从进化的角度解释自私个体之间合作的出现和维持仍然是生物学中的一个巨大挑战,经济和社会科学。社会排斥被认为是这个难题的答案。然而,以前的相关研究通常假设一次性互动,而忽略搭便车是如何识别的,这似乎太理想化了。在这项工作中,我们考虑重复互动,其中排除者需要支付监控费用以识别排除的搭便车者,并且一旦在重复互动过程中被排除者识别和排除,搭便车者就不能参与以下可能的游戏互动.我们发现,引入这种排除可以防止重复群体互动中合作的破裂。特别是,我们证明了合作者之间的进化振荡,当实施早期排除时,叛逃者和排除者可以出现在无限大的人群中。此外,我们发现,当在有限种群中考虑随机突变选择时,种群大部分时间都处于合作者主导早期排除的状态。我们的结果强调,早期排除可以成功解决重复群体互动中提到的合作之谜。
Explaining the emergence and maintenance of cooperation among selfish individuals from an evolutionary perspective remains a grand challenge in biology, economy and social sciences. Social exclusion is believed to be an answer to this conundrum. However, previously related studies often assume one-shot interactions and ignore how free-riding is identified, which seem to be too idealistic. In this work, we consider repeated interactions where excluders need to pay a monitoring cost to identify free-riders for exclusion and free-riders cannot participate in the following possible game interactions once they are identified and excluded by excluders in the repeated interaction process. We reveal that the introduction of such exclusion can prevent the breakdown of cooperation in repeated group interactions. In particular, we demonstrate that an evolutionary oscillation among cooperators, defectors and excluders can appear in infinitely large populations when early exclusion is implemented. In addition, we find that the population spends most of the time in states where cooperators dominate for early exclusion when stochastic mutation-selection is considered in finite populations. Our results highlight that early exclusion is successful in solving the mentioned enigma of cooperation in repeated group interactions.