Previous research has shown that moral emotions interact with self-control and unstructured socializing in explaining rule-breaking behavior. High levels of moral emotions appear to weaken the effects of both self-control and unstructured socializing, in explaining rule-breaking behavior. The current study examined whether these interactions also affect rule-breaking behavior that is explicitly committed with friends. In addition, three operationalizations of moral emotions were distinguished. Data were collected from N = 169 adolescents (54% female; mean = 14.95 years; SD = 1.7) using a self-report questionnaire battery. Results indicate that high levels of anticipated emotions in moral conflicts (AEMC) attenuate the effect of low self-control on one\'s own rule-breaking behavior. In contrast, high levels of both guilt- and shame-proneness enhanced the effect of unstructured socializing on one\'s own and rule-breaking with friends. The limitations of the study, ideas for future research, and practical implications are also discussed.

Moral injury has emerged as an important construct for understanding the distress experienced in the aftermath of a moral violation, initially among combat veterans and increasingly among other populations, such as healthcare workers and first responders. While numerous measures have been validated to assess for exposure to potentially morally injurious events and/or sequelae, additional tools are needed to facilitate nuanced discussion of the experience of moral injury in therapeutic encounters. The Moral Injury Experience Wheel (MIEW; Fleming, 2023) is an infographic instrument that is designed to elicit precise language and help differentiate feelings in an effort to process morally perplexing circumstances. This paper describes the contents and potential clinical applications of a newly developed manual to guide the use of the MIEW. The MIEW and manual are designed to be used independently or alongside existing moral injury interventions. A case study featuring the use of the MIEW and manual demonstrates how the tools can be used in a professional healthcare setting. Recommendations for moral injury care practitioners are provided.

Background: Moral distress is common in neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) nurses. Purpose: The purpose of this study was to evaluate the relationships between NICU nurses\' moral foundations, moral emotions, and moral distress. Research design and method: This is an observational cross-sectional self-report questionnaire study. Participants and research context: One hundred and forty-two (24%) of 585 Level 3-4 NICU nurses completed pen-and-paper self-report measures of moral foundations (harm, fairness, ingroup, authority, and purity) (Moral Foundations Questionnaire-20), proneness to self-conscious moral emotions (guilt and shame) (modified Personal Feelings Questionnaire-2), and moral distress (futile care, compromised care, and untruthful care) (modified Revised Moral Distress Scale). Ethical considerations: Participation was voluntary and anonymous. The ethics committees of the participating hospitals approved the study protocol (HREC Reference: LNR/18/SCHN/316). Results: Non-parametric statistical analyses showed medium to large correlations between moral foundations and moral emotions. Moral foundations and moral emotions had trivial to small correlations with moral distress. Using a liberal p-value of <.10 for statistical significance because of the small sample size, harm (rs = 0.22) and fairness (rs = 0.16) predicted futile care, ingroup predicted compromised care (rs = 0.19) and untruthful care (rs = 0.15), and purity predicted untruthful care (rs = 0.15). Guilt-proneness predicted futile care (rs = 0.15). Shame-proneness did not predict moral distress. Conclusion: The correlations between moral foundations and moral emotions were significant. Moral foundations and guilt-proneness predicted one or more dimensions of moral distress. The smaller than expected effect sizes may have been owing to how moral foundations, moral emotions, and moral distress were conceptualized and measured, or to moral disengagement, including NICU nurses\' possible reluctance to countenance aversive but morally warranted feelings of guilt and especially shame. Understanding the nature of these relationships may complement the efforts of NICU administrators, educators, counsellors, and nurses themselves to mitigate moral distress.

Despite being of undisputed importance, there is no consensus on what emotions are, with the majority of research that constructs ideas about them being colored by a particular worldview. This conceptual article examines the case for conducting an Islamic analysis of emotion. It might seem a peculiar area to examine; what would be the need to analyze such a universal psychological concept through the lens of a particular religion? Three points are used to argue for this endeavor. To begin with, this article highlights the relative instability of the term; there is yet no universally agreed upon definition of what emotions are, and which human processes they contribute to. As the concept is still being defined, there is merit in engaging with the discussion, particularly given the relative absence of metaphysics from the debate. Secondly, specificities relating to emotions and how they have conceptualized are considered. This section delves into the way in which variable factors, such as culture, language, and worldview, influence how emotions manifest. The overarching point argued for here is that how emotions are experienced, and even which emotions are experienced, are shaped by factors that are not consistent across time and space. Accordingly, different worldviews will formulate different \"emotional palates\" and \"emotional ideologies\"; different groups of people will understand and engage with emotions differently. Thirdly, a broader discussion ensues pertaining to the nature of science, psychology, and their relationship with secularity. This discussion includes critique of the idea that forces such as secularism and scientific materialism have been \"discovered\" and are therefore value-neutral. Accordingly, understandings of emotions to have emerged from the Academy, and contemporary psychology, are value-laden. This section also looks at the origins of science in order to determine whether it is inherently atheistic or areligious, and therefore antagonistic to a religious worldview. The section also challenges the apparent secularity of psychology and key psychologists. A range of other facets pertaining to how the emotions have been conceptualized, such as their relational core, their interaction with moral faculties, and their enmeshment with what is important to individuals and groups, are also considered.

