Peer-reviewed journals in the biological and life sciences literature have published articles that represent the biological view that a human\'s life begins at fertilization (\"the fertilization view\"). As those statements are typically offered without explanation or citation, the fertilization view seems to be uncontested by the editors, reviewers, and authors who contribute to scientific journals. However, Americans are split on whether the fertilization view is a \"philosophical or religious belief\" (45%) or a \"biological and scientific fact\" (46%), and only 38% of Americans view fertilization as the starting point of a human\'s life. In the two studies that explored experts\' views on the matter, the fertilization view was the most popular perspective held by public health and IVF professionals. Since a recent study suggested that 80% of Americans view biologists as the group most qualified to determine when a human\'s life begins, experts in biology were surveyed to provide a new perspective to the literature on experts\' views on this matter. Biologists from 1,058 academic institutions around the world assessed survey items on when a human\'s life begins and, overall, 96% (5337 out of 5577) affirmed the fertilization view. The founding principles of the field Science Communication suggest that scientists have an ethical and professional obligation to inform Americans, as well as people around the world, about scientific developments so members of the public can be empowered to make life decisions that are consistent with the best information available. Given that perspective-and a recent study\'s finding that a majority of Americans believe they deserve to know when a human\'s life begins in order to make informed reproductive decisions-science communicators should work to increase the level of science awareness on the fertilization view, as it stands alone as the leading biological perspective on when a human\'s life begins.

Scientific-consensus communication is among the most promising interventions to minimize the gap between experts\' and the public\'s belief in scientific facts. There is, however, discussion about its effectiveness in changing consensus perceptions and beliefs about contested science topics. This preregistered meta-analysis assessed the effects of communicating the existence of scientific consensus on perceived scientific consensus and belief in scientific facts. Combining 43 experiments about climate change, genetically modified food, and vaccination, we found that a single exposure to consensus messaging had a positive effect on perceived scientific consensus (g = 0.55) and on belief in scientific facts (g = 0.12). Consensus communication yielded very similar effects for climate change and genetically modified food, whereas the low number of experiments about vaccination prevented conclusions regarding this topic. Although these effects are small, communicating scientific consensus appears to be an effective way to change factual beliefs about contested science topics.

We explore messy translations of evidence in policy as a site of \'uncomfortable science\'. Drawing on the work of John Law, we follow evidence as a \'fluid object\' of its situation, also enacted in relation to a hinterland of practices. Working with the qualitative interview accounts of mathematical modellers and other scientists engaged in the UK COVID-19 response, we trace how models perform as evidence. Our point of departure is a moment of controversy in the public announcement of second national lockdown in the UK, and specifically, the projected daily deaths from COVID-19 presented in support of this policy decision. We reflect on this event to trace the messy translations of \"scientific consensus\" in the face of uncertainty. Efforts among scientists to realise evidence-based expectation and to manage the troubled translations of models in policy, including via \"scientific consensus\", can extend the dis-ease of uncomfortable science rather than clean it up or close it down. We argue that the project of evidence-based policy is not so much in need of technical management or repair, but that we need to be thinking altogether differently.

Some people hold beliefs that are opposed to overwhelming scientific evidence. Such misperceptions can be harmful to both personal and societal well-being. Communicating scientific consensus has been found to be effective in eliciting scientifically accurate beliefs, but it is unclear whether it is also effective in correcting false beliefs. Here, we show that a strategy that boosts people\'s understanding of and ability to identify scientific consensus can help to correct misperceptions. In three experiments with more than 1,500 U.S. adults who held false beliefs, participants first learned the value of scientific consensus and how to identify it. Subsequently, they read a news article with information about a scientific consensus opposing their beliefs. We found strong evidence that in the domain of genetically engineered food, this two-step communication strategy was more successful in correcting misperceptions than merely communicating scientific consensus. The data suggest that the current approach may not work for misperceptions about climate change.

There are inconsistent findings concerning the efficacy of consensus messages to persuade individuals to hold scientifically supported positions on climate change. In this experiment, we tested the impact of consensus messages on skeptics\' climate beliefs and attitudes and investigated how the decision to pretest initial climate beliefs and attitudes prior to consensus message exposure may influence results. We found that although consensus messages led individuals to report higher scientific agreement estimates, total effects on key variables were likely an artifact of study design; consensus messages only affected climate attitudes and beliefs when they were measured both before and after message exposure. In the absence of a pretest, we did not observe significant total effects of consensus messages on climate outcomes. These results highlight the limitations of consensus messaging strategies at reducing political polarization and the importance of experimental designs that mimic real-world contexts.
UNASSIGNED: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10584-021-03200-2.

