It is an open question when procreation is justified. Antinatalists argue that bringing a new individual into the world is morally wrong, whereas pronatalists say that creating new life is morally good. In between these positions lie attempts to provide conditions for when taking an anti or pronatal stance is appropriate. This paper is concerned with developing one of these attempts, which can be called qualified pronatalism. Qualified pronatalism typically claims that while procreation can be morally permissible, there are constraints on when it is justified. These constraints often concern whether an individual is motivated to procreate for the right reasons. For instance, if someone is not sufficiently concerned with the child\'s future welfare, the qualified pronatalist will say that procreation is not justified. Moreover, David Wasserman says that this concern forms a role-based duty. That is, prospective parents have special duties to be concerned for the child\'s future welfare by virtue of the role they occupy. In this paper, I argue that a proper examination of a prospective parent\'s role-based duties entails that more is needed to justify procreation. Bringing a new person into the world leaves fewer resources for people who already need them, and the current size of the human population is unsustainable from a planetary point of view. Therefore, even if there is nothing wrong with procreation per se, the external condition of overpopulation, and its ensuing public health issues, plausibly gives rise to a role-based duty that prospective parents must account for when deciding whether to procreate.

Herjeet Kaur Marway recently proposed the Principle of Procreative Justice, which says that reproducers have a strong moral obligation to avoid completing race and colour injustices through their selection choices. In this article, we analyze this principle and argue, appealing to a series of counterexamples, that some of the implications of Marway\'s Principle of Procreative Justice are difficult to accept. This casts doubt on whether the principle should be adopted. Also, we show that there are some more principled worries regarding Marway\'s idea of a strong pro tanto duty not to complete injustices through one\'s procreative choices. Nonetheless, we believe Marway\'s arguments point in the right general direction regarding duties and structural injustice. Thus, in the final part, we suggest a positive proposal on how it would be possible to respond to the cases we raise. More specifically, we explore the suggestion that agents have a pro tanto duty to participate in eliminating structural injustice. Importantly, this duty can be satisfied, not only in procreation choices but in multiple ways.

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From the standpoint of disability advocacy, further exploration of the concept of well-being stands to be availing. The notion that \"welfarism\" about disability, which Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane debuted, qualifies as helpful is encouraged by their claim that welfarism shares important commitments with that advocacy. As becomes clear when they apply their welfarist frame to procreative decisions, endorsing welfarism would, in fact, sharply undermine it. Savulescu and Kahane\'s Principle of Procreative Beneficence-which reflects transhumanism, or advocacy of radical bioenhancement-morally requires parents to choose the child who will, in all probability, have \"the best life.\" Assuming the emergence of potent biotechnologies, procreative decision-making would be highly standardized, for prospective parents would be morally obliged to maximize select capacities, including intelligence, self-control, and hedonic set-point, in their children. Welfarism, applied to reproduction, is staunchly objectivist about what course is incumbent on decision-makers, giving no credence to first-personal values, aspirations, and experiences. Though this dismissal of individual perspectives applies to everyone, its implications for disability advocacy are especially severe. With that advocacy in view, greater attention to \"well-being\" should, therefore, be severed from the welfarism of Savulescu and Kahane.

Anna Smajdor\'s proposal of whole body gestational donation (WBGD) states that female patients diagnosed as brain-dead should be considered for use as gestational donors. In this response, Smajdor\'s proposal is rejected on four different accounts: (a) the debated acceptability of surrogacy despite women\'s autonomy, (b) the harm to dead women ́s interests, (c) the interests of the descendants, and (d) the symbolic value of the body and interests of relatives. The first part argues that WBGD rests on a particular conception of the instrumentalization of bodies that cannot be circumvented simply by the patient\'s consent and relinquished autonomy. The second part argues the importance of avoiding any harm to dead women\'s interests. The third part identifies the importance of the interest of the foetus in the light of Procreative-Beneficence principle that Smajdor overlooks. And finally, the fourth part considers the symbolic value of the human body and the interest of relatives. The main goal of this commentary is not to show that WBGD cannot be implemented; rather, it is to show that there are not any good arguments in favour of doing so.

