-edged sword: It allows us to question our actions and desires and whether they are worth pursuing, which is what elevates us to agentic beings. However, it also allows us to alienate ourselves from our actions and desires, and thus rob ourselves of our experience of freedom. Lastly, I show how our subjective freedom is lost and gained in a constant process, generated by a reflexive-relating-to ourselves. As we act, we continually encounter constraints (physical and psychological) that bar us from acting upon our desires. This compels us to reflect on our actions and desires, and so, our feeling of freedom evaporates. However, through a retrospective forgetting, or reconstruction, of the constraints we encounter, we may regain our experience of being free.

BACKGROUND: Kinesiophobia after percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) may lead to decreased compliance with rehabilitation exercises. Effective interventions are essential to overcome kinesiophobia after PCI. The aim of this trial is to investigate the clinical effects of an intervention based on the fear-avoidance model (FAM) on kinesiophobia in post-PCI patients.
METHODS: Eighty participants will be recruited in the Department of Cardiology in Hebei Provincial People\'s Hospital. And they will be randomly allocated to the test group and undergo a 5-day step-to-step intervention. The primary outcome will be the scores of a scale on kinesiophobia. Secondary outcome measures included self-efficacy for exercise, psychogenic anxiety, and the occurrence of cardiovascular adverse events. Primary and secondary outcome data will be collected at baseline (t0), on the day of discharge (t1), and one month after discharge (t2).
CONCLUSIONS: The effectiveness of an intervention based on the FAM to increase exercise self-efficacy and decrease kinesiophobia in post-PCI patients will be demonstrated. The findings of this study will facilitate post-PCI patients to participate in cardiac rehabilitation.
BACKGROUND: ChiCTR2200065649 Effect of an intervention based on the fear-avoidance model on exercise fear in patients after percutaneous coronary intervention. Registered on November 10, 2022.

People tend to remember information from which they chose better than information assigned to them-a pattern known as the self-choice effect. The present studies tested the hypothesis that choosing for another person also improves memory. Studies 1a and 1b found that choosing for self and choosing for others both enhance memory compared with having no choice. Study 2 found that choosing for others boosts memory regardless of the closeness of the other. Study 3 found no memory benefit of making easy or difficult choices for others, contrary to predictions. And in Study 4 choosing for others enhanced memory only for chosen items. A mini meta-analysis combining all studies supported the conclusion that choosing for others enhances memory on a par with choosing for oneself. These results suggest that the effects of choice on memory signify something other than self-reference, which we presume to be substantially reduced when choosing for others.

BACKGROUND: Treatment of chronic inflammatory bowel disease (IBD) aims to improve patients\' quality of life and the extent of treatment success is measured via patient reported outcomes (PROs). However, questionnaires used to collect PROs often include scales that are not specific to IBDs. Improving these scales requires a deeper understanding of patients\' lived experience. With this study we give first insights and develop hypotheses on how patients with IBDs experience their body and self and how they adjust their life plans in the context of precision medicine (PM). The guiding question is to understand what they need to achieve a good life, while facing their disease.
METHODS: We developed a conception of the \"good life\" that draws on Philippa Foot\'s \"naturalized\" approach and distinguishes six different dimensions that are relevant for a good life. This conception guided us as we conducted 10 qualitative interviews with patients suffering from IBD who were in precision medicine clinical research settings. The interviews aimed to gain insights for answering our research question: How do body experiences affect the good life of patients with IBD? We analyzed the interviews with interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA).
RESULTS: Five group experiential themes emerged: (i) Life options and plans, (ii) other people\'s responses, (iii) strategies to deal with others\' responses, (iv) perception of the body and self, and (v) perception of life as good despite suffering. We report here on three of them (i, iv and v), which are primarily relevant for evaluating the outcomes of PM care. Whereas with \"life options and plans (i),\" our study predominantly confirmed previous research, with \"perception of the body and self (iv),\" we found that some of the patients changed their relationship to their body and themselves. They perceived the body or the disease as the \"other\" and their self appears divorced from their own body. Although this might be an avoidance strategy patients use to assign responsibility for their condition and its \"disgusting\" symptoms to the \"other,\" it is important to include it in patient reported outcome (PRO) assessments.
CONCLUSIONS: We conclude with the insight that the multi-dimensional approach based on Foot\'s concept of a good life is well-suited as a basis for investigating the quality of life of people with IBD. Interviews based on this concept produced results that go beyond the understanding of health-related quality of life (HRQoL). Additionally, we offer some considerations about patients\' opportunities for achieving a good life and suggestions for further developing patient reported outcome scales.

In this article we present a review of research on the IAM Task, whereby memories are cued by self-images in the form of \"I am … \" statements, such as I am a grandfather, I am a Bob Dylan fan, I am from Darlington, I am a Psychologist. Such cues are particularly successful at accessing memories associated with the formation of specific aspects of the self. We describe the conceptual and historical context for the development of our task and review findings from other researchers who have used the same basic design. We present aggregate data and examples from across several experiments, examining how these patterns change in psychological distress and dysfunction. We also discuss research on \"I will be\" statements and how these have been adopted to examine self-related future cognitions. We conclude that the working self operates to organise memory retrieval and make accessible episodic and semantic material for self-relevant periods across the lifespan. Moreover, accessibility of self-images can be modulated by retrieval of autobiographical memories, highlighting Conway\'s bidirectional relationship between memory and the self. We provide suggestions for future research and for the first time provide a standardised version of our IAM Task for use by researchers.

Learning how others perceive us helps us tune our behavior to form adaptive relationships. But which perceptions stick with us? And when in the learning process are they codified in memory? We leveraged a popular television series-The Office-to answer these questions. Prior to their functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) session, viewers of The Office reported which characters they identified with, as well as which characters they perceived another person (i.e. counterpart) was similar to. During their fMRI scan, participants found out which characters other people thought they and the counterpart were like, and also completed rest scans. Participants remembered more feedback inconsistent with their self-views (vs. views of the counterpart). Although neural activity while encoding self-inconsistent feedback did not meaningfully predict memory, returning to the inconsistent self feedback during subsequent rest did. During rest, participants reinstated neural patterns engaged while receiving self-inconsistent feedback in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC). DMPFC reinstatement also quadratically predicted self-inconsistent memory, with too few or too many reinstatements compromising memory performance. Processing social feedback during rest may impact how we remember and integrate the feedback, especially when it contradicts our self-views.

The human capacity for symbolic representation arises, evolutionarily and developmentally, from the exploitation of a widespread sensorimotor network, along a fundamental continuity between embodied and symbolic modes of experience. In this regard, the fine balancing between constrained sensorimotor connections (responsible for self-embodiment processing) and more untethered neural associations (responsible for abstract and symbolic processing) is context dependent and plastically neuromodulated, thus intersubjectively constructed within a specific socio-cultural milieu. Instead, in the schizophrenia spectrum this system falls off catastrophically, due to an unbalance toward too unconstrained sensorimotor connectivity, leading to a profound distortion of self/world relation with a symbolic activity detached from its embodied ground. For this very reason, however, schizophrenia psychopathology may contribute to unveil, in a distorted or magnified way, ubiquitous structural features of human symbolic activity, beneath the various, historically determined cultural systems. In this respect, a comparative approach, linking psychopathology and ethnoarchaeology, allows highlight the following invariant formal characteristics of symbolic processing: (1) Emergence of salient perceptive fragments, which stand out from the perceptual field. (2) Spreading of a multiplicity of new significances with suspension of common-sense meaning. (3) Dynamic and passive character through which meaning proliferation is experienced. This study emphasizes the importance of fine-grained psychopathology to elucidate, within a cross-disciplinary framework, the evolutionarily and developmental pathways that shape the basic structures of human symbolization.

In this longitudinal study, we investigated the effects of institutionalization on the sense-of-self in individuals with Alzheimer\'s Disease (AD). We recruited two groups of participants: one living in care facilities (i.e., institutionalized-group) and another group living in their own home (i.e., non-institutionalized-group). In the two groups, we assessed the \"Who-am-I\" task on which participants were invited to provide statements beginning with the phrase \"I am\" that they felt were essential in defining who they are. We assessed this task, in the two groups, at a baseline (approximately one-month before-institutionalization) and at a follow-up (approximately six months after institutionalization). We analyzed whether responses on the \"Who-am-I\" task reflected physical-, social-, or psychological-self. Unlike at the baseline, fewer statements describing physical-, social-, and psychological-self were observed in the institutionalization than in the non-institutionalized group at the follow up. These findings demonstrate negative effects of institutionalization on the sense of self in AD.

The self-reference effect (SRE) is a memory advantage produced by encoding information in a self-relevant manner. The \"evaluative\" SRE arises when people engage in explicit self-evaluation/reflection to process to-be-remembered items, while the \"incidental\" SRE occurs when self-referential information (e.g., one\'s own name) is co-presented with to-be-remembered items but is irrelevant to a given task. Using a divided-attention paradigm, the present study examined potential differences in the attentional requirements of the evaluative and incidental SREs. During encoding, personality-trait words were presented simultaneously with the participant\'s own or a celebrity\'s name. The participants\' task was either to evaluate whether each word described themselves/the celebrity (evaluative encoding) or to indicate the location of each word (incidental encoding), in the presence or absence of a secondary task. A subsequent recognition test with a remember/know procedure showed better overall recognition and enhanced episodic recollection for words presented with one\'s own name vs. another name, with this SRE being larger in the evaluative than incidental encoding condition. Critically, divided attention at encoding attenuated the magnitudes of both evaluative and incidental SREs to a comparable degree in overall recognition and episodic recollection. These findings suggest that both the evaluative and incidental SREs are resource-demanding, effortful mnemonic benefits.

Narrative identity allows individuals to integrate their personal experiences into a coherent and meaningful life story. Addictive disorders appear to be associated with a disturbed sense of self, reflected in problematic and disorganized self-narratives. In recent literature, a growing body of research has highlighted how narrative approaches can make a dual contribution to the understanding of addiction: on the one hand, by revealing crucial aspects of self structure, and, on the other, by supporting the idea that addiction is a disorder related to unintegrated self-states in which dissociative phenomena and the resulting sense of \'loss of self\' are maladaptive strategies for coping with distress. This conceptual review identified the main measures of narrative identity, i.e., narrative coherence and complexity, agency, and emotions, and critically examines 9 quantitative and qualitative studies (out of 18 identified in literature), that have investigated the narrative dimension in people with an addictive disorder in order to provide a synthesis of the relationship between self, narrative and addiction. These studies revealed a difficulty in the organization of narrative identity of people with an addictive disorder, which is reflected in less coherent and less complex autobiographical narratives, in a prevalence of passivity and negative emotions, and in a widespread presence of themes related to a lack of self-efficacy. This review points out important conceptual, methodological and clinical implications encouraging further investigation of narrative dimension in addiction.