UNASSIGNED: Spill response procedures are an important aspect of laboratories where infectious materials are handled. The decades-old conventional method of spill cleanup uses paper towels to cover the spill. It requires 2 staff and involves a considerable amount of bending and squatting and being able to balance in those positions while wearing personal protective equipment (PPE). In this article, we describe a method that simplifies spill cleanup and compares it to the conventional method. The simplified method can be easily conducted by 1 person, takes about half the time, generates less waste, and reduces the amount of time spent in contaminated areas.
UNASSIGNED: The objective is to describe a modified, simple method of spill cleanup.
UNASSIGNED: A mock spill was created and a spill response initiated per the institution\'s procedure. The simplified procedure uses a pail filled with decontaminant and a household mop dripping with the decontaminant. Mopping is done from the noncontaminated area toward the contaminated area so the spill does not spread. Mopping is done more than once, and all the materials used, including the mop(s), are disposed as biohazardous material.
UNASSIGNED: The simplified spill cleanup process described here can be performed by just one person and does not require bending and squatting while wearing PPE. The kit is very simple, consisting of a pail and a mop, which are common household tools familiar to most people.
UNASSIGNED: The mop-and-pail methodology is simple, requires only one staff member, generates less biological waste, and requires less training and practice while effectively cleaning the spill.

One of the most important requirements for the personnel of microbiological laboratories working with pathogenic and infectious agents is the observance of precautionary measures and the implementation of a set of preventive measures, collectively interpreted as biological safety (biosafety). To a large extent, biosafety problems are also relevant for all clinical laboratories working with biosubstrates, with the potential threat of containing pathogens of bloodborne infections in them. On December 30, 2020, the President of the Russian Federation signed Federal Law № 492 «On the Biological Safety of the Russian Federation» (№ 492-FZ), which regulates the basic legal norms and regulation of biosafety issues, as well as a list of measures to prevent the risks of the spread of infections due to accidents, bioterrorist acts and sabotage. The current pandemic of the coronavirus infection COVID-19 has demonstrated, on the one hand, the epidemiological vulnerability of the single world space, and on the other hand, the decisive influence of biological emergencies on the emergence of negative political and economic processes in the world community. In this regard, the issues of ensuring biosafety in the work of microbiological laboratories in the context of protecting personnel and the environment from accidental or unintentional spread of infections are relevant. Working with pathogenic biological agents in microbiological laboratories is constantly associated with the risk of accidents and possible laboratory infection (laboratory-acquired infections) of employees, environmental pollution if the requirements of regulatory documents on biological safety are not met. In accordance with the requirements of № 492-FZ, in order to prevent biological threats, it is necessary to create a system for monitoring biological risks in microbiological laboratories when working with any infected material.

Biological agents and infectious pathogens have the potential to cause very significant harm, as the natural occurrence of disease and pandemics makes clear. As a way to better understand the risk of Global Catastrophic Biological Risks due to human activities, rather than natural sources, this paper reports on a dataset of 71 incidents involving either accidental or purposeful exposure to, or infection by, a highly infectious pathogenic agent. There has been significant effort put into both reducing the risk of purposeful spread of biological weapons, and biosafety intended to prevent the exposure to, or release of, dangerous pathogens in the course of research. Despite these efforts, there are incidents of various types that could potentially be controlled or eliminated by different lab and/or bioweapon research choices and safety procedures. The dataset of events presented here was compiled during a project conducted in 2019 to better understand biological risks from anthropic sources. The events which are listed are unrelated to clinical treatment of naturally occurring outbreaks, and are instead entirely the result of human decisions and mistakes. While the events cover a wide range of cases, the criteria used covers a variety of events previously scattered across academic, policy, and other unpublished or not generally available sources.

Vaccinia virus, the prototype Orthopoxvirus, is widely used in the laboratory as a model system to study various aspects of viral biology and virus-host interactions, as a protein expression system, as a vaccine vector, and as an oncolytic agent. The ubiquitous use of vaccinia viruses in laboratories around the world raises certain safety concerns because the virus can be a pathogen in individuals with immunological and dermatological abnormalities, and on occasion can cause serious problems in normal hosts. This chapter reviews standard operating procedures when working with vaccinia virus and reviews published cases of accidental laboratory infections with poxviruses.