Ethical vegans and vegetarians believe that it is seriously immoral to bring into existence animals whose lives would be miserable. In this paper, I will discuss whether such a belief also leads to the conclusion that it is seriously immoral to bring human beings into existence. I will argue that vegans should abstain from having children since they believe that unnecessary suffering should be avoided. After all, humans will suffer in life, and having children is not necessary for a good life. Thus vegans, and probably vegetarians as well, should not have children. I will consider several objections against this controversial claim, show why the objections fail and conclude that it would be best for ethical vegans to abstain from procreation.

BACKGROUND: children with perinatal human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection now survive to adolescence and adulthood and so are confronted with issues related to sexuality and sexual reproductive health. This study is aimed at determining the sexual knowledge and behaviours of these adolescents, determining their procreation intention and the impact of their age, gender and understanding of the mother to child transmission risk on their procreation intention.
METHODS: a hospital-based cross-sectional study of adolescents and young adults aged 15-24 years infected with HIV in the perinatal period, accessing tertiary care in Enugu. A pretested questionnaire was used to obtain information about socio-demographic variables, sexual knowledge and behaviour, procreation intention and knowledge of prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV. Data analysis was descriptive and a test association using fisher´s chi square was done on the variables.
RESULTS: seventy-one adolescents were studied. The majority (95.8%) were less than 20 years of age. Mean age was 17.01 ± 1.80 years with M: F ratio of 1:1.7. Nineteen (26.8%) were sexually active with 15 (78.9%) having single partners. About 80% had their first sexual activities before the age of 18 years. Fifty-six (78.9%) received some form of sex education. Only gender and socio-economic status was significantly related to marriage and procreation intentions of respondents.
CONCLUSIONS: there´s need for sustained/intensive education programs and policy on sexual practices with focus on perinatally infected adolescents who may not be well informed on risk and consequences of their sexual preferences.

Whole body gestational donation offers an alternative means of gestation for prospective parents who wish to have children but cannot, or prefer not to, gestate. It seems plausible that some people would be prepared to consider donating their whole bodies for gestational purposes just as some people donate parts of their bodies for organ donation. We already know that pregnancies can be successfully carried to term in brain-dead women. There is no obvious medical reason why initiating such pregnancies would not be possible. In this paper, I explore the ethics of whole-body gestational donation. I consider a number of potential counter-arguments, including the fact that such donations are not life-saving and that they may reify the female reproductive body. I suggest if we are happy to accept organ donation in general, the issues raised by whole-body gestational donation are differences of degree rather than substantive new concerns. In addition, I identify some intriguing possibilities, including the use of male bodies-perhaps thereby circumventing some potential feminist objections.

Reconstruction of the endometrium in patients with endometrial atrophy and Asherman\'s syndrome using Wharton\'s jelly-derived mesenchymal stem cells (WJ-MSCs).
Prospective pilot study, with the inclusion of two patients.
After administration of WJ-MSCs into the uterine cavity, endometrial reconstruction was achieved in both patients. Pregnancy was achieved in one of them, after transfer of a frozen embryo, completed by delivery around the due date.
Endometrial atrophy and Asherman\'s syndrome, is one of the most frustrating clinical situations we face in assisted reproductive procedures. The use of Wharton\'s jelly-derived mesenchymal stem cells in restoring the normal function of the endometrium, could become an easy and accessible therapeutic medal, for this endometrial dysfunction, which is so difficult to treat.

Preconception genetic testing is carried out to inform couples on their carrier status for recessive or X-linked genetic disease, and aims to extend their possible reproductive choices. These genetic tests are available in several countries and are currently being considered in France in the context of bioethics laws revision, raising multiple medical, ethical, and societal concerns. To provide insights into questions relative to preconception genetic testing implementation, we conducted, through a qualitative research methodology, individual and group interviews in families with experience of genetic disease, physicians and researchers in the human and social sciences, and an ethics committee. In particular, the respondents agreed on the importance of a free test and an informed choice. The economic stakes of the test appeared to be a major determinant of its development for the participants. The use of genetic data has been a source of raised fears of a eugenic drift. The remaining questions were relative to the pathologies to be tested, the access to the test, its supervision, the role of physicians and in particular of primary care professionals. Based on individual opinions and collective debates, our work delimits the challenges of preconception genetic testing implementation in France through a qualitative methodology, providing further data necessary to its introduction in the health care system.