Philanthropy is essential to public goods such as education and research, arts and culture, and the provision of services to those in need. Providers of public goods commonly struggle with the dilemma of whether to accept donations from morally tainted donors. Ethicists also disagree on how to manage tainted donations. Forgoing such donations reduces opportunities for societal well-being and advancement; however, accepting them can damage institutional and individual reputations. Half of professional fundraisers have faced tainted donors, but only around a third of their institutions had relevant policies (n = 52). Here, we draw on two large samples of US laypeople (ns = 2,019; 2,566) and a unique sample of experts (professional fundraisers, n = 694) to provide empirical insights into various aspects of tainted donations that affect moral acceptability: the nature of the moral taint (criminal or morally ambiguous behavior), donation size, anonymity, and institution type. We find interesting patterns of convergence (rejecting criminal donations), divergence (professionals\' aversion to large tainted donations), and indifference (marginal role of anonymity) across the samples. Laypeople also applied slightly higher standards to universities and museums than to charities. Our results provide evidence of how complex moral trade-offs are resolved differentially, and can thus motivate and inform policy development for institutions dealing with controversial donors.

Community characteristics can explain differences in bullying rates between schools. Underpinned by the social-ecological model, this study examined the relationships among community violence exposure (CVE), moral emotions (guilt and sympathy), and bullying in adolescents. We also explored the moderating role of gender in these relationships. The sample included 915 adolescents (48.6% female and 51.4% male) aged 11-16 (M age = 13.76, SD = 0.82). Students responded to the self-report measures. We used a latent variable structural equation modeling (SEM) approach to examine the relationships between variables. The SEM indicated that CVE was negatively associated with moral emotions (guilt and sympathy) and positively associated with bullying. In addition, CVE had a negative indirect association with bullying through their negative relationship with moral emotions. The structural model is equivalent for both genders, suggesting gender does not moderate these relationships. These findings indicate that CVE are associated with differences in school bullying rates.

Previous research on moral judgment (MJ) has focused on understanding the cognitive processes and emotional factors that influence different types of moral judgment tasks, such as personal and impersonal dilemmas. However, few studies have distinguished between the emotions related to cognition and the complex emotions specifically caused by MJ tasks. This gap in knowledge is important to address to have a better understanding of how emotions influence moral judgment. The aim of this study was to investigate the influence of fear and the role of moral emotions on MJ. Data were collected from 145 participants through jsPsych and analyzed using mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA) and correlation analysis. The study found that individuals who were triggered by the fear increased the number of utilitarian moral judgments in personal moral scenarios and lengthened the cognitive process, but not in impersonal moral dilemmas. Hence, we speculate that fear may play a cognitive role in personal moral dilemmas and an emotional role in impersonal moral dilemmas. Another finding is that the complex moral emotions arising from the moral decision-making process may affect the effectiveness of fear and potentially influence moral judgments. However, this study adopts a cautious attitude toward these discoveries, and further verification of this hypothesis should be conducted in the future.

Moral and self-conscious emotions like guilt and shame can function as internal negative experiences that punish or deter bad behaviour. Individual differences exist in people\'s tendency to experience guilt and shame. Being disposed to experience guilt and/or shame may predict students\' expectations of their emotional reactions to engaging in immoral behaviour in the form of academic misconduct, and thus dissuade students from intending to engage in this behaviour. In this study, students\' (n = 459) guilt and shame proneness, their expectations of feeling guilt and shame if they engaged in academic misconduct, and their intentions to engage in academic misconduct were measured. Three of the four facets of the guilt and shame proneness scale [GASP: Guilt-Negative-Behavior-Evaluation (NBE), Guilt-Repair, Shame-Negative-Self-Evaluation (NSE)] had significant negative correlations with academic misconduct intentions, and these relationships were mediated by anticipating shame and guilt related to engaging in academic misconduct. These results suggest that for some students expecting to experience negative moral emotions when engaging in academic misconduct may protect them from breaching ethical assessment rules.

Do moral beliefs motivate action? To answer this question, extant arguments have considered hypothetical cases of association (dissociation) between agents\' moral beliefs and actions. In this paper, I argue that this approach can be improved by studying people\'s actual moral beliefs and actions using empirical research methods. I present three new studies showing that, when the stakes are high, associations between participants\' moral beliefs and actions are actually explained by co-occurring but independent moral emotions. These findings suggest that moral beliefs themselves have little or no motivational force, supporting the Humean picture of moral motivation.

Self-conscious emotions, such as shame and guilt, play a fundamental role in regulating moral behaviour and in promoting the welfare of society. Despite their relevance, the neural bases of these emotions are uncertain. In the present meta-analysis, we performed a systematic literature review in order to single out functional neuroimaging studies on healthy individuals specifically investigating the neural substrates of shame, embarrassment, and guilt. Seventeen studies investigating the neural correlates of shame/embarrassment and seventeen studies investigating guilt brain representation met our inclusion criteria. The analyses revealed that both guilt and shame/embarrassment were associated with the activation of the left anterior insula, involved in emotional awareness processing and arousal. Guilt-specific areas were located within the left temporo-parietal junction, which is thought to be involved in social cognitive processes. Moreover, specific activations for shame/embarrassment involved areas related to social pain (dorsal anterior cingulate and thalamus) and behavioural inhibition (premotor cortex) networks. This pattern of results might reflect the distinct action tendencies associated with the two emotions.