Empirical research on the Gateway Belief Model (GBM) has flourished in recent years. The model offers a dual-process account of how attitude change happens in response to normative cues about scientific agreement. A plethora of correlational and experimental evidence has emerged documenting the positive direct and indirect effects of communicating the scientific consensus on global warming. I review recent scholarship and argue that the next generation of research on the GBM should focus on better justifying the inclusion of moderators on both a theoretical and empirical level, explicitly manipulate motivations to process the consensus message, model how consensus cues operate in competitive information networks and test the model in field settings using causal chain experiments.

College and university biology majors who are not climate change deniers may yet be unaware of the degree of scientific consensus on climate change and unprepared to communicate about climate science to others. This study reports on a population of climate change accepting biology majors at a large, private research university in the American northeast. Our students tended to greatly underestimate the degree of scientific consensus around climate change, to be only moderately worried about climate change, and to be unconfident in their ability to communicate about the state of the scientific consensus around climate change. After an introduction to the scholarly literature that substantiates and quantifies the scientific consensus on climate change in the context of a course on biological research literature, our students showed significant increases in their estimates of the consensus on climate change, and their estimates were more accurate. Additionally, they became more worried about climate change as well as more confident in their ability to communicate about the scientific consensus to others. These results are in line with the Gateway Belief Model, which positions perception of scientific agreement on climate change as an important driver of acceptance and motivation toward action.

Research suggests that physical activity can be used as an intervention to increase cognitive function. Yet, there are competing views on the cognitive effects of physical activity and it is not clear what level of consensus exists among researchers in the field. The purpose of this study was two-fold: Firstly, to quantify the scientific consensus by focusing on the relationship between physical activity and cognitive function. Secondly, to investigate if there is a gap between the public\'s and scientists\' interpretations of scientific texts on this topic. A two-phase study was performed by including 75 scientists in the first phase and 15 non-scientists in the second phase. Participants were asked to categorize article abstracts in terms of endorsement of the effect of physical activity on cognitive function. Results indicated that there was a 76.1% consensus that physical activity has positive cognitive effects. There was a consistent association between scientists\' and non-scientists\' categorizations, suggesting that both groups perceived abstracts in a similar fashion. Taken together, this study provides the first analysis of its kind to evaluate the level of consensus in almost two decades of research. The present data can be used to inform further research and practice.

Effectively addressing climate change requires significant changes in individual and collective human behavior and decision-making. Yet, in light of the increasing politicization of (climate) science, and the attempts of vested-interest groups to undermine the scientific consensus on climate change through organized \"disinformation campaigns,\" identifying ways to effectively engage with the public about the issue across the political spectrum has proven difficult. A growing body of research suggests that one promising way to counteract the politicization of science is to convey the high level of normative agreement (\"consensus\") among experts about the reality of human-caused climate change. Yet, much prior research examining public opinion dynamics in the context of climate change has done so under conditions with limited external validity. Moreover, no research to date has examined how to protect the public from the spread of influential misinformation about climate change. The current research bridges this divide by exploring how people evaluate and process consensus cues in a polarized information environment. Furthermore, evidence is provided that it is possible to pre-emptively protect (\"inoculate\") public attitudes about climate change against real-world misinformation.

Climate change is an urgent global issue, with demands for personal, collective, and governmental action. Although a large body of research has investigated the influence of communication on public engagement with climate change, few studies have investigated the role of interpersonal discussion. Here we use panel data with 2 time points to investigate the role of climate conversations in shaping beliefs and feelings about global warming. We find evidence of reciprocal causality. That is, discussing global warming with friends and family leads people to learn influential facts, such as the scientific consensus that human-caused global warming is happening. In turn, stronger perceptions of scientific agreement increase beliefs that climate change is happening and human-caused, as well as worry about climate change. When assessing the reverse causal direction, we find that knowing the scientific consensus further leads to increases in global warming discussion. These findings suggest that climate conversations with friends and family enter people into a proclimate social feedback